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PROCEEDINGS 

OF  THE 

;¥-  OF    POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

IN  THE  CITY  OF  NEW  YORK 


Volume  VI].  APW4r+9*6--  [Namber  3 


CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN 


BY 

ERNEST  WILSON  CLEMENT 


The  Academy  of  Political  Science 

Columbia  University,  New  York 

1916 


To  HON.  SHO  NEMOTO,  M.  P. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Preface        

Bibliography    .        .        . 
Pronunciation  of  Japanese  Words  . 

Introduction 

I.  The  Imperial  Prerogative 
II.  The  Privy  Council 

III.  The  "ErpF.R  ■^tat^mf^"  .         | 

IV.  The  Cabinet    .        .        . 
V.  The  Imperial  Diet    .   , 

VI.  The  Judiciary 

VII.  The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Subjects 

VIII.  Political  Parties 

IX.  Public  Opinions  . 

X.  Conclusion 

Appendix  : 

I.  Constitution  of  the  Empire  of  Japan  £. 
II.  Imperial  Ordinance  Concerning  the  House  of  Peers 

III.  Law  of  the  l^Iouses.  ..... 

IV.  Law  of  Finance  ...... 

V.  New  Law  of  Election  (1902) 


*AGE 
I 

2 
2 
3 

5 
10 

13 
18 

35 
38 
40 

43 
46 

54 
63 
65 
78 
84 


VI.  Imperial  House  Law  ......   103 


35605o 


PREFACE 

This  pamphlet  is  an  attempt  to  give  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the 
progress  and  position  of  constitutional  government  and  repre- 
sentative institutions  in  Japan.  It  does  not  pretend  to  enter 
into  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  various  questions  which  natur- 
ally arise;  and  yet  it  may  serve  as  an  introduction  to  a  more 
thorough  study.  The  Appendix  contains  the  principal  docu- 
ments necessary  for  such  a  study.  It  may,  indeed,  seem  that 
the  Appendix  is  disproportionately  large  and  that  an  opera- 
tion should  have  been  performed.  But  the  material  there  re- 
produced is  of  such  importance  that  it  could  not  well  have 
been  omitted  or  abridged.  If  any  desire  a  more  detailed 
study  of  the  subject  of  this  pamphlet,  they  are  referred  to 
Uyehara's  Political  Development  of  Japan,  from  which  we  have 
often  quoted.  We  only  hope  that  the  brief  study  of  this 
pamphlet  may  arouse  a  deep  interest  in  more  profound  in- 
vestigation. 

Ernest  Wilson  Clement. 

Tokyo,  Japan,  December  30,  1915. 

(321) 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Ito,  Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  Empire  of  Japan,  Igirisu  Horitsu 

Gakko,  Tokyo,  1889. 
Clement,  Constitutional  Government  in  Japan,  American  Academy  of  Political 

and  Social  Science,  Philadelphia,   1903. 
Kawakami,  The  Political  Ideas  of  Modern  Japan,  Shokwabo,  Tokyo,  1903. 
Iyenaga,  The  Constitutional  Development  of  Japan  (1853-1881),  Johns  Hopkins 

Press,  Baltimore,  1891. 
Uyehara,    The    Political    Development    of    Japan    (1867-1909),    Dutton,    New 

York,  1910. 
McLaren,  Japanese  Government  Documents,  Asiatic  Society  of  Japan,  Tokyo, 

1914. 
Satoh,  Evolution  of  Political  Parties  in  Japan,  Kawakami,  Tokyo,  1914- 
Clement,   Political    Parties   in    Japan,   Political   Science    Quarterly,    December, 

1912. 
Takenob(u)  and  Kawakami,  Japan  Year  Book,  Tokyo,  1912  and  1914- 
Hozumi,    Ancestor-Worship    and    Japanese    Law,    Maruzen    Kabushiki-Kaisha, 

Tokyo,  1912. 
Masaoka,  Japan  to  America,  Putnam,  New  York,  19 14. 

PRONUNCIATION  OF  JAPANESE  WORDS. 

a  like  a  in  father  ai  as  in  aisle 

e  like  e  in  men  ei  as  in  -weigh 

i  like  i  in  pin         '  au  ")   mm      .     ,   _ 

r  y  as  o  in  bone 

o  like  o  in  pony  0     \ 

u  like  00  in  book  u  as  00  in  moon 

i  in  the  middle  of  a  word  and  u  in  the  middle  or  at  the  end  of  a  word  are 
sometimes  almost  inaudible. 

The  consonants  are  all  sounded,  as  in  English :  g,  however,  has  only  the 
hard  sound,  as  in  give,  although  the  nasal  ng  is  often  heard ;  ch  and  s  are 
always  soft,  as  in  check  and  sin;  and  z  before  u  has  the  sound  of  dz.  In  the 
case  of  double  consonants,  each  one  must  be  given  its  full  sound. 

There  are  as  many  syllables  as  vowels.  There  is  practically  no  accent ;  but 
care  must  be  taken  to  distinguish  between  o  and  5,  u  and  u,  of  which  the 
second  is  more  prolonged  than  the  first. 

Be  sure  to  avoid  the  flat  sound  of  a,  which  is  always  pronounced  ah. 

Japanese  words,  especially  names,  should  almost  always  be  divided  into 
syllables  with  a  vowel  at  the  end  of  each  syllable.  The  principal  exception  is 
in  the  case  of  double  consonants ;  there  the  syllabic  division  is  made  between 
the  two  consonants:  n  may  also  close  a  syllable. 

(322) 


INTRODUCTION 

The  Japanese  Constitution  was  promulgated  February  u, 
1889;  the  first  national  election  for  members  of  the 
Lower  House  of  the  Imperial  Diet  was  held  on  July  4, 
1890;  and  the  first  session  of  the  Japanese  Diet  was  formally 
opened  on  November  29,  1890.  According  to  the  Preamble 
of  the  Constitution,  the  time  of  the  opening  of  that  first  session 
was  to  be  "  the  date  when  the  present  Constitution  comes  into 
force  ",  Of  course,  that  instrument  was  practically  in  force 
as  soon  as  it  was  promulgated,  because  preparations  were  begun 
to  carry  out  in  detail  its  provisions,  as  well  as  the  provisions 
of  the  Imperial  House  Law,  the  Ordinance  concerning  the 
House  of  Peers,  the  Law  of  the  (Two)  Houses,  the  Law  of  the 
Election  of  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  the 
Law  of  Finance, — all  of  which  were  promulgated  in  connection 
with  the  Constitution.1 

In  any  event  (without  trying  to  be  too  exact  mathemati- 
cally), it  is  perfectly  proper  to  assume  that,  by  191 5,  twenty- 
five  years  of  constitutional  government  in  modern  Japan  have 
passed.  This  is,  then,  a  suitable  time  to  be  "  looking  back- 
ward "  over  the  quarter  of  a  century,  to  attempt  to  portray  the 
progress  of  constitutionalism  in  Japan,  and  to  determine  its 
present  status.  For  this  purpose,  the  heading  "  Constitutional 
Imperialism  "  has  been  adopted.  It  should  be  stated  that  there 
was  a  slight  inclination  to  make  the  title  "  Imperialistic  Con- 
stitutionalism."    But  as  Imperialism  was  first  chronologically/ 


and  is  still  first  theoretically  and  practically,  with  such  modi- 
fications as  have  been  introduced  by  the  Constitution,  it 
seemed  more  appropriate,  from  every  point  of  view,  to  make 
"Constitutional"  an  adjective  modifying  ''Imperialism". 

This  fact  should  be  borne  in  mind  by  American  readers,  who 
must  not  expect  to  find,  in  the  Japanese  political  system,  such 

1  Those  documents  are  printed  in  full  in  the  Appendix  of  this  book,  except 
the  Imperial  House  Law,  which  is  given  only  in  part. 

(323) 


4  INTRODUCTION 

popular  rights  and  privileges  as  they  enjoy,  or  such  as  the 
English  enjoy  under  a  constitutional  monarchy.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  the  Japanese  constitution  was  framed  prin- 
cipally from  German  models,  as  best  suited  to  the  conditions 
in  Japan  at  that  time.  The  American  Republic  and  the 
British  Empire  were  too  radical  in  their  political  constitutions 
to  be  followed  by  a  nation  emerging  from  centuries  of  feudal- 
ism and  absolute  imperialism.  The  modifications  of  imperial- 
ism could  not  be  too  extreme  or  too  sudden,  but  must  be  slight 
and  gradual.  The  people  as  a  whole  must  be  educated  up  to 
the  point  where  they  could  understand  and  appreciate,  not 
only  political  rights  and  privileges,  but  also  political  duties  and 
responsibilities.  Fukuzawa,  the  great  Commoner  of  Japan, 
once  wrote  as  follows: 

Owing  to  the  peculiar  customs  which  have  for  so  long  existed,  we 
are  not  at  all  sensitive  about  our  privileges  and  our  rights. 

The  Japanese  people  needed  to  be  gradually  educated  up  to  an 
appreciation  of  popular  rights  and  duties.  Thus  the  Con- 
stitution was  to  be,  in  a  sense,  the  school-master  to  lead  them 
Ito  Constitutionalism. 

Now,  this  subject  of  "  Constitutional  Imperialism  in  Japan  " 
may  be  conveniently  divided  into  the  following  topics : 
I.  The  Imperial  Prerogative. 
II.  The  Privy  Council. 
III.  The  "  Elder  Statesmen." 
IV.  The  Cabinet 
V.  The  Imperial  Diet 

A.  House  of  Peers. 

B.  House  of  Representatives. 
VI.  The  Judiciary. 

VII.  The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Subjects. 
VIII.  Political  Parties. 
IX.  Public  Opinion. 
X.  Conclusions. 

(3*0 


I.  THE  IMPERIAL  PREROGATIVE 

The  sovereignty  of  the  Emperor  is  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  the  Japanese  Constitution.     Article  I  reads  as  follows  : 

The  Empire  of  Japan  shall  be  reigned  over  and  governed  by  a 
line  of  Emperors  unbroken  for  ages  eternal. 

The  late  Prince  Ito,  the  chief  compiler  of  the  Constitution, 
in  his  Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  Empire  of 
Japan,1  says  of  this  article : 

It  is  meant  that  the  Emperor  on  the  Throne  combines  in  Himself 
the  sovereignty  of  the  State  and  the  government  of  the  country  and 
of  His  subjects. 

The  "  divine  right  of  kings  "  was  carried  to  such  an  extreme 
in  England  that  Charles  I  lost  his  head ;  but  in  Japan  "  the 
divine  right  of  the  Emperor  "  is  acknowledged  to  a  degree  of 
which  no  Stuart  ever  even  dreamed.  Uyehara,  in  his  Political 
Development  of  Japan  2  sets  forth  that  point  very  vividly :  he 
asserts  that  the  Emperor  of  Japan  can  use  "  more  effectively 
than  Louis  XIV  "  the  latter's  famous  expression,  "  L'Etat  c'est 
moi."  And  then  the  Japanese  writer  sums  up  the  status  of 
the  Emperor  as  follows: 


He  is  to  the  Japanese  mind  the  Supreme  Being  in  the  Cosmos  of 
Japan,  as  God  is  in  the  Universe  to  the  pantheistic  philosopher 
From  him  everything  emanates;  in  him  everything  subsists;  there  is 
nothing  on  the  soil  of  Japan  existent  independent  of  him.  He  is  the 
sole  owner  of  the  Empire,  the  author  of  law,  justice,  privilege,  and 
honor,  and  the  symbol  of  the  unity  of  the  Japanese  nation.  He  has 
no  pope  or  archbishop  to  crown  him  at  his  accession.  He  is  supreme 
in  all  temporal  affairs  of  the  State  as  well  as  in  all  spiritual  matters, 
and  he  is  the  foundation  of  Japanese  social  and  civic  morality.8 

1  Igirisu  Horitsu  Gakko,  Tokyo,  1889,  p.  3. 

2  Dutton,  New  York,  1910,  pp.  19-24. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  23.  ( 

(325) 


:i 


6  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN       [Vol.  VI 

As  a  corollary  of  this  fundamental  principle,  the  Emperor 
is  "  sacred  and  inviolable."      Ito  says : 

The  Emperor  is  Heaven-descended,  divine  and  sacred ;  He  is  pre- 
eminent above  all  His  subjects.  He  must  be  reverenced  and  is  in- 
violable. .  .  .  Not  only  shall  there  be  no  irreverence  for  the  Em- 
peror's person,  but  also  shall  He  not  be  made  a  topic  of  derogatory 
comment  nor  one  of  discussion.1 

It  is  really  unthinkable  that  any  Japanese  Emperor  could 
ever  sufTer  the  fate  of  Charles  I  of  England.  It  was  this  idea 
of  imperial  sanctity  that  made  the  people  discredit,  at  first,  the 
report  of  the  anarchist  conspiracy  of  1 910.  It  must  however 
be  acknowledged,  that  even  the  Emperor  is  not  always  exempt 
from  being  the  subject  of  discussion.  And  yet  on  the  whole 
\he  is  generally  considered  sacred,  so  that  attempts  to  drag  him 
Unto  politics  are  resented.  An  apparent  attempt  to  utilize  for 
partisan  purposes  an  imperial  rescript  by  the  new  young  Em- 
peror is  believed  to  have  ruined  Katsura's  last  ministry  in 
1913.  And  the  failure  of  Saionji  at  that  time  to  make  the 
Seiyukai  yield  to  what  was  said  to  be  the  imperial  desire  in 
that  case  is  thought  to  have  compelled  him  to  give  up  the  lead- 
ership of  that  party  and  retire  to  private  life. 

Dr.  McLaren,  in  a  lecture  before  the  Asiatic  Society  of 
Japan,  spoke  as  follows  on  this  point : 

The  tremendous  prestige  of  the  Imperial  name  had  been  used  con- 
tinually for  the  defense  of  the  Government.  .  .  .  The  divine  de- 
scent of  the  Monarch  had  been  made  to  bear  the  whole  burden  of  the 
oligarchical  form  of  government.  .  .  .  The  oligarchy  and  the  mon- 
archy had  been  merged  into  a  single  governing  power,  which  con- 
tinued to  exist  through  the  reverence  of  the  people  for  the  Throne.  * 

This  idea  of  the  sacredness  of  the  imperial  name  has  given 
rise  to  some  ridiculous  instances  of  so-called  lese  majeste.  For 
instance,  the  Ministry  was  censured  in  1893  "  for  its  careless- 
ness in  maintaining  the  dignity  of  the  crown."     It  happened 

1  Commentaries,  p.  6. 

2  Japan  Advertiser,  Tokyo,  19  June,  1913. 

(326) 


No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  PREROGATIVE  7 

that  an  English  lawyer,  counsel  for  the  Japanese  government, 
in  a  case  before  the  English  Consular  Court  at  Yokohama,  had 
used  the  name  of  the  Emperor  in  his  plea! 

The  Constitution  further  states  positively  that 

The  Emperor  is  the  head  of  the  Empire,  combining  in  himself 
the  rights  of  sovereignty  and  exercising  them,  according  to  the 
provisions  of  the  present  Constitution.1 

Ito,  in  his  comments  on  this  article,  refers  to  the  Emperor  as 

This  Most  Exalted  Personage  who  thus  holds  in  His  hands,  as 
it  were,  all  the  ramifying  threads  of  the  political  life  of  the  country, 
just  as  the  brain,  in  the  human  body,  is  the  primitive  source  of  all 
mental  activity  manifested  through  the  four  limbs  and  the  different 
parts  of  the  body.2 

Not  only  does  the  Emperor  thus  exercise  the  executive  power 
of  the  State,  but,  according  to  a  specific  article :  3  "  The  Em- 
peror exercises  the  legislative  power  with  the  consent  of  the 
Imperial  Diet."  And,  as  the  Emperor,  by  Article  VI,  gives 
sanction  to  laws  and  orders  them  to  be  promulgated  and  exe- 
cuted," it  naturally  and  logically  follows,  according  to  Ito, 
that  "  He  also  possesses  the  power  to  refuse  His  sanction."* 
On  this  point,  Uyehara  writes  as  follows : 

The  sanction  of  the  Sovereign  to  a  bill  is  the  final  point  in 
Japanese  legislation.  The  Emperor  is  absolutely  free  either  to  give 
or  refuse  sanction.  Therefore,  you  may  say  that  the  Emperor  has  an 
absolute  veto  over  all  legislation.  There  is  no  constitutional  way 
for  the  Diet  to  over-ride  this  veto  of  the  Emperor.5 

Moreover,  the  imperial  control  of  the  legislative  organ, 
the  Imperial  Diet,  is  seen  in  the  fact  that,  by  Article  VII, 
"  The  Emperor  convokes  the  Imperial  Diet,  opens,  closes  and 
prorogues  it,  and  dissolves  the  House  of  Representatives." 

The  fact  that  the  Constitution  reserves  to  the  Emperor  cer- 

1  Article  IV.  2  Op.  cit.,  p.  7. 

3  Article  V.  4  Op.  cit.,  p.  11. 

5  Political  Development  of  Japan,  p.  128. 

(327) 


8  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  IAPAN      [Vol.  VI 

tain  powers  is  not  so  different  from  the  custom  of  conferring 
such  "  reserved  rights  M  upon  the  executive  in  other  countries 
as  to  require  special  comment.  It  is  sufficient  to  call  attention 
to  Articles  XI-XVI.1 

There  is,  however,  one  constitutional  provision  which  re- 
quires special  notice  under  this  topic  of  "  The  Imperial  Pre- 
rogative." The  Constitution  cannot  be  amended  unless  a  pro- 
ject to  that  effect  is  submitted  by  imperial  order  to  the  Imperial 
Diet.  Then,  in  neither  House,  can  an  amendment  be  debated 
unless  two-thirds  of  its  members  are  present;  and  no  amend- 
ment can  be  passed  unless  two-thirds  of  the  members  present 
approve.8  Ito  explains  why  the  Diet  cannot  initiate  an  amend- 
ment by  saying  that  "  the  right  of  making  amendments  to  the 
Constitution  must  belong  to  the  Emperor  Himself,  as  He  is 
the  sole  author  of  it."  *  But  just  as  the  late  Emperor,  now 
known  as  Meiji  Tenno,  granted  the  Constitution  in  response 
to  a  desire  or  a  demand,  so  doubtless  any  prudent  emperor 
will  heed  public  opinion  with  reference  to  amendments. 

It  may  be  said  in  general  concerning  the  imperial  authority 
in  Japan  that,  while  nominally  and  theoretically  it  is  not 
limited,  yet  practically  it  is  somewhat  limited.  Uyehara  says : 
14  Neither  custom  nor  law,  written  or  unwritten,  nor  the  Con- 
stitution limits  his  ultimate  sovereign  power;  He  is  the  Su- 
preme Lord  and  Absolute  Master  of  the  Empire."4 

Yet  the  Emperor  does  not  interfere  in  the  actual  adminis- 
tration of  affairs;  he  reigns  but  he  does  not  rule.  The  late 
Emperor  took  a  deep  personal  interest  in  the  affairs  of  state, 
but  never  showed  the  slightest  desire  to  exercise  "  personal 
rule."  It  is,  therefore,  not  difficult  for  an  emperor,  unless  he 
.j  is  a  man  of  strong  personality,  to  be  at  the  same  time  an 
/  "  absolute  monarch  "  and  an  absolute  figure-head.  That  was 
'  often  the  case  in  Old  Japan ;  and  it  is  not  an  impossibility  even 
in  New  Japan.  Uyehara  affirms  most  positively  that  "  it  is 
not  the  personality  of  the  Emperor  .  .  .  upon  which  the 
strength  and  the  value  of  the  Japanese  monarchy  depend  " ;  5 

1  Appendix.  2  Article  LXXIII.  3  Op.  cit.,  p.  140. 

*  Op.  cit.,  pp.   193-194.  *  Ibid.,  p.  201. 

(328) 


No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  PREROGATIVE  g 

and  he  claims  that  it  is  "  the  unique  history  and  tradition  of 
the  imperial  throne  "  ;  but  we  make  bold  to  say,  even  in  opposi- 
tion to  a  Japanese,  that  the  personality  of  the  sovereign  is  of  A 
special  importance.  It  is  possible  that,  in  general,  the  imperial 
personality  weighs  more  than  the  individual  personality.  But 
in  the  case  of  the  late  Emperor,  Meiji  Tenno,  his  own  per- 
sonality, in  the  sense  of  his  individuality,  was  no  small  element 
in  the  loyalty  and  patriotism  of  thousands  of  his  subjects.  And 
it  is  not  an  invidious  comparison  to  state  that  the  feeling 
toward  the  present  Emperor  does  not  seem  as  yet  to  be  the  same 
as  that  toward  his  illustrious  father,  Mutsuhito  the  Great. 

(329) 


II.  THE  PRIVY  COUNCIL 

According  to  Ito's  Commentaries  the  Privy  Council  is  "  the 
highest  body  of  the  Emperor's  constitutional  advisors,"  l  as 
well  as  "  the  palladium  of  the  Constitution  and  the  law  " ;  and 
its  duty,  according  to  the  same  authority,  is  "to  be  perfectly 
loyal  and  straight-forward  in  furnishing  advice  to  the  Em- 
peror." It  is  higher  than  the  Cabinet,  because  its  advice  may 
be  asked  concerning  the  organization  of  a  cabinet.  Moreover, 
all  the  measures  of  a  cabinet  may  be  referred  to  it  by  the 
Emperor,  either  before  they  are  presented  to  the  Diet  by  the 
Cabinet,  or  after  they  have  passed  the  Diet.  The  Privy  Coun- 
cil is,  therefore  such  an  influential  body  that  membership 
therein  is  accounted  a  very  great  honor.  It  must,  however, 
be  said  with  regret  that  occasionally  the  Privy  Council  has 
been  found  a  convenient  place  in  which  to  shelve  a  prominent 
man  for  whom  some  provision  must  be  made.  And  the  min- 
isters of  State  who  form  the  Cabinet  have  seats  in  the  Privy 
Council  ex  officio  and  are  just  enough  by  themselves  to  con- 
stitute a  quorum  of  ten  members. 

The  Privy  Council  has  a  voice  in  giving  advice  to  the  Im- 
perial Family  Council  concerning  such  important  matters  as 
changing  the  order  of  succession  to  the  throne  and  the  selection 
of  a  regent  in  case  the  Emperor  is  a  minor.  And  the  Privy 
Council  may  be  particularly  consulted  by  the  Emperor  in  case 
of  a  political  crisis.  While  the  Cabinet  is  "a  board  of  the  chief 
executive  officers  ",  the  Privy  Council  is  "  a  deliberative  body 
consisting  of  the  chief  legal  advisors  of  the  Sovereign."  Ito 
suggests  that  "  it  will  certainly  prove  an  important  piece  of 
constitutional  mechanism."  2  Indeed,  the  gradual  evolution 
of  the  power  of  the  Privy  Council  is  a  most  noteworthy  feature 
in  the  Japanese  constitution.  On  the  other  hand,  those  who 
believe  in  popular  institutions  think  that  the  Privy  Council 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  98.  2  ibM, 

(330) 


THE  PRIVY  COUNCIL 


n 


v> 


^y 


has  "  usurped  "  power  and  that  its  authority  must  be  limited 
by  reforms  in  its  official  organization.1 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  give  details  of  the  organization  of 
the  Privy  Council ;  but  it  may  be  well  to  reproduce  the  follow- 
ing articles  of  the  Imperial  Ordinance  of  1888,  as  amended 
in  1890: 

Article  II. — The  Privy  Council  shall  consist  of  one  President,  one 
Vice-President,  twenty-five  Councillors,  one  Chief  Secretary  and  five 
Secretaries. 

Article  VI. — The  Privy  Council  shall  hold  its  meetings  for  the 
purpose  of  advising  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  and  shall  state  its 
opinions  with  regard  to  the  following  matters : 

1.  Matters  which  come  under  its  jurisdiction  according  to  the 
Koshitsu  Tempan  (Law  of  the  Houses). 

2.  Drafts  and  doubtful  points  relating  to  articles  of  the  Constitu- 
tion and  to  laws  and  ordinances  dependent  to  the  Constitution. 

3.  Proclamations  of  the  law  of  siege  provided  for  in  Article  XIV, 
and  Imperial  Ordinances  mentioned  in  Articles  VIII  and  LXII  of 
the  Constitution,  as  well  as  all  other  Imperial  Ordinances  of  a  re- 
strictive character. 

4.  International  treaties  and  pledges. 

5.  Matters  relating  to  the  amendment  of  the  organization  of  the 
Privy  Council  and  the  rules  for  conducting  business  in  the  Privy 
Council. 

6.  Matters  specially  called  for,  besides  those  mentioned  in  the  last 
paragraphs. 

Article  X,  Paragraph  2. — The  President  shall  cause  the  Chief  Sec- 
retary to  make  explanations  and  shall  afterwards  allow  the  members 
to  discuss  matters  freely,  but  no  member  can  speak  without  obtaining 
the  permission  of  the  President,  who  may  engage  in  all  debates,  and 
shall  point  out  the  questions  to  be  decided,  and  require  members  to 
vote  with  regard  to  the  same. 

We  also  reproduce,  from  the  original  Ordinance  of  April 
28,  1888,  the  following  statement: 

Article  VIII. — Though  the  Privy  Council  is  the  Emperor's  highest 
resort  of  council,  it  shall  not  interfere  with  the  Executive. 

1  The  Presidents  of  the  Privy  Council  have  been  Count  Ito,  Count  Oki, 
Count  Kuroda,  Marquis  Saionji,  Marquis  Ito,  and  Prince  Yamagata. 

(330 


III.  THE  ELDER  STATESMEN 

A  body  of  men  known  as  Genro,  which  is  freely  translated 
into  English  by  the  term  "  Elder  Statesmen  ",  must  not  be 
omitted  from  this  discussion  of  "  Constitutional  Imperialism." 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  are  not  mentioned  in  the  Constitu- 
tion; they  are  an  extra-constitutional  body;  but  they  outrank 
levery  constitutional  body  except  the  Emperor  and  the  Privy 
^Council.     They  are  a  survival  of  feudalism ;  they  are  relics  of 
history.     To  be  more  literal,  they  are  the  survivors  of  the 
great  band  of  men  who  accomplished  the  Restoration  of  1868, 
and  reconstructed  Japan  during  the  marvelous  years  of  the 
Meiji  era.    They  deserve  the  greatest  credit  for  making  New 
Japan  what  she  now  is;  they  were  statesmen  of  the  highest 
I  ability :  but  they  are  considered  to  have  outlived  their  useful- 
'  ness ;  they  are  an  anachronism.     There  are  only  three  left  since 
the  death  of  Prince  Ito,  the  most  active  and  most  eminent,  and 
of  Marquis  Inouye;  the  survivors  are  Princes  Yamagata  and 
Oyama  (who  rarely  acts)  and  Marquis  Matsukata. 

The  Elder  Statesmen  have  been  the  "  Warwicks  of  Japan  ", 
not  in  the  sense  of  being  king-makers  but  in  that  of  being 
cabinet-makers.  In  fact  they  have  not  only  made,  but  also 
unmade,  cabinets.  They  have  been  the  power  behind  and 
before  the  throne.  They  have  invariably  been  consulted,  un- 
officially of  course,  by  the  Emperor  in  all  great  political  crises. 
But  it  certainly  looks  as  if  the  days  of  that  "  august  but  obso- 
lete "  body  are  numbered.  It  is  an  open  secret,  that,  while 
they  recommended  Count  Okuma  to  the  Emperor  for  the  pre- 
miership in  April,  191 4,  they  did  so,  after  the  futile  attempt 
to  constitute  a  reactionary  ministry  under  Viscount  Kiyoura, 
merely  because  they  found  that  they  could  no  longer  oppose 
the  popular  demand.  Thus  one  result  of  the  first  quarter 
century  of  constitutionalism  in  Japan  has  been  the  almost 
complete  elimination  of  this  once  strong  extra-constitutional 
factor,  which  death  will  soon  entirely  eliminate. 

(332) 


IV.  THE  CABINET 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Cabinet  has  no  official  stand- 
ing in  the  Constitution.  "  Ministers  of  State "  are  merely 
mentioned  and  to  that  extent  are  recognized  even  in  their 
official  capacities;  but  the  Cabinet  as  a  body  is  not  officially 
recognized.  Of  course,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted,  that 
several  ministers  of  State,  of  whom  one  is  known  as  "  Prime 
Minister,"  would  form  an  organization,  called  a  "  Ministry  " 
or  a  "  Cabinet."  Thus,  indirectly,  the  Cabinet,  as  a  constitu- 
tional organ,  is  recognized  and  must  receive  consideration.1 

1The  following   (issued  in   1899)   explains  itself. 

Imperial  Notification  No.  135. 
Functions  of  the  Cabinet. 

Art.  I. — The  Cabinet  is  composed  of  the  various  Ministers  of  State. 

Art.  II. — The  Minister  President  of  State  stands  at  the  head  of  the  Min- 
isters of  State,  reports  affairs  of  State  to  the  Sovereign,  and  in  compliance  with 
Imperial  instructions,  has  general  control  over  the  various  branches  of  the 
administration. 

Art.  III. — The  Minister  President  of  State,  should  an  occasion  seem  suffi- 
ciently important  to  demand  such  a  course,  has  competence  to  give  instruc- 
tions to  any  branch  of  the  administration  or  to  suspend  its  notifications,  pend- 
ing an  expression  of  the  Sovereign's  will  on  the  subject. 

Art.  IV. — All  laws  and  all  imperial  ordinances  affecting  the  administra- 
tion as  a  whole,  shall  bear  the  counter  signature  of  the  Minister  President  as 
well  as  that  of  the  Minister  from  whose  Department  they  directly  emanate. 
All  imperial  ordinances  affecting  a  special  Department  only,  shall  be  coun- 
signed  by  the  Minister  of  that  Department  alone. 

Art.  V. — The  following  matters  shall  be  submitted  for  deliberation  by  the 
Cabinet : 

(1.)   Drafts  of  laws,  financial  estimates,  and  settled  accounts. 

(2.)  Treaties  with  foreign  countries  and  all  national  questions  of  importance. 

(3.)  Ordinances  relating  to  administration,  or  to  the  carrying  out  of  regu- 
lations and  laws. 

(4.)  Disputes  connected  with  the  relative  competence  of  Ministers  of  De- 
partments. 

(5.)  Petitions  from  the  people,  handed  down  from  the  Throne  or  submitted 
by  the  Imperial  Diet. 

(6.)   Expenditures  apart  from  the  ordinary  estimates. 

(333) 


o 


I4  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN      [Vol.  VI 

The  ministers  of  State  are  the  following:  Minister  President 
of  State,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Minister  of  Home  Af- 
fairs, Minister  of  Finance,  Minister  of  War,  Minister  of  the 
Navy,  Minister  of  Justice,  Minister  of  Education,  Minister  of 
Agriculture  and  Commerce,  Minister  of  Communications,  and 
Minister  of  the  Imperial  Household.  But  the  last-mentioned 
is  not  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  which,  when  fully  constituted, 
consists  thus  of  ten  members. 

To  elucidate  what  follows,  we  have  prepared  (see  following 
page)  a  table  of  the  Cabinets  during  the  past  twenty-five  years 
or  so.  It  should,  however,  be  explained  that  the  figures  of 
duration  cannot  be  given  with  absolute  exactness,  but  are 
approximate;  because,  theoretically,  each  Cabinet  holds  over 
till  its  successor  takes  office,  but  practically  gives  up  office  at 
the  time  of  resignation.  However,  the  interim  is  generally 
only  a  few  days  and,  at  the  longest,  has  been  only  one  month. 

The  table  of  Cabinets  shows  that,  in  the  first  eight  cases 
(with  the  exception  of  the  Okuma-Itagaki  Cabinet,  which 
lasted   only   a   few   months),   three   of  the   Elder   Statesmen 

(7.)  Appointments  of  chokunin  officials  and  of  local  prefects  and  gov- 
ernors, as  well  as  their  promotions  and  removals. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  any  important  matters  connected  with  the  duties 
of  Ministers  of  Departments,  and  having  relation  to  the  higher  branches  of 
the  administration,  shall  also  b*e  submitted  for  deliberation  by  the  Cabinet. 

Art.  VI. — Every  Minister  of  a  Department  is  competent  to  submit  any 
matter  whatsoever  bearing  on  his  functions  for  the  consideration  of  the  Cabinet 
through  the  Minister  President. 

Art.  VII. — With  the  exception  of  military  or  naval  affairs  of  grave  im- 
portance which,  having  been  reported  directly  to  the  Sovereign  by  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  may  have  been  submitted  by  His  Majesty  for  the  consideration  of 
the  Cabinet,  the  Ministers  of  State  for  War  and  the  Navy  shall  report  to  the 
Minister  President.. 

Art.  VIII. — Should  the  Minister  President  be  prevented  from  discharging 
his  functions,  they  may  be  temporarily  delegated  to  another  Minister  of  State 
in  conjunction  with  the  latter's  own  duties. 

Art.  IX. — Should  any  Minister  of  State  be  prevented  from  discharging  his 
functions,  they  may  be  delegated  temporarily  to  another  Minister  of  State  in 
conjunction  with  the  latter's  own  duties,  or  another  Minister  may  be  ap- 
pointed to  discharge  them. 

Art.  X. — In  addition  to  the  various  Ministers  of  State,  a  Minister  may  be 
specially  authorized  to  sit  in  the  Cabinet. 

(334) 


No.  3]  THE  CABINET  l$ 


(Yamagata,  Matsukata  and  Ito)  took  turns  as  Premier  and 
were  in  power  (with  other  Elder  Statesmen,  like  Inouye  and 
Oyama,  sometimes  in  the  Cabinets  with  them)  for  about 
twelve  years.  Then  for  the  next  period  of  about  twelve  years, 
Katsura  (Yamagata's  lieutenant)  and  Saionji  (Ito's  lieuten- 
ant) held  power  alternately. 

The  table  of  Cabinets  also  shows  that  the  average  duration 
of  the  fourteen  ministries  that  held  office  for  a  period  of 
24^  years  (December  1889 — March  19 14)  is  almost  twenty- 
one  months.  The  average  of  the  first  eight  Ministries,  which 
covered  eleven  and  one-half  years,  is  a  little  over  seventeen 
months;  while  the  average  of  the  last  six  Ministries,  which 
covered  almost  thirteen  years,  is  almost  twenty-six  months.  It 
is  interesting  to  note  that  the  two  unusually  long  terms  were 
held  by  the  first  Ito  and  the  first  Katsura  Ministries,  which 
covered  the  periods  respectively  of  the  War  with  China  (1894, 
1895)  and  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1904,  1905),  when  poli- 
tical rivalries  were  temporarily  buried.  Moreover,  Katsura 
holds  two  records — of  both  the  longest  and  the  shortest  min- 
istries. 

Table  of  Cabinets. 
Premier  Term  of  Office  Years       Months 

Yamagata Dec,  1889— April,  1891  1  5 

Matsukata  May,    1891— July,     1891  1  3 

Ito Aug.,  1892— Aug.,  1896  4  1 

Matsukata Sept.,  1896— Dec,   1897  1  4 

Ito  Jan.,    1898— June,    1808  0  6 

Okuma-Itagaki  June,   1898— Oct.,    1898  0  4 

Yamagata Nov.,  1898— Sept.,  1900  1  11 

Ito    Oct.,   1900— May,    1901  0  8 

Katsura June,   1901— Jan.,    1006  4  7 

Saionji  Jan.,    1906— July,     1908  2  6 

Katsura July,    1908 — Aug.,  1911  3  2 

Saionji Sept.,  1911 — Dec,   1912  1  4 

Katsura Dec,  1912— Feb.,    1913  0  2 

Yamamoto Feb.,   1913— Mar.,  1914  1  1 

Okuma Apr.,   1914— 

As  in  England,  any  member  of  the  Cabinet  may  be  also  a 
member  of  either  House.  And  ministers  who  may  not  be 
members  have,  nevertheless,  the  right  at  any  time  to  take  seats 

(335) 


I 


!6  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

(in  a  special  place)  and  to  speak  in  either  House.     They  have 
also  free  access  to  committee  rooms. 

The  Cabinet  may  be  called  the  Emperor's  executive  organ. 
I  to  says : 

The  Ministers  of  State  are  charged  with  the  duty  of  giving  advice 
to  the  Emperor;  they  are  to  serve  as  media  through  which  the  Im- 
perial commands  are  conveyed,  and  are  to  execute  administrative 
affairs.1 

Uyehara  says  that  the  Cabinet  "is  the  channel  and  medium 
through  which  the  Sovereign  exercises  his  power."  2 

The  principal  question  with  reference  to  the  Cabinet  is  that 
of  its  responsibility.  The  text  of  the  Constitution  is  unfor- 
tunately (perhaps  purposely?)  indefinite;  it  reads  as  follows: 

The  respective  Ministers  of  State  shall  give  their  advice  to  the 
Emperor  and  be  responsible  for  it.3 

But  Ito  is  more  explicit  in  his  Commentaries,  where  he  uses 
the  following  expression : 

The  appointment  and  dismissal  of  them  [Ministers]  having  been 
included  by  the  Constitution  in  the  sovereign  power  of  the  Emperor, 
it  is  only  a  legitimate  consequence  that  the  power  of  deciding  as  to 
the  responsibility  of  Ministers  is  withheld  from  the  Diet. 

Ministers  are  directly  responsible  to  the  Emperor  and  indirectly 
so  to  the  people. 

It  is  the  Sovereign  and  not  the  people  that  can  decide  as  to  the 
responsibility  of  Ministers.* 

As  a  matter  of  fact  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  until  some- 
what recently  it  was  acknowledged  and  accepted,  in  theory 
and  in  practice,  that  the  Cabinet  was  responsible  only  to  the 
Emperor.  And  yet,  even  as  early  as  1895,  Ito  himself  made 
an  informal  alliance  with  the  Liberal  party;  and  Matsukata, 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  93. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  140. 

3  Article  LV. 
*  Loc.  cit. 

(336) 


No.  3]  THE  CABINET  ij 

who  followed  him,  similarly  obtained  the  support  of  the  Pro- 
gressive party. 

The  year  1898  witnessed  an  attempt,  but  a  short-lived  one, 
to  establish  a  "  party  cabinet M  under  Okuma  and  Itagaki. 
Next,  even  the  conservative  Yamagata  followed  the  plan  of 
an  entente  cordiale  with  the  predominant  party  (Liberal)  in 
the  Lower  House.  In  1 900-1 901,  an  I  to  ministry  was  an- 
other abortive  attempt  to  establish  a  "  party  cabinet "  under 
the  auspices  of  Ito's  newly  organized  party  (Seiyukai) .  Later 
Saionji  and  Yamamoto  made  more  serious  and  more  success- 
ful attempts  to  carry  on  the  administration  in  close  connection 
with  the  dominant  party  (Seiyukai)  in  the  Lower  House. 
Finally,  on  Christmas  Day,  1914,  Okuma  dissolved  the  House 
of  Representatives  and  appealed  to  a  general  election,  by 
which  he  obtained  a  large  majority  to  back  up  his  Ministry, 
which  is  at  once  a  personal  and  a  party  cabinet.  The  old-style 
"transcendental  cabinet"  is  no  longer  possible;  a  "party 
cabinet "  is  demanded  by  public  opinion  and  is  another  of  the 
results  of  the  first  quarter  century  of  constitutionalism. 

(337) 


V.  THE  IMPERIAL  DIET 

From  the  point  of  view  of  constitutionalism,  the  Japanese 
Imperial  Diet  should  be  one  of  the  most  important  organs. 
But  at  the  outset,  Americans  and  British  must  be  warned  not 
to  expect  an  institution  like  either  the  American  Congress  or 
the  British  Parliament.  The  Japanese  national  assembly  is 
rather  like  the  German  institution  and  is,  therefore,  generally 
called  the  "  Imperial  Diet ".  It  is  well  known  that  German 
ideas  of  government  were  largely  followed  by  Ito  in  drawing 
up  the  Japanese  Constitution,  because  they  seemed  best  fitted 
to  Japanese  Imperialism. 

The  Japanese  Imperial  Diet  is  bicameral :  it  consists  of  a 
House  of  Peers  (Kizoku-in)  and  a  House  of  Representatives 
(Shugi-in) .  The  House  of  Peers  is  composed  of  a  varying 
number  of  members  (about  375), — part  hereditary,  part  elec- 
tive, and  part  appointive.  The  hereditary  members  are  the 
imperial  princes  and  the  princes  and  marquises.  The  elec- 
tive members  are  those  chosen  from  among  the  counts,  vis- 
counts, and  barons,  and  the  highest  taxpayers  of  each  pre- 
fecture. The  appointive  members  are  those  who  are  nomin- 
ated by  the  Emperor  "  for  meritorious  services  to  the  State 
and  for  erudition."  But  the  number  of  appointive  members 
and  of  elective  taxpayers  "  shall  not  exceed  the  number  of 
the  members  having  the  title  of  nobility."  The  hereditary 
members  and  the  appointive  members  enjoy  a  life  tenure; 
while  the  elective  members  serve  for  a  term  of  seven  years. 

The  membership  of  the  House  of  Peers  in  the  Thirty-sixth 
Session  *  of  the  Imperial  Diet  was  as  follows: 

Imperial  princes   12 

Princes     13 

Marquises    33 

Counts    17 

Viscounts     69 

Barons    62 

Imperial  appointees    124 

Highest  tax-payers   44 

Total     374 

1  May  20-June,  10,  191 5. 

(338) 


THE  IMPERIAL  DIET  jO 

The  offices  of  president  and  vice-president  of  the  House  of 
Peers  have  been  held  by  the  following  members : 


Presidents. 

Vice-Presidents. 

I 890- I 89 I 

Count  Ito 

1890-1891 

Count  Higashikuze 

1891-1896 

Marquis  Hachisuka 

1891-1893 

Baron  Hosowaka 

1 896- 1 903 

Prince  Konoye 

1893-1894 

Marquis  Saionji 

1903- 

Prince  Tokugawa 

1894- 

Marquis  Kuroda 

The  House  of  Representatives  consists  of  381  members. 
Any  "  male  Japanese  subject  who  is  not  less  than  full  thirty 
years  of  age  shall  be  eligible  for  election/'  except  that  certain 
persons  laboring  under  mental  or  financial  or  civic  disabilities 
can  neither  enjoy  the  franchise  nor  be  eligible  for  election. 
Heads  of  noble  families ;  men  in  the  active  service  of  the  army 
or  the  navy;  students;  Shinto  priests  and  ministers,  priests 
and  teachers  of  religion  of  all  kinds;  teachers  of  elementary 
schools;  and  certain  Government  officials  and  persons  working 
for  the  Government  under  contract  are  likewise  ineligible  in 
either  case. 

Electors  must  possess  the  following  qualifications : 

1.  Completion  of  the  twenty-fifth  year  of  age. 

2.  A  permanent  residence  in  the  election  district  for  not 
less  than  one  year  previous  to  the  date  of  drawing  up  the 
electoral  list. 

3.  Payment  of  direct  national  taxes  to  the  amount  of  not 
less  than  ten  yen. 

It  should  be  noted  that,  while  an  elector  possesses  the  fran- 
chise five  years  before  he  is  eligible  for  election,  the  candidate 
has  the  great  advantage  over  the  elector  of  not  being  limited 
by  any  residential  or  property  qualifications. 

The  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  are  elected 
under  the  system  of  large  electoral  districts,  and  by  single 
non-transferable  votes.  The  ballot  is  secret.1  A  city  hav- 
ing a  population  of  over  30,000  forms  one  electoral  district, 
with  one  or  two  members,  according  to  size.  The  three 
cities   of  Tokyo,   Osaka   and   Kyoto   form   each  one  district, 

1  Uyehara,  op.  cit.,  p.  178. 

(339) 


20  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

with  eleven,  six,  and  three  members  respectively.  In  all  other 
cases,  each  prefecture  forms  one  district,  with  from  two  to 
twelve  members  according  to  the  population.  There  are  special 
provisions  for  the  Hokkaido  on  account  of  its  large  area  and 
scattered  population.  There  are  many  polling-places  in  each 
district. 

The  members  of  both  Houses  receive  an  annual  allowance 
(2,000  yen)  and  traveling  expenses,  except  those  who  are  in 
the  service  of  the  Government.  Of  course,  no  one  can  be  a 
member  of  both  Houses  at  the  same  time. 

The  members  of  the  two  Houses  possess  certain  special 
personal  privileges. 

No  Member  of  either  House  shall  be  held  responsible  outside  the 
respective  Houses  for  any  opinion  uttered  or  for  any  vote  given  in 
the  House  (Article  LII). 

The  Members  of  both  Houses  shall,  during  the  session,  be  free 
from  arrest,  unless  with  the  consent  of  the  House,  except  in  cases 
of  flagrant  delicts,  or  of  offences  connected  with  a  state  of  internal 
commotion  or  with  a  foreign  trouble  (Article  LIII). 

Ordinary  sessions  of  the  Imperial  Diet  must  be  convoked 
every  year;  and  they  last  for  three  months.  This  time  limit, 
however,  may  be  prolonged  by  Imperial  Order  in  case  of 
necessity.  An  extraordinary  session  may  be  convoked  by  Im- 
perial Order,  "  when  urgent  necessity  arises  "  ;  and  its  duration 
"shall  be  determined  by  Imperial  Order."  x  In  the  case  of  the 
dissolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  a  new  election 
must  be  held  at  such  a  time  as  will  enable  the  new  House  to 
be  "convoked  within  five  months  from  the  day  of  dissolution.' ' 

A  quorum  in  either  House  consists  of  one-third  of  the  whole 
number  of  members;  and,  without  such  quorum,  "no  debate 
can  be  opened  and  no  vote  can  be  taken." 

An  "  absolute  majority  "  is  required  for  a  decision  in  either 
House.  The  President  has  no  vote,  except  in  the  case  of  a 
tie,  when  he  has  the  deciding  vote. 

In  general,  the  two  Houses  have  equal  rights  and  powers 

1  In  twenty-five  years,  there  were  eleven  special  sessions. 

(340) 


No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  DIET 


21 


and  are  supposed,  therefore,  to  be  co-ordinate.  It  is  however 
provided  by  the  Constitution  (Article  LXV),  that  "the  budget 
shall  be  first  laid  before  the  House  of  Representatives." 

In  a  hard-fought  contest  with  the  House  of  Representatives 
in  1892,  the  House  of  Peers  won  for  itself  an  imperial  inter- 
pretation to  the  effect  that  it  had  the  right  to  reinsert  in  the 
Budget  items  expunged  by  the  House  of  Representatives,  i.  e., 
that  it  had  equal  rights  of  amendment  with  the  latter. 

But  an  absolute  equality  of  the  two  Houses  is  difficult  to 
maintain.  According  to  Ito,  it  was  the  intention  of  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution,  in  case  the  House  of  Peers  ful- 
filled its  functions,  to  make  it 

serve  in  a  remarkable  degree  to  preserve  an  equilibrium  between 
political  powers,  to  restrain  the  undue  influence  of  political  parties, 
to  check  the  evil  tendencies  of  irresponsible  discussions,  to  secure 
the  stability  of  the  Constitution,  to  be  an  instrument  for  maintaining 
harmony  between  the  governing  and  the  governed,  and  to  permanently 
sustain  the  prosperity  of  the  country  and  the  happiness  of  the  people.1 

The  House  of  Peers  is  naturally  much  more  conservative  and 
bureaucratic  than  the  House  of  Representatives;  and  it  has 
checked  not  only  evil  tendencies  but  also  progressive  legisla- 
tion. It  almost  invariably  supports  the  administration,  "  no 
matter  who  forms  it ",  unless  the  latter  appears  too  radical. 
It  has  hindered  the  attempts  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
to  revise  or  repeal  "  repressive  and  arbitrary  laws  "  against 
public  meetings,  the  press,  political  associations,  etc.  It  has 
also  checked  attempts  to  revise  the  land-tax,  to  reform  the 
electoral  system,  etc. ;  and  it  has  often  opposed  the  House  of 
Representatives  in  contests  over  the  budget.  According  to 
Ito,  again :  "  The  House  of  Peers  can  stop  all  legislation,  how- 
ever important  and  necessary  it  may  be,  and  it  cannot  be  dis- 
solved." * 

A  little  study  of  each  session  of  the  Imperial  Diet  may  be 
profitable ;  and  to  illustrate  such  study,  a  table  giving  the  dates 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  66. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  166. 

(340 


22 


CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  Vl 


of  the  election,  of  the  opening  and  the  closing,  and  of  suspen- 
sion, reopening  and  dissolution,  is  appended.  The  asterisks 
in  the  first  column  indicate  special  elections  following  disso- 
lutions. The  dates  in  the  second  column  are  those  of  the 
formal  opening  ceremony;  in  the  last  column,  those  of  the 
formal  closing  ceremony  in  the  cases  where  the  session  "  died 
a  natural  death  ". 

Table  of  Sessions  of  the  Diet 


July    4. 
*Feb.  15, 


♦Mar.  I, 
♦Sept.  i, 


1890 
1892 


894 
894 


•Mar.  15, 
*Aug.  10, 


Aug.  10, 
♦Mar.  1. 


1898 


1902 
1903 


♦Mar.    1,  1904 


May    15, 
May  15, 


[908 


1912 


'Mar.  25,  1915 


Nov 
Nov, 
May 
Nov. 
Nov. 
May 


.  29, 
v.  26, 
6, 

29, 
.  28, 

5. 
Oct.  15 


OPENED 


Dec. 
Dec. 


5. 

24, 
28, 
Dec.  25, 
Dec.  24, 
May  19, 
Dec.  2, 
Nov.  22, 
Dec.  25, 
Nov.  10, 
Dec.  9, 
May  12, 
Dec.  10, 
Mar.  20, 
Nov.  30, 
Dec.  28, 
Dec.  28, 
Dec.  28, 
Dec.  25, 
Dec.  24, 
Dec.  23, 
Dec.  27, 
Aug.  23, 
Dec.  27, 
Dec.  26, 
May  6, 
June  22, 
Sept.  4, 
Dec.  7, 
May  20, 


1890 
1 891 
1892 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1894 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1 901 
1902 
1903 
1903 
1904 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1912 

1913 
1914 
1914 
1914 
1914 
1915 


SUSPENDED 


May  16 

Jan.  23,  1893 

Dec.  19  .  . 


Feb.  15,  1896 
June  7  .  .  . 


Feb.  27,  1901 

Dec.  16  . 
May  21   .  . 


Jan.  21,  1913 


REOPENED 


May  23 
Feb.  7  . 
Dec.  291 


Feb.  25 
June  10 


Mar.  14 


Dec.  28 
May  23 


Feb.  5  . 


DISSOLVED 


Dec.  25,  1891 


Dec.  30,  1893 
June  2,  1894 


Dec.  25,  1897 
June  10,  1898 


Dec.  28,  1902 
Dec.  11,  1903 


Dec.  25,  1914 


CLOSED 


Mar.  8,  1891 


June  15, 
Feb.  28, 


1892 
1893 


Oct.  22, 
Mar.  25, 
Mar.  29, 
Mar.  25, 


Mar.  10, 
Feb.  24, 
Mar.  25, 
Mar.  10, 


1894 

1895 
1896 

1897 


1899 
1900 
1 901 
1902 


June   5,    1903 


Mar.  30, 
Feb.  28, 
Mar.  28, 
Mar.  28, 
Mar.  27, 
Mar.  25, 
Mar.  24, 
Mar.  23, 
Mar.  26, 
Aug.  26, 
Mar.  27, 
Mar.  26, 
May  8, 
June  29, 
Sept.  10, 


1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1912 

IQ13 
1914 
1914 
1014 
1914 


jjune  10,  1915 


1  On  December  29  there  was  a  second  suspension  for  fourteen  days,  but  on  the  next 
day^dissolution  was  announced. 

(342) 


No.  3] 


THE  IMPERIAL  DIET 


23 


The  following  persons  held  the  offices  of  president  and  vice- 
president  of  the  House  of  Representatives  during  the  session 
of  the  period  under  review : 


SESSION. 

President. 

Vice-President. 

1,2 

Nakashima 

Tsuda 

3»4 

Hoshi 

Sone 

5 

Kusumoto 

Abe 

6 

Kusumoto 

Kataoka 

7-9 

Kusumoto 

Shimada 

10,  11 

Hatoyama 

Shimada 

12-17 

Kataoka 

Motoda 

18 

Kataoka 

Sugita 

19 

Kono 

Sugita 

20,  21 

Matsuda 

Minoura 

22-24 

Sugita 

Minoura 

25-28 

Haseba 

Koedzuka 

29,30 

O-oka 

Seki 

3i 

O-oka,  Haseba,  Oku 

Seki 

32-35 

Oku 

Seki 

36 

Shimada 

Hanai 

It  was  feared  by   many   that  the  first  session  would   de- 


ERRATA 

On  page  22,  (page  342  of  bound  volume)  under- 
Diet — read  corrections  as  follows: 


-Table  of  Sessions  of  the 


Session   4,  closed 
Session    7,  opened 
Session    8,  closed 
Session  13,  opened 
Session  16,  opened 
Session  30,  reopened 
Session  32,  opened 


March  1,  1893, 
October  18,  1894. 
March  27,  1895, 
December  3,  1898, 
December  10,  1901, 
February  4, 
May  5,  I9H. 


instead  of  February  28 
instead  of  October  15 
instead  of  March  25 
instead  of  December  2 
instead  of  November  10 
instead  of  February  5 
instead  of  May  6 


t — t ^    v.^v   ti.u.,)    i.nuuiiuu    uic   puuiil    U1UL  d   Lllldlll    IlUlllUei 

of  men,  members  of  the  House  of  Peers,  "  had  formed  an  or- 
ganization  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  the   manner  of 

(343) 


22 


CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  Vl 


of  the  election,  of  the  opening  and  the  closing,  and  of  suspen- 
sion, reopening  and  dissolution,  is  appended.  The  asterisks 
in  the  first  column  indicate  special  elections  following  disso- 
lutions. The  dates  in  the  second  column  are  those  of  the 
formal  opening  ceremony;  in  the  last  column,  those  of  the 
formal  closing  ceremony  in  the  cases  where  the  session  "  died 
a  natural  death  ". 

Table  of  Sessions  of  the  Diet 


ELECTION 


July    4,    1890 
*Feb.  15,1892 


♦Mar.  1,  1894 
♦Sept.  1,  1894 


OPENED 

Nov. 

29, 

1890 

Nov. 

26, 

1891 

May 

6, 

1892 

Nov. 

29, 

1892 

Nov. 

28, 

1893 

May 

IS, 

1894 

Oct. 

*Si 

1894 

Dec. 

24, 

1894 

Dec. 

28, 

189s 

rw 

•»c. 

iXofi 

SUSPENDED 


May  16 

Jan.  23,  1893 

Dec.  19     .   . 


Feb.  15,  1896 


REOPENED 


May  23 
Feb.  7  . 
Dec.  291 


Feb.   25 


DISSOLVED 


Dec.  25,  1891 


Dec.  30,  1893 
June  2,    1894 


Mar.  8,  1891 


June  15,  1892 
Feb.  28,  1893 


Oct.  22,  1894 
Mar.  25,  1895 
Mar.  29,  1896 
Mar.  2S.  1807 


l      1 


1  On  December  29  there  was  a  second  suspension  for  fourteen  days,  but  on  the  next 
day^dissolution  was  announced. 

(342) 


President. 

Vice-President, 

Nakashima 

Tsuda 

Hoshi 

Sone 

Kusumoto 

Abe 

Kusumoto 

Kataoka 

Kusumoto 

Shimada 

Hatoyama 

Shimada 

Kataoka 

Motoda 

Kataoka 

Sugita 

Kono 

Sugita 

Matsuda 

Minoura 

Sugita 

Minoura 

Haseba 

Koedzuka 

O-oka 

Seki 

O-oka,  Haseba,  Oku 

Seki 

Oku 

Seki 

Shimada 

Hanai 

No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  DIET  23 

The  following  persons  held  the  offices  of  president  and  vice- 
president  of  the  House  of  Representatives  during  the  session 
of  the  period  under  review : 

Session. 
if  a 

3,4 

5 
6 

7-9 
10, 11 
12-17 

18 

19 

20,  21 

22-24 

25-28 

29,30 

3i 

32-35 

36 

It  was  feared  by  many  that  the  first  session  would  de- 
velop such  antagonism  between  the  Government  and  the 
legislature  as  to  lead  to  a  serious  rupture;  but  such  an 
unfortunate  outcome  was  averted  by  tact  on  both  sides. 
The  House  of  Peers  was  composed  of  252  members,  as 
follows:  10  imperial  princes,  10  princes  and  21  marquises, 
having  a  hereditary  tenure  of  office;  16  counts,  70  vis- 
counts and  22  barons,  elected  by  "  the  members  of  their 
respective  orders ";  forty-four  persons  chosen  from  among 
and  by  the  highest  taxpayers  in  each  imperial  city  (fu) 
and  prefecture  (ken)  ;  and  fifty-nine  persons,  nominated 
by  the  Emperor  on  account  of  meritorious  services.  Some 
of  these  members  were  incapables,  possessing  no  merit  save 
their  rank;  some  were  merchants,  whose  wealth  was  their 
only  qualification ;  some  among  those  appointed  for  erudition 
were  mere  book-worms  without  knowledge  of  political  science. 
A  curious  paragraph,  occurring  now  and  then  in  the  news- 
papers of  that  time,  informed  the  public  that  a  certain  number 
of  men,  members  of  the  House  of  Peers,  "  had  formed  an  or- 
ganization  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  the   manner  of 

(343) 


24  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

studying  political  questions!"  Nor  was  this  so  strange; 
for  as  representative  institutions  in  Japan  were  but  in  their 
infancy,  it  would,  of  course,  be  unreasonable  to  expect  the  first 
Diet  to  be  composed  largely  of  tried  and  experienced  legisla- 
tors. But  it  is  only  fair  to  add  that  in  both  houses  there  were 
many  veteran  statesmen  and  well-versed  young  politicians, 
and  that  the  House  of  Peers  has  since  been  steadily  growing 
in  reputation  and  influence.  The  House  of  Representatives 
consisted  of  an  even  300  members,  who  had  a  great  variety  of 
professions  and  showed  great  differences  in  personal  ability 
and  experience.  The  old  samurai  (gentry)  class  had  109, 
and  the  heimin  (commonalty)  class  had  191  representatives.1 

It  was  on  December  2,  1890,  that  the  House  of  Peers  had  the 
honor  of  receiving  the  first  bill  ever  presented  to  a  National 
Assembly  in  Japan — a  "  bill  for  the  amendment  and  control 
of  the  system  of  weights  and  measures."  It  was  on  December 
4  that  Count  Matsukata,  Minister  of  Finance,  laid  before  the 
House  of  Representatives  the  first  budget,  over  which  ensued 
a  prolonged  and  bitter  discussion.  The  Government  asked  for 
the  sums  of  70,800,311  yen  for  "  ordinary  expenditures,"  and 
23,204,082  yen  for  "  extraordinary  expenditures."  The 
Budget  Committee  of  the  House  recommended  a  reduction  of 
about  7,840,000  yen ;  the  "  Moderates  "  proposed  a  reduction 
of  5,000,000  or  6,000,000  yen.  At  one  time  it  looked  as  if  the 
"  Radicals  "  would  surely  win  and  thus  provoke  the  Govern- 
ment to  dissolve  the  House  of  Representatives;  but  finally  a 
compromise  was  effected,  by  which  the  government  consented 
to  a  reduction  of  about  6,500,000  yen. 

Other  important  measures  passed  by  the  Diet  were  bills  for 
opening  additional  ports,  for  postponement  of  the  operation  of 
the  Commercial  Code,  for  reforming  weights  and  measures  ac- 
cording to  the  metric  system.  One  bill,  passed  by  the  lower 
House,  but  not  reached  in  the  upper  House,  was  for  the  re- 
duction of  the  land  tax. 

1  This  paragraph  and  several  following  ones  are  taken  from  the  writer's 
pamphlet  on  "  Constitutional  Government  in  Japan,"  published  in  1903  by  the 
American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  Philadelphia,  as  No.  371 
of  its  series  of  publications. 

(344) 


No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  DIET  2$ 

The  second  session  was  almost  entirely  consumed  in  a  bitter 
fight  over  the  budget.  Fortunately,  the  appropriation  of 
$500,000  for  the  Columbian  Exposition  in  Chicago  was  put 
through  by  itself  in  a  supplementary  budget.  Vain  attempts 
were  made  to  amend  the  publication  regulations,  the  law  for 
public  assembly,  and ,  other  regulations,  in  a  way  to  grant 
greater  freedom  of  the  press  and  liberty  of  speech.  The  main 
strength  of  the  opposition,  which  had  a  good  working  ma- 
jority, was  spent  upon  reductions  of  the  budget;  and  the  gov- 
ernment, insisting  that  the  reductions  proposed  were  too  drastic 
for  administrative  purposes,  finally  dissolved  the  lower  House 
on  Christmas  Day. 

The  third  session,  which  was  a  special  session,  necessi- 
tated by  the  dissolution  of  the  previous  regular  session,  was 
marked  by  two  conflicts :  one  between  the  lower  House  and  the 
Government  on  the  subject  of  interference  in  the  election  of 
members  of  that  House ;  and  one  between  the  two  Houses  with 
reference  to  the  respective  powers  of  deliberation  and  consent 
in  respect  to  the  budget.  In  the  former  case,  the  House  of 
Representatives  by  a  large  majority  passed  a  resolution  ar- 
raigning the  Government  for  improper  interference  in  the 
February  elections.  As  a  result  of  this  resolution,  the  ses- 
sion was  suspended  for  one  week.  The  dispute  between  the  two 
Houses  arose  from  the  fact  that  the  House  of  Peers  made 
amendments  in  the  budget  sent  up  from  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, by  restoring  some  items  expunged  by  the  latter. 
The  majority  of  the  representatives  contended  that  the  House 
of  Peers,  though  competent  to  diminish  or  expunge  items,  ex- 
ceeded its  authority  when  it  inserted  items,  because,  accord- 
ing to  the  Constitution,  the  budget  must  originate  with  the 
executive,  and  any  new  item  must  be  submitted  first  to  the 
lower  House.  The  upper  House,  however,  insisted  that  it  had 
equal  rights  of  amendment  with  the  lower  House,  and  not  only 
sent  its  amended  budget  down  a  second  time,  but  also  voted 
an  address  to  the  Throne  on  the  question  at  issue.  The  Em- 
peror, having  consulted  the  Privy  Council,  decided  that 
"neither  House  is  superior  or  inferior  to  the  other  except  .  .  . 
that  .   .  .  the  lower  House  receives  the  budget  from  the  Gov- 

(345) 


26  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

ernment  before  the  upper."  The  particular  points  at  issue  be- 
tween the  two  Houses  were  afterwards  settled  by  compromise, 
and  the  budget  was  finally  passed  on  the  last  day  of  the 
session.  But  once  again  several  important  measures  failed  to 
get  through  both  Houses. 

The  apparently  inevitable  conflict  between  the  Diet  and  the 
Government  was  continued  in  the  fourth  session,  when  it  took 
the  form  of  a  dispute  over  what  the  Constitution  terms  "fixed 
expenditures,"  and  says  "  shall  be  neither  rejected  nor  re- 
duced by  the  Imperial  Diet,  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
Government"  (Article  LXVII).  The  lower  House  called  for 
large  reductions,  especially  in  naval  expenditures;  but  the  Gov- 
ernment refused  to  entertain  the  idea,  although  the  opposi- 
tion mustered  a  large  majority.  Even  after  the  Government, 
by  suspending  the  session,  had  given  an  opportunity  for  calm 
reflection,  the  opposition  vehemently  continued  the  fight  and 
finally  carried  by  the  sweeping  majority  of  seventy-eight  an 
address  to  the  Throne  impeaching  the  Cabinet.  The  Emperor, 
with  the  advice  of  the  Privy  Council,  having  carefully  con- 
sidered the  situation,  critical  in  the  extreme,  issued  a  con- 
ciliatory and  compromise  message,  in  which  he  skillfully 
balanced  the  censure  and  the  praise  on  each  side  and  closed  by 
donating  ten  per  cent  of  the  imperial  household  allowance,1 
and  by  directing  all  civil  and  military  officials  (with  certain 
exceptions)  to  give  the  same  percentage  of  their  salaries,  for 
six  years,  to  the  fund  for  building  men-of-war.  The  total 
sum  thus  obtained  was  from  2,000,000  to  3,000,000  yen. 
This  spirit  of  compromise  was  still  further  carried  out  in  the 
remainder  of  the  budget,  which  was  reduced,  on  its  expense 
side,  by  about  3,750,000  yen.  In  this  fourth  session,  the  Diet 
also  passed  three  important  bills,  marking  long  steps  in  ad- 
vance in  the  path  of  popular  rights;  these  bills  effected  most 
desirable  amendments  in  the  copyright  law,  the  publication 
regulations,  and  the  law  of  public  meeting  and  political  asso- 
ciation. 

In   the   fifth   session,    Mr.    Hoshi,    president  of   the   lower 

1  Then  3,000,000  yen. 

(346) 


No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  DIET  2J 

House,  was  accused  of  unprofessional  conduct  as  a  lawyer  and 
of  having  abused  his  official  position  in  the  interests  of  certain 
legislation,  and  finally  not  only  deposed  from  office,  but  also 
expelled  from  membership.  Later  a  conflict  arose  between 
the  House  of  Representatives  and  the  Government  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  strict  enforcement  of  the  treaties;  this  led  to  a  sus- 
pension for  ten  days.  When  the  House  reassembled,  it  was 
deemed  by  the  Government  to  be  in  the  same  unconciliatory 
mood,  and  the  session  was  again  suspended  for  two  weeks. 
The  following  day,  however,  dissolution  was  ordered,  so  that 
practically  nothing  of  importance  was  accomplished  in  that 
session. 

The  sixth  session  was  short-lived  and  came  to  an  untimely 
end,  because  the  House  of  Representatives  passed  an  address 
to  the  Throne,  impeaching  the  Cabinet.  By  this  time  the  situ- 
ation had  become  very  critical :  the  Ito  ministry  stood  firm,  and 
the  opposition  were  aroused  by  two  dissolutions  within  six 
months ;  so  that  the  harmonious  co-operation  of  the  legislative 
and  the  executive  departments  appeared  almost  an  impossi- 
bility. At  this  juncture,  the  war  with  China  broke  out  and 
temporarily  cleared  the  political  atmosphere.  There  were, 
indeed,  those  who  claimed  that  the  Ministry  was  not  averse 
to  a  war  which  should  divert  the  minds  of  the  people  from 
politics  and  unite  the  nation  in  a  common  patriotic  cause. 

Consequently,  when  the  seventh  (extraordinary)  session 
was  convened  at  Hiroshima  in  October,  1894,  it  took  only  a 
few  days  to  get  organized  and  vote,  with  unanimity,  an  ap- 
propriation of  150,000,000  yen  for  carrying  on  the  war. 

The  eighth  session,  which  met  at  the  regular  time  two 
months  later,  also  passed  the  budget  with  absolute  unanimity, 
and  sank  all  party  differences  in  an  earnest  effort  to  support 
the  government  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

But  a  year  later,  when  the  ninth  session  began,  partisan 
feelings  were  again  aroused  in  connection  with  post-bellum 
measure^,  and  finally  resulted,  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
in  a  resolution  of  want  of  confidence  in  the  Cabinet.  This  was 
met  by  a  suspension  for  ten  days,  after  which  that  resolution 
was  voted  down.     This  result  was  due  to  a  coalition  between 

(347) 


28  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

the  Cabinet  and  the  Liberal  Party  (Jiyuto),  the  first  in  the 
history  of  constitutional  government  in  Japan.  In  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  of  this  alliance,  the  Liberal  leader,  Count 
Itagaki,  and  other  Liberal  politicians,  were  admitted  into  the 
Cabinet.  But  this  coalition  ministry  was  soon  broken  up  by 
internal  dissensions;  and  Count  Matsukata,  with  the  aid  of 
Count  Okuma  and  the  Progressives,  organized  the  next 
ministry. 

When  the  tenth  session  of  the  Diet  began,  it  was  supposed 
that  the  new  Cabinet  was  in  a  minority  in  the  lower  house;  but 
it  soon  gained  the  support  of  a  good  working  majority  and  put 
through  its  measures  with  remarkable  ease  and  celerity.  Al- 
though the  session  was  interrupted  by  frequent  recesses  on  ac- 
count of  the  death  and  funeral  of  the  Empress  Dowager,  a 
great  deal  was  accomplished.  A  national  taxation  law,  a  new 
tariff  law,  the  adoption  of  the  gold  standard,  a  radical  revision 
of  the  press  law  and  the  law  of  public  meetings  in  the  interests 
of  larger  freedom,  and  the  budget,  were  among  the  important 
measures  carried  through  both  Houses. 

But  one  year  later,  when  the  eleventh  session  was  opened, 
the  condition  had  so  materially  changed  that  a  resolution  of 
want  of  confidence  in  the  Cabinet  was  able  to  command  a  good 
majority,  and  was  on  the  point  of  being  voted  on  the  second 
day  of  the  session,  when  the  Ministry  forced  a  "  dissolution  " 
and  then  itself  resigned.  In  the  following  month  Marquis  Ito 
was  again  at  the  helm,  with  a  Cabinet  supposed  to  be  able  to 
command  the  support  of  the  Liberals. 

The  twelfth  (special)  session,  however,  was  not  of  very 
long  duration.  The  bone  of  contention  was  the  subject  of 
taxation:  the  Ministry  wished  to  obtain  a  larger  amount  of 
revenue  by  increasing  the  land  tax ;  but  the  Liberals,  who  in 
the  first  few  sessions  of  the  Diet  had  been  ardent  supporters  of 
a  reduction  of  that  tax,  did  not  dare  to  put  themselves  in  an 
apparently  inconsistent  position.  The  result  was  that  the  Gov- 
ernment was  unable  to  get  many  supporters  for  its  bill,  and, 
after  one  suspension,  again  resorted  to  dissolution,  in  less  than 
six  months  after  the  previous  one,  and  then,  like  the  preceding 
Cabinet,   resigned  office.     Although   this  sudden   end  of  the 

(34*) 


No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  DIET  2g 

session  found  some  important  measures  left  on  the  docket,  yet 
the  income-tax  law,  the  naturalization  law,  and  the  revised 
Civil  Code  were  fortunate  enough  to  get  through  both  Houses. 

The  Okuma-Itagaki  "  Party  Cabinet,"  organized  with  the 
support  of  the  new  Constitutional  party,  formed  by  the 
amalgamation  of  the  opposition  parties  and  factions,  was  soon 
broken  up  by  internal  dissensions;  and  the  new  party  itself,  be- 
cause it  was  not  a  real  union  but  only  an  amalgamation,  was 
rent  in  pieces.  But  the  temporary  alliance  had  served  its  pur- 
pose; so  that,  when  the  Yamagata  ministry  was  organized, 
theoretically  as  a  "Neutral  Cabinet,"  it  found  itself  compelled 
to  make  an  informal  alliance  with  the  Liberals. 

The  result  was  that  the  thirteenth  session  of  the  Diet  was 
harmonious  and  "  unusually  fruitful  of  legislative  works,"  as 
one  vernacular  journal  expressed  it  in  its  English  column. 
The  chief  failure  of  this  session  was  the  inability  of  the  two 
Houses  to  agree  upon  a  new  law  of  election,  by  which  the  right 
of  franchise  should  be  largely  extended  by  diminishing  the  age 
limit  and  amount  of  property  qualification.  But  many  im- 
portant measures  were  carried  through,  such  as  a  reform  of  the 
local  government  system,  the  amendment  of  the  code  of  crim- 
inal procedure,  the  increase  of  the  land-tax  and  a  budget  call- 
ing for  246,451,706  yen  of  expenditures. 

The  fourteenth  session  was  a  very  tame  one,  but  was  dis- 
tinguished by  success  in  passing  a  new  election  law.  By  this 
law  the  membership  of  the  House  of  Representatives  was  in- 
creased to  376;  the  districts  were  rearranged  to  give  urban 
populations  a  more  adequate  representation;  the  plan  of  un- 
signed uninominal  ballots  was  adopted;  the  limits  of  an  elec- 
toral district  were  extended  to  include  a  whole  prefecture,  ex- 
cept in  the  cases  of  urban  districts;  and  the  property  and  age 
qualifications  were  reduced,  so  that  the  electoral  franchise 
was  largely  extended.1  Moreover,  the  property  qualifications 
of  candidates  were  entirely  abolished. 

In  the  fifteenth  session,  the  Ito  Cabinet,  supported  by  Ito's 
newly  organized  party  (Seiyukai) ,  commanded  a  majority  in 

1  There  are  now  over  1,000,000  voters  in  parliamentary  elections. 

(349) 


30  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

the  lower  House,  but  met  strong  opposition  in  the  upper 
House.  Such  a  conservative  body  as  the  House  of  Peers  could 
not  brook  the  idea  of  having  the  leader  of  a  political  party  a£ 
Premier,  and  refused  to  pass  the  budget  which  was  sent  up 
from  the  House  of  Representatives.  When  negotiations  proved 
absolutely  fruitless,  Ito  resorted  to  the  extreme  measure  of  an 
Imperial  Rescript,  which  resulted  in  the  passage  of  the  budget. 

The  sixteenth  session  was  a  quiet  one,  because  Ito,  who  had 
been  succeeded  by  Katsura,  gave  instructions  to  his  party,  be- 
fore he  started  on  a  trip  abroad,  "  not  to  present  unreasonable 
opposition  to  the  Government." 

The  seventeenth  session  was  short-lived;  it  was  dissolved 
because  it  threw  out  Katsura's  bill  for  increased  taxation  for 
the  sake  of  securing  funds  for  naval  expansion. 

The  eighteenth  session  (special)  was  quiet,  because  a  com- 
promise had  been  effected  between  Katsura  and  the  Seiyukai. 

The  nineteenth  session  holds  the  record  (with  the  eleventh 
session)  as  the  shortest  session,  of  only  one  day.  Mr.  Kono, 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  had  introduced 
into  his  reply  to  the  address  from  the  Throne  a  short  clause 
which  amounted  to  an  impeachment  of  the  Government.  This 
use  of  a  purely  formal  document  for  partisan  purposes  could 
not  be  overlooked ;  and  dissolution  was  the  punishment. 

The  twentieth  and  the  twenty-first  sessions,  meeting  dur- 
ing the  Russo-Japanese  War,  showed  again  a  burying  of 
political  differences  and  unanimous  support  of  the  Government. 

The  twenty-second  session  opened  with  Katsura  still  in 
power,  but  in  only  a  few  days  found  him  succeeded  by  Saionji, 
who  had  followed  Ito  as  leader  of  the  Seiyukai.  This  was  a 
very  important  session  at  which  post-bellum  measures  swelling 
the  budget  to  600  million  yen,  including  the  great  expansion 
of  the  national  armament  and  the  nationalization  of  the  private 
railways,  were  passed  by  the  lower  House,  practically  without 
any  amendment.1 

The    twenty-third    and    the    twenty-fourth    sessions,    with 

1  Satoh,  Evolution  of  Political  Parties  in  Japan,  Tokyo,  1914,  p.  73. 

(350) 


No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  DIET  3! 

Saionji  continuing  as  Premier  and  the  Seiyukai  as  the  strong- 
est party  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  passed  off  quietly. 

The  twenty-fifth  session  illustrated  what  Uyehara1  calls 
"  one  of  the  anomalies  of  Japanese  domestic  politics."  The 
Seiyukai,  in  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  sup- 
ported the  non-party  Katsura  Cabinet,  which  had  been  organ- 
ized when  Saionji,  for  some  unaccountable  reason,  resigned. 
It  would  seem  that,  as  Uyehara  suggests,2  the  Seiyukai 'had 
no  other  course,  except  to  run  the  risk  of  a  dissolution  and 
the  loss  of  their  majority  in  an  expensive  election. 

The  twenty-sixth  and  the  twenty -seventh  sessions  con- 
tinued this  anomaly,  which  Katsura  called  a  "  Rapprochement 
Policy."  But  the  Seiyukai  were  enabled  during  these  sessions 
to  obtain  from  Katsura  some  concessions  in  return  for  their 
support.  For  instance,  the  Government  was  compelled  to 
agree  to  a  slight  reduction  of  the  land-tax,  a  reassessment  of 
the  taxable  value  of  land,  a  revised  tariff,  etc.  Moreover, 
attention  must  be  called  to  the  budget  for  1909- 19 10.  The 
Japan  Mail  said : 

It  may  be  described  broadly  as  the  first  really  sound  document 
of  its  kind  which  a  Japanese  Cabinet  has  been  in  a  position  to  compile 
for  some  years,  since  it  brings  expenditures  strictly  within  the  limits 
of  visible  income  and  since  it  makes  no  draft  upon  contingent  assets. 

When  the  twenty-eighth  session  met,  it  found  Saionji  again 
at  the  post  of  Premier,  with  the  Seiyukai  in  a  majority  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  so  that  everything  passed  off 
smoothly. 

The  twenty-ninth  session  was  a  special  one,  necessitated 
by  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Mutsuhito,  and  was  marked  by 
perfect  unanimity. 

The  thirtieth  session  was  a  stormy  one  from  the  very  out- 
set. The  Saionji  Cabinet  had  been  wrecked  by  the  demand 
of  the  War  Minister  (Gen.  Uyehara)   for  an  increase  of  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  253. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  254. 

(350 


32  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

army  by  two  divisions.  Katsura  had  come  back  x  to  political 
life  as  Premier  and  was  also  organizing  a  new  political  party 
(Doshikai).  The  new  Premier  and  Saionji  had  effected  an 
understanding,  by  which  an  oral  message  was  to  be  given 
by  the  new  young  Emperor  to  Saionji,  asking  him  to  use  his 
influence  to  keep  the  Seiyukai  from  pressing  its  opposition. 
But  when  Saionji  delivered  his  message  to  the  Seiyukai,  he 
found  them  strongly  united  in  declining  to  conform  to  the 
desire  of  their  President.  They  were  even  more  bitterly  op- 
posed to  Katsura  for  dragging  the  Throne  into  the  contest. 
Their  attitude,  as  Satoh  points  out  (p.  90),  "  was  tantamount 
to  disobeying  an  Imperial  command."  Katsura  suspended  the 
Diet  and  intended  to  resort  to  dissolution;  he  is  reported  to 
have  even  carried  in  his  pocket  the  Imperial  Order  for  dis- 
solution, but,  when  he  realized  the  strength  of  public  opinion 
against  him,  he  resigned.  Some  of  the  newspaper  comments 
on  this  struggle  are  interesting  and  instructive.  The  Chuo 
Shimbun,  Tokyo,  speaking  of  "  such  a  hot  encounter  between 
the  executive  and  the  legislature,"  says : 

While  its  occurrence  during  the  national  mourning  was  to  be  re- 
gretted, it  had  the  effect  of  chastising  the  clansmen  and  saying 
constitutional  government  from  ruin. 

The  Yomiuri  Shimbun,  Tokyo,  said : 

What  took  place  during  the  last  three  months  shows  that  the 
center  of  gravity  in  the  political  world  has  been  shifted  from  the 
executive  to  the  legislative  department. 

Inasmuch  as  the  new  Ministry  under  Yamamoto  was  prac- 
tically a  Seiyukai  Cabinet,  the  rest  of  the  session  was  quiet. 

The  thirty-first  session  was  not  so  peaceful.  When  it 
transpired  that  the  proposed  budget  included  a  very  large  sum 
for  naval  expansion,  while  at  the  same  time  naval  scandals 
were  being  exposed,  the  popular  disaffection  became  very  great. 
The  Seiyukai,  with  a  large  absolute  majority  as  the  result  of 

1  He  had  retired  to  the  posts  of  Lord  Keeper  of  the  Privy  Seal  and  Lord 
Chamberlain  to  the  new  Emperor  Yqshihito. 

(352) 


No.  3]  THE  IMPERIAL  DIET  33 

the  election  of  19 12,  passed  the  budget,  with  a  reduction, 
however,  of  30,000,000  yen  from  the  naval  appropriation. 
The  House  of  Peers  voted  a  reduction  of  70,000,000  yen,  "  the 
whole  of  the  new  appropriation."  When  a  conference  of  the 
two  Houses  failed  to  effect  any  compromise,  it  happened  that 
the  whole  budget  "  failed  to  materialize."  The  Yamamotc» 
Cabinet  resigned  and  the  Diet  adjourned. 

The  thirty-second,  the  thirty-third  and  the  thirty-fourth 
sessions  were  all  special  ones.  The  first  one  was  necessitated 
by  the  death  of  the  Empress-Dowager  and  was  marked  by 
unanimity.  The  thirty-third  session  presented  the  interest- 
ing spectacle  of  the  new  Okuma  Cabinet,  with  only  a  small 
number  of  supporters  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  con- 
fronting the  Seiyukai  with  its  large  absolute  majority.  Al- 
though the  Ministry  was  implacable,  yet,  as  its  program  pre- 
sented no  great  issue  for  a  difference  of  opinion,  the  Seiyukai 
wisely  refrained  from  carrying  their  opposition  so  far  as  to 
refuse  to  pass  the  important  special  budget.  The  thirty- 
fourth  session,  necessitated  by  Japan's  ultimatum  to  Germany, 
was  harmonious. 

The  thirty-fifth  session  (ordinary),  however,  found  the 
Seiyukai  taking  a  firm  stand  against  the  Government  on  the 
budget,  on  the  ground  of  opposition  to  the  army  increment 
feature;  so  that  Okuma  decided  to  appeal  to  the  people  by 
a  dissolution. 

The  thirty-sixth  session  (special),  with  the  Okuma 
Cabinet  supported  by  a  large  absolute  majority,  obtained  in 
the  election,  passed  the  army  increment  bill  which  had 
wrecked  two  strong  cabinets.  And  it  is  one  of  the  frequent 
paradoxes  of  Japanese  politics,  that  the  popular  Premier 
Okuma  finally  put  through  that  most  unpopular  measure. 

After  this  somewhat  detailed  consideration  of  the  thirty- 
six  sessions  of  the  Imperial  Diet,  it  may  be  profitable  to 
examine  the  tables  on  pages  25  and  26;  for  they  throw  some 
light  on  various  points.  It  is  instructive  to  note  that,  during 
the  first  decade,  there  were  fourteen  sessions  (of  which,  of 
course,  four  were  special)  ;  five  cases  each  of  suspension  and 
dissolution,  the  latter  of  which  necessitated  five  special  elec- 

(353) 


34  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN 

tions;  that  no  House  was  permitted  to  serve  out  its  full  term 
of  four  years,  except  the  one  which  was  elected  in  August,  1898, 
and  which  ran  over  into  the  next  period.  This  we  shall  make 
a  half  decade,  during  which  there  were  seven  sessions  (two 
special  sessions)  ;  three  cases  of  suspension  and  two  of  dis- 
solution, the  latter  of  which  necessitated  two  special  elections ; 
and  one  House,  elected  in  March,  1904,  served  out  its  full 
term,  almost  all  of  which  was  in  the  next  period.  On  the 
other  hand,  during  the  last  decade,  there  have  been  fifteen 
sessions  (five  special  ones),  with  only  a  single  suspension 
and  a  single  dissolution  and  one  special  election.  And  the 
last  dissolution,  on  December  25,  19 14,  was  really  in  the  inter- 
ests of  constitutionalism.  In  fact,  as  one  looks  down  the  table 
of  sessions  of  the  Diet  for  twelve  years,  from  1903  to  191 5, 

I*  he  cannot  help  noticing  one  of  the  most  significant  proofs  of 
the  progress  of  constitutionalism  in  Japan.     And,  if  one  com- 
pares that  table  with  the  table  of  Cabinets,  he  will  not  fail  to 
observe  that  there  have  been  more  dissolutions  of  the  Ministry 
than  of  the  Diet  for  the  past  ten  or  twelve  years.     In  spite  of 
the  fact  that  the  longer  tenure  of  the  members  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  was  often  gained  by  unholy  alliances  with  the 
I  administration,  on  the  whole,  there  is  good  reason  for  encour- 
?  agement  over  the  general  progress  of  representative  institu- 
[  tions  in  Japan. 

(354) 


VI.  THE  JUDICIARY 

The  Japanese  Constitution  has  comparatively  little  to  say 
on  the  subject  of  judicature,  and  only  in  very  general  state- 
ments. It  is  doubtless  for  the  best  not  to  have  the  judiciary 
system  too  strictly  limited  by  hard  and  fast  constitutional  pro- 
visions. It  is  wise  that  merely  "  glittering  generalities  "  are 
given  and  that  the  details  of  organization  are  left  to  more 
flexible  arrangements.     Article  LVII  reads  as  follows: 

The  Judicature  shall  be  exercised  by  the  Courts  of  Law  according 
to  law,  in  the  name  of  the  Emperor.  The  organization  of  the  Courts 
of  Law  shall  be  determined  by  law. 

Ito  explains  this  in  the  following  terms  : 

The  Sovereign  is  the  fountain  of  justice,  and  His  judicial  author- 
ity is  nothing  more  than  a  form  of  the  manifestation  of  sovereign 
power.  Therefore  judgment  shall  be  pronounced  in  the  name  of  the 
Emperor,  the  judicial  authority  in  this  respect  representing  Him 
in  His  sovereign  power.1 

Concerning  judges  it  was  merely  provided  that 

The  judges  shall  be  appointed  from  among  those  who  possess 
proper  qualifications  according  to  law.  No  judge  shall  be  deprived 
of  his  position,  unless  by  way  of  criminal  sentence  or  disciplinary 
punishment.  Rules  for  disciplinary  punishment  shall  be  determined 
by  law.2 

Ito  gives  the  following  explanation : 

In  order  to  remain  impartial  and  fair  in  trials,  the  judges  ought 
to  occupy  an  independent  position,  free  from  the  interference  of 
power,  and  should  never  be  influenced  by  the  interest  of  the  mighty 
or  by  the  heat  of  political  controversies.3 

Satoh  4   calls  attention  to  one  striking  illustration   of  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  ioi.  2  Article  LVIII. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  105.  4  Op.  cit.,  pp.  45,  46. 

(355) 


36  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

independence  of  the  judiciary.  It  was  in  connection  with  the 
trial  of  the  man  who  assaulted  and  wounded  the  Czare- 
witch  (now  Czar)  of  Russia  at  Otsu  in  1 891.  An  attempt  was 
made  to  consider  it  a  special  case  for  political  purposes.  But 
the  court  stood  firm  to  judge  the  case  purely  from  the  legal 
point  of  view  and  condemned  the  assailant,  not  to  capital  pun- 
ishment (as  desired  by  the  Government),  but  to  life  imprison- 
ment, which  was  the  maximum  punishment  by  law  in  such  a 
case.     Satoh  adds: 

This  was  not  only  a  technical  point  of  thrilling  importance,  but 
was  indeed  a  landmark  of  great  prominence  in  the  path  of  Japan's 
progress  as  a  constitutional  nation.  Here  the  principle  of  entire 
independence  of  the  judiciary  from  the  executive  was  permanently 
and  most  conspicuously  established. 

There  is  one  more  important  provision,  in  Article  LIX,  that 

trials  and  judgments  of  a  Court  shall  be  conducted  publicly. 

When,  however,  there  exists  any  fear,  that  such  publicity  may 
be  prejudicial  to  peace  and  order,  or  to  the  maintenance  of  public 
morality,  the  public  trial  may  be  suspended  by  provision  of  law  or 
by  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Law. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the  Japanese  judiciary  has  no 
power  to  interpret  the  Constitution.  Such  power,  as  has  been 
pointed  out  in  preceding  sections,  resides  entirely  with  the 
Emperor. 

Moreover,  the  ordinary  Japanese  court  of  law  has  no  juris- 
diction, according  to  Article  LXI,  in  any 

suit  at  law,  which  relates  to  rights  alleged  to  have  been  infringed  by 
the  illegal  measures  of  the  administrative  authorities,  and  which  shall 
come  within  the  competency  of  the  Court  of  Administrative  Litiga- 
tion specially  established  by  law. 

This  leads  Uyehara  '  to  make  the  following  comment : 

There  is  nothing  in  the  Constitution  to  safeguard  the  rights  and 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  132. 

(356) 


No.  3]  THE  JUDICIARY  37 

liberties  of  the  people  from  the  encroachment  of  the  permanent 
executive  officials. 

For  the  Cabinet  has  "  almost  sole  control "  over  the  Court 
of  Administrative  Litigation,  whose  "  scope  is  extensive ", 
for  it 

adjudicates  in  all  cases  relating  to  the  assessment  of  taxes,  with  the 
exception  of  custom  duties,  [and  to]  the  punishment  of  defaulting 
taxpayers;  the  prohibition  of  withdrawal  of  permission  to  engage  in 
business ;  water  rights  and  works  (matters  mostly  concerning  irriga- 
tion) \  and  disputes  between  the  State  and  individual  concerning  the 
ownership  of  land. ' 

One  is  tempted  to  enter  upon  a  discussion  of  the  modern 
Japanese  judiciary  system,  which  has  been  subjected  to  a  great 
deal  of  severe  criticism.  It  will  however  suffice  in  this  con- 
nection to  state  that,  in  general,  the  system  is  a  marked  im- 
provement over  the  so-called  administration  of  law  in  feudal 
days,  and  that  justice  and  equity  generally  prevail.  The  fam- 
ous Korean  conspiracy  trial  was  not  carried  on  according 
to  Anglo-Saxon  ideas  of  judicature  and  seemed  to  be  a  mis- 
carriage of  justice;  so  that  when  Imperial  Amnesty  was 
granted,  in  February  191 5,  to  those  who  had  been  declared 
guilty  and  had  served  part  of  their  sentence,  it  was  a  cause  of 
great  rejoicings  The  Japanese  system,  modeled  after  the 
systems  of  the  continent  of  Europe,  including  a  preliminary 
examination,  with  methods  amounting  practically  to  torture  in 
some  cases ;  the  delay  in  granting  bail,  if  it  be  granted  at  all ; 
the  apparent  idea  that  a  man  is  considered  guilty  until  he  is 
proven  innocent — these  and  other  minor  points  are  counter 
to  Anglo-Saxon  ideas  of  justice  and  equity.  They  have  all 
been  the  object  of  severe  criticism,  not  only  by  foreigners  but 
also  by  Japanese;  and  they  are  likely  to  be  modified  in  a  way 
to  give  the  police  less  power  and  the  accused  greater  protection. 
And  only  lately  there  has  been  a  lively  discussion  whether 
the  system  of  trial  by  jury  should  be  adopted  in  Japan. 

1  Ibid.,  p.   141.  1 

(357) 


VII.  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  SUBJECTS 

The  Japanese  Constitution  contains  fifteen  Articles  (XVIII- 
XXXIII)  on  the  topic  of  the  duties  and  the  rights  of  subjects. 
It  states  that  the  conditions  necessary  for  being  a  Japanese 
subject  shall  be  determined  by  law.  It  permits  Japanese  sub- 
jects, according  to  certain  qualifications,  to  hold  public  office. 
It  makes  them  amenable  to  military  service  and  to  payment  of 
taxes,  according  to  law.  It  specifies  that  they  shall  have  liberty 
of  abode  within  the  limits  of  law;  that  their  right  of  property 
shall  remain  inviolate;  that  their  houses  shall  not  be  entered 
or  searched  without  their  consent,  except  in  cases  provided 
for  in  the  law;  that  the  secrecy  of  their  letters  shall  remain 
inviolate,  except  in  cases  mentioned  in  law.  It  gives  them 
permission  to  present  petitions,  under  certain  proper  conditions. 

It  declares : 

No  Japanese  subject  shall  be  arrested,  detained,  tried  or  punished, 
unless  according  to  law  (Article  XXIII). 

No  Japanese  subject  shall  be  deprived  of  his  right  of  being  tried 
by  the  judges  determined  by  law  (Article  XXIV). 

It  also  prescribes  that 

Japanese  subjects  shall,  within  the  limits  of  law,  enjoy  the  liberty 
of  speech,  writing,  publication,  public  meetings  and  association 
(Article  XXIX)  ; 


and  that 


W^V^ 


Japanese  subjects  shall,  within  limits  not  prejudicial  to  peace  and 
order,  and  not  antagonistic  to  their  duties  as  subjects,  enjoy  freedom 
of  religious  belief  (Article  XXVIII) . 

It  will  of  course  be  observed,  that  all  the  immunities  and 
privileges  of  Japanese  subjects  are  limited  by  such  conditions 
as  "  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  law  ",  "  except  in  the 
cases  provided  for  in  the  law  ",  "  wkhin  limits  not  prejudicial 

(358) 


RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  SUBJECTS 


39 


to  peace  and  order  ",  etc.-  It  may,  therefore,  be  correct  to  say, 
as  Uyehara  says :  "  The  Constitution  of  Japan  provides  no 
absolute  guarantee  in  respect  of  civil  rights  and  liberties."  * 
He  also  states  rather  strongly : 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  that  part  of  the  Constitution  which  deals | 
with  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people  is  a  mere  ornamental  1 
flourish,  so  long  as  the  Government  is  not  responsible  to  the  people.2' 

On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that,  during 
the  first  twenty-five  years  of  constitutionalism  in  Japan,  great 
progress  has  been  made  in  the  extension  of  popular  rights  and 
privileges  by  laws  which  have  been  enacted.  If  the  reader 
will  kindly  take  the  trouble  to  glance  back  over  the  review 
of  the  thirty-six  sessions  of  the  Diet,  he  can  see  for  himself 
that  this  statement  is  true.  He  should  notice  especially  what 
was  accomplished  in  the  fourth,  the  tenth,  the  thirteenth, 
and  the  fourteenth  sessions  in  the  way  of  extending  popu- 
lar rights  and  privileges.  And  this  advance  is  a  kind  of\ 
guarantee  of  still  greater  progress  under  more  favorable! 
conditions  all  along  the  line  of  popular  government.  In 
appraising  the  value  of  what  has  been  accomplished,  though 
it  is  far  from  being  satisfactory,  one  must  be  careful  not  to 
pass  judgment  according  to  the  standard  of  Anglo-Saxon  ideas 
of  individual  rights  and  privileges.  It  is  fair  only  to  compare 
the  Japan  of  191 5  with  the  Japan  of  1890.  The  writer  was 
living  in  Japan  (in  Mito),  when  the  Constitution  was  promul- 
gated (1889)  and  when  the  first  Diet  met  (1890)  ;  and  he  can 
testify  from  personal  observation  and  experience  to  the  pro- 
gress which  has  been  made  in  a  quarter  of  a  century  in  the 
expansion  of  personal  rights  and  liberty. 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  183. 

2  ibid.,  p.  186. 

(359) 


VIII.  POLITICAL  PARTIES 

This  is  another  topic  which  is  not  mentioned  in  the  Japanese 
Constitution,  but  which  is  a  natural  and  necessary  outgrowth 
of  constitutionalism.  Political  parties  are  important  organs 
of  representative  institutions.  It  is  not  necessary  to  enter 
into  a  lengthy  discussion  of  this  topic  which  is  more  fully 
treated  by  the  writer  in  The  Political  Science  Quarterly  for 
December,  191 2.  And  still  more  recently  (June,  1914),  Mr. 
Henry  Satoh  has  published  a  book,  Evolution  of  Political 
Parties  in  Japan,  to  which  some  references  have  already  been 
made.      Uyehara  also  discusses  this  topic.1 

The  history  of  political  parties  in  Japan  may  be  divided 
£nto  the  following  periods:  (1)  embryonic  period,  1867- 1882  ; 
(2)  organizing  period,  1882-1890;  (3)  developing  period, 
1890-1898;  (4)  influential  period,  1898-1911;  (5)  predomi- 
nant   period,    191 1 .       But    in    this    connection,    we    are 

specially  concerned  only  with  the  three  periods  from  1890  to 
the  present  time. 

The  first  national  election,  on  July  4,  1890,  resulted  in  the 
return  of  members  divided  among  ten  small  groups,  some  of 
which  however  succeeded  in  amalgamating  into  four  or  five 
parties,  of  which  the  largest  one  was  the  Jiyuto,  or  Liberal 
Party.  For  several  years  the  Liberals  and  the  Progressives 
(Kaishinto  or  Shimpoto)  were  the  most  prominent  parties; 
and  each  in  turn  was  sought  in  alliance  by  the  Government. 
In  1898,  those  two  parties,  burying  the  hatchet,  united  in 
organizing  the  Kenseito,  or  Constitutional  party.  This  new 
party  was  suddenly  called  upon  to  form  a  Cabinet,  generally 
known  as  the  Okuma-Itagaki  Ministry,  from  the  leaders  of 
the  two  parties  that  had  united.  This  hyphenated  Ministry 
soon   fell   a  prey  to   internal   dissensions;   and   the   coalition, 

1  Kawakami,  The  Political  Ideas  of  Modern  Japan,  Shokwabo,  Tokyo,  1903 ; 
and  Lay's  paper  in  the  Transactions  of  the  Asiatic  Society  of  Japan,  Tokyo, 
Vol.  XXX,  pp.  363-462,  are  also  valuable. 

(36o) 


POLITICAL  PARTIES  41 

which  was  only  an  amalgamation,  was  dissolved  into  its  ori- 
ginal elements.    In  1900  Ito's  new  party,  the  Seiyukai,  of  which! 
the  old  Liberals  formed  the  nucleus,  was  suddenly  called  on 
to  form  a  Ministry,  which  was  also  short-lived.     These  at- 
tempts at  party  government  seem  to  have  been  premature;  but 
they  served  to  indicate  the  trend  of  events.       Moreover,   as 
Uyehara  puts  it,  concerning  the  first  attempt,  "  its  real  im- 
portance lies  in  the  fact  that  it  had  completely  disposed  of  the 
prejudice  that  a  person   directly   connected   with   a  political  j 
party  could  not  become  a  Cabinet  minister."  x     The  second  J 
Saionji  and  the  Yamamoto  ministries  were  strongly  "  party/ 
cabinets  " ;  and  Okuma's  is  still  more  so,  albeit  it  is  also  aj 
"personal  cabinet",  in  which  Okuma  is  indisputably  "Premier". 

And  this  is  a  reminder  of  one  of  the  peculiar  features  of  | 
Japanese  political  parties.     That  is  the  personal  element  by/ 
which  factions  and  parties  have  rallied  around  men  more  than' 
measures,  persons  rather  than  principles.     This  feature  is,  of  \ 
course,  a  survival  of  the  feudal  system,  as  has  been  pointed  | 
out  by  Ozaki    (now   Minister  of  Justice)    in   an   article  in   a 
magazine  called  Shinseiki  (New  Century).     He  said:  "The 
fact  is  that  the  majority  of  our  politicians  are  still  subject  to 
feudal  notions.     Their  attitude  to  the  president  of  a  party  is 
precisely  that  of  the  retainers  of  a  daimyo  to  their  lord." 

Another  peculiarity  is  that  party  ties  are  loose  and  party  .t 
principles  are  indefinite.      Individuals  do  not  find  it  difficult  | 
to  shift  allegiance  from  one  party  or  faction  to  another,  often  ■ 
without  sacrificing  their  principles,  if  they  have  any!     This  is 
largely  due  to  the  indefiniteness  and  generalities  of  party  plat- 
forms, or  the  lack  of  positively  distinguishing  principles  separ- 
ating parties.      For  instance,  the  same  party  has  been  found, 
according  to  circumstances,  either  in  support  of  or  in  opposi- 
tion to  an  increase  of  the  land-tax.     Okuma  and  Ozaki,  now 
"  in  ",  have  put  through  the  army  increment  scheme,  which 
they  vigorously  opposed,  when  "  out  " ;  and  they  do  not  mind 
the  charge  of  inconsistency.     They  seem  to  agree  with  Emerson 
that  "  a  foolish  consistency  is  the  hobgoblin  of  little  minds  ". 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  241. 

(361) 


42 


CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN 


Japanese  political  parties,  in  spite  of  their  faults,  have  cer- 
tainly made  great  progress.  The  Japan  Times,  on  October 
12,  191 1,  wrote  that  party  government  would  be  welcome 
"  notwithstanding  all  the  evils  of  the  party  system,  because  it 
will  get  rid  of  a  self-bureaucracy,  assuming  the  leadership  of 
the  nation  ".     Satoh  says: 

The  formation  of  the  Okuma  Government  thus  proves  to  be  a 
victory  of  the  principle  of  party  government,  and  the  Premier,  Count 
Okuma,  has  now  the  satisfaction  of  having  come  out  triumphant  over 
his  enemies  after  his  many  years'  fight  for  the  constitutional  progress 
of  his  beloved  country.1 

It  now  seems  quite  evident  that  the  Japanese  political  parties, 
imperfect  though  they  are,  have  behind  them  the  people  of  the 
•Empire. 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  106. 

(362) 


IX.  PUBLIC  OPINION 

One  of  the  most  significant  phases  of  the  political  progress 
made   in   New   Japan   during  the  past  twenty-five  years   ofi 
constitutionalism  has  been  the  development  of  an  expressivej 
public  opinion.     During  the  feudal  system  there  was,  from 
one  point  of  view,  no  public  opinion ;  or  at  the  best,  it  was  very 
narrow  and  local  in  its  sphere  of  action.     But  along  with  the. 
granting  of  popular  rights  and  privileges,  with  the  spread  of  J 
education,  with  the  growing  importance  and  power  of  the  pressj 
there  has  been  a  most  gratifying  evolution  of  public  opinion. 
It  is  true,  "  and  pity  'tis  'tis  true  ",  that  often  the  most  evident 
manifestation  of  that  opinion  has  been  in  mob  violence.     But 
in  spite  of  that  unfortunate,  though  perhaps  inevitable,  con- 
comitant, public  opinion,  as  expressed  in  the  press  and  on  the 
platform,  can  no  longer  be  ignored,  but  must  always  be  taken 
into  consideration.     And  the  Japanese  press,  in  spite  of  the 
existence  of  "  yellow  journalism  ",  is  a  creator  and  expresser 
of  sound  public  opinion. 

There  can  be  little  if  any  doubt  that  it  was  nothing  but  the 
power  of  public  opinion  which  overwhelmed  the  Katsura  Min- 
istry in  February,  191 3,  after  less  than  two  months  of  official 
life.  And  it  was  likewise  the  fact  that  public  opinion  held  the 
Yamamoto  Ministry  responsible  for  the  naval  scandals  which 
forced  that  Cabinet  out  of  power  in  March,  1914,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  it  was  supported  by  the  Seiyukai  with  a  big  major- 
ity in  the  House  of  Representatives.  And  it  was  public  opinion 
which  upheld  the  Okuma  Cabinet  for  several  months  against 
that  hostile  Seiyukai  majority  and  finally,  in  the  election  of 
March,  19 15,  completely  turned  the  tables  and  gave  Okuma  a 
big  majority.  Of  course,  public  opinion  is  likely  to  be  more 
or  less  fickle  and  sometimes  even  unjust.  In  191 3,  the  Seiyukai 
members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  were  the  popular 
idols  on  account  of  their  resolute  opposition  to  Katsura:  in 

(363) 


44  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

1914,  because  they  supported  the  Yamamoto  Cabinet,  they  were 

in  danger  of  suffering  personal  indignities  at  the  hands  of  a 

mob,  and  had  to  be  specially  protected  from  violence.     Verily, 

the  populace  are  iconoclasts  as  well  as  hero-worshipers. 

/     It  goes  without  saying  that  public  opinion  in  Japan  would 

/be  less  violent  and  more  regular,  and  so  more  powerful,  if 

{  a  larger  number  of  people  possessed  the  electoral  franchise. 

The  number  of  electors  has,  it  is  true,  increased  considerably 

in   twenty-five   years,    as   may   be   seen    from   the    following 

statistics :  * 

1890 453474 

1892  460,914 

1894  464,278 

1896  467,607 

1898 501,459 

1902  983>i93 

1904  757,788 

1908  1,582,676 

1912  1,503,968 

[1915  1,546,241] 

The  increase  in  1902  was  due  to  the  lowering  of  the  property 
qualification.  The  decrease  in  1904  was  due  to  the  lowering 
of  the  land-tax.  The  increase  in  1908  was  due  to  the  extension 
of  the  electoral  franchise  to  the  Hokkaido  and  several  new 
urban  districts.  The  increase  in  191 5  was  due  to  the  extension 
of  the  franchise  to  the  Okinawa  prefecture. 

One  discouraging  feature  has  been  that  so  many  of  the 
electors  did  not  exercise  their  privilege.     An  improvement  in 

ithis  respect  would  doubtless  follow  the  complete  establishment 
of  party  government  and  a  wider  extension  of  the  franchise. 
The  election  in  March,  191 5,  indeed,  showed  a  marked  im- 
provement. Whereas  the  average  rate  of  non-voters  among 
the  electors  was  almost  12  per  cent  in  1898,  almost  14  per  cent 
in  1903  and  1904,  over  14  per  cent  in  1908,  and  about  10. 1  per 
cent  in  191 2,  in  191 5,  it  was  only  8  per  cent.  These  figures 
are  eloquent. 

1  Japan  Year  Book  for  191 2  and  19 14. 

(364) 


No.  3]  PUBLIC  OPINION  45 

The  following  are  the  full  statistics  *  of  the  election  of  191 5  : 

Number  of  electors    1,546,241 

Number   of  non-voters    121,548 

Number  of  voters  1,424,693 

Number  of  invalid   votes    7,557 

Number  of  valid  votes 1,417,136 

These  figures  show  that  a  larger  proportion  of  the  electorsi 
than  ever  before  appreciated  the  value  of  the  "  precious  one/ 
vote  ". 

Woman  suffrage  is  fortunately  not  yet  an  issue  in  Japan;! 
but  universal  male  suffrage  has  been  discussed.  A  bill  to  that 
effect  once  passed  the  House  of  Representatives  but  was  shelved 
in  the  House  of  Peers.  Indeed,  it  may  not  be  wise  to  pass  too 
suddenly  to  such  an  extreme  as  universal  suffrage;  it  may  be 
better  to  extend  the  franchise  gradually  by  reducing  the 
amount  of  the  tax  qualification  required  for  eligibility  to  vote. 
It  is  expected  that  the  Okuma  Cabinet,  if  it  survives  till  the 
next  regular  session  of  the  Diet  in  the  winter  of  next  year 
(1916),  will  introduce  an  electoral  reform  bill  to  round  out  the 
quarter  century  of  constitutionalism  in  Japan. 

1  Furnished  by  Hon.  Sho  Nemoto,  M.  P. 

(365) 


X.  CONCLUSION 

It  is  certainly  desirable  to  ascertain  what  conclusions  and 
inferences  may  fairly  be  drawn  from  what  has  been  recorded 
above.  In  the  first  place  it  is  quite  evident  that,  when  one 
writes  of  the  Government  in  Japan,  a  capital  "  G  "  should  be 
employed.  There  is  nothing  small  or  weak  about  the  adminis- 
tration, whether  national,  provincial,  municipal,  or  what  not. 
I  It  all  centers  about  the  national  administration  in  Tokyo ;  it  is 
a  case  of  centralization;  it  is  a  centripetal  form  of  govern- 
ment; it  gravitates  around  and  toward  the  Imperial  palace  in 
Tokyo.  It  was  with  good  reason  that  Dr.  W.  E.  Griffis  called 
his  first  great  work  on  Japan  The  Mikado's  Empire ;  for  the 
Empire  belongs  to  the  Emperor.  And  it  is  also  with  good 
reason  that  Dr.  Griffis  gives  the  title  of  The  Mikado  to  his 
most  recent  work.  A  book  entitled  Japan  to  America,  com- 
piled by  Mr.  Naoichi  Masaoka,  and  published  by  Putnams 
(1914),  includes  a  contribution  of  a  few  pages  (100-103)  by 
Mr.  Iechiro  Tokutomi,  the  able  editor  of  the  Kokumin  Shim- 
bun,  Tokyo,  on  "  Centripetal  Mikadoism  ".  We  quote  here 
some  of  Mr.  Tokutomi's  expressions : 

C  1  But  our  imperialism,  our  democratism,  our  socialism — all  these 
(center  upon  a  single  principle,  and  it  is  "  centripetal  Mikadoism  ", 
as  we  express  it  and  advocate  it.  Rome  was,  at  one  time,  the  center 
of  the  Roman  Empire;  hence  the  adage,  "All  roads  lead  to  Rome  ". 
In  a  like  manner,  the  Mikado  is  the  center  of  our  nation.  Con- 
sidered as  a  body  politic,  it  has  him  as  its  sovereign ;  considered 
as  a  distinct  race,  it  has  him  as  its  leader;  considered  as  a  social 
community,  it  has  him  as  its  nucleus.  Who  can,  then,  contradict 
me  when  I  say  that  all  our  "  isms  " — social,  racial  and  political — 
are  included,  involved,  implicated,  by  this  "  centripetal  Mikadoism  "? 

And  he  attributes  Japan's  "  great  socio-economic  revolution  " 
to  the  "  automatic  process  "  of  that  u  centripetal  Mikadoism  ". 
Another  natural  inference  from  these  studies  is  that  custom 
is  more  powerful  than  law.     Or,  to  express  the  idea  in  another 

(366) 


W 


CONCLUSION  47 

way,  it  takes  a  long  time  for  a  new  law  to  establish  itself  against 
an  old  custom.  The  feudal  system  had  been  so  strongly  in- 
trenched in  Japan,  that,  even  after  it  was  nominally  abolished, 
it  persisted  in  fact  in  many  survivals  which  die  hard.  It  is 
true  that  there  is  a  strong  popular  demand  for  more  representa- 
tive institutions ;  it  is  also  true  that  the  mass  of  the  people  are 
somewhat  contented  with  the  status  quo  and  are  rather  submis- 
sive in  spirit.  They  still  endure  official  surveillance  and  hold 
officialdom  in  awe;  they  take  off  their  hats  when  speaking  to 
a  policeman.  The  survival  of  absolutism  may  be  seen  in  the 
tendency  to  establish  Government  monopolies  and  to  national- 
ize industries.  The  survival  of  feudalism  is  evident  in  the 
political  party  system,  where  clannishness  still  prevails  and 
loyalty  to  men  is  stronger  than  fidelity  to  principle. 

Another  conclusion  one  may  reach  is  that  nominality  does 
not  always  correspond  with  reality.  The  Japanese  have  a 
common  expression,  yumei-mufitsu,  which  means  literally 
"  having  name  without  reality  ".  A  certain  thing  may  be 
so  only  in  name,  not  in  reality ;  nominally  so,  but  not  really  so. 
This  is  a  criticism  which  some  have  brought  against  Japan's 
present  political  system;  that  it  is  only  nominally,  not  really, 
constitutionalism.  This  may  bejtrue  to  a  certain  extent;  the 
same  political  phrases  do  not  connote  exactly  the  same  things 
in  all  countries.  But  there  is  another  phase  of  this  nominality. 
Theoretically  and  nominally,  the  central  Government,  for  in- 
stance, has  control  over  each  prefectural  Government:  the 
Emperor  appoints  the  Governor  of  each  Prefecture;  and  the 
Minister  of  Home  Affairs  has  the  authority  to  dissolve  a 
Prefectural  Assembly;  but  he  rarely  exercises  that  authority. 
Both  the  Minister  and  the  Governor,  though  they  are  centraliz- 
ing officials,  prefer  to  respect  local  public  opinion  in  local 
affairs. 

It  is  not  without  profit  to  pay  a  little  attention  to  the  new 
election  law.  The  process  seems  somewhat  complicated  and 
long-drawn-out,  so  that  it  requires  several  meetings  with  vari- 
ous officials.  First,  there  is  the  casting  of  the  ballot  under  one 
set  of  officials;  secondly,  there  is  the  counting  of  the  ballots 
under  the  same  or  a  different  set  of  officials;  and,  thirdly, 

(367) 


48  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

there  is  the  election  meeting,  under  another  set  of  officials 
(part  of  whom,  however,  may  be  the  same),  to  decide  the 
result  of  the  election.  Possibly  this  long  process  may  insure 
a  minimum  of  fraud  and  interference. 

We  have  already  called  attention  to  the  radical  changes 
effected  by  this  new  law;  and  concerning  its  results  we  quote 
Uyehara,  as  follows: 

The  new  law  greatly  improved  the  electoral  system  by  securing  a 
better  representation  of  the  different  classes  of  the  people  and  of  the 
different  prefectures,  by  extending  the  choice  of  candidates,  and  by 
abolishing  open  voting;  and  it  works,  as  a  whole,  very  much  better 
than  the  old  law.1 

The  political  campaign  of  the  special  election  of  March  25, 
191 5,  calls  for  comment  in  this  connection,  because  it  illustrates 
some  points  in  the  evolution  of  popular  institutions  in  Japan. 

Ehe  conduct  of  a  political  campaign  had  become  too  formal 
nd  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  professional  canvassing 
gents;  so  that  to  some  extent  the  yen  had  become  mightier 
than  the  pen.  The  cost  of  election  had  grown  to  be  enormous, 
except  in  the  very  few  cases  in  which  a  candidate  was  so  for- 
tunate as  to  meet  with  little  or  no  opposition.  It  was,  of 
course,  a  matter  of  discussion  as  to  what  constituted  the  legal 
expenses  of  a  campaign ;  and  it  required  no  little  care  and  abil- 
ity to  steer  clear  between  the  Scylla  and  the  Charybdis  of 
parsimony  and  bribery.  It  seemed  to  demand  several  thous- 
and yen  for  an  "  average  man  "  to  carry  on  a  campaign  in  a 
strictly  legal  manner.  This  sum  would  include  such  items  as 
printing,  postage,  advertising,  rent  of  offices,  carriage  hire,  and 
speech-making  expenses. 

House-to-house  canvassing  is  one  special  feature  of  a  cam- 
paign and  is  here  dubbed  "  the  submarine  attack  ".  It  has 
been  carried  on  by  teachers,  family  doctors,  female  hair- 
dressers, et  al. ;  and  it  has  been  especially  utilized,  in  a  few 
cases,  by  female  members  of  the  family  of  the  candidate.  This 
feature  of  women  as  campaigners  has  been  strongly  discussed, 
pro  and  con,  by  the  press. 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  179. 

(368) 


No.  3]  CONCLUSION  49 

In  the  campaign  of  191 5,  speech-making  was  a  more  promi- 
nent feature  than  ever.  Ozaki,  Minister  of  Justice,  and  the 
Premier  himself  actually  "  took  the  stump ".  One  unique 
feature  of  the  campaign  was  the  sight  of  Okuma  on  a  trip  west- 
ward by  rail,  making  short  speeches  from  the  car-window  at 
important  stations.  Another  unique  feature  was  the  fact  that, 
at  many  places  where  the  presence  of  Ozaki  or  Okuma  was 
impossible,  their  "tinned  speeches"  were  heard  from  the  phono- 
graph. And  an  opposition  candidate  went  one  better  by  letting 
Ozaki  speak  through  the  machine  but  stopping  it  every  few 
minutes  to  answer  Ozaki's  points.  There  certainly  never  has 
been  such  a  "  popular  "  campaign. 

It  may  be  added  that  the  landslide  to  Okuma  was  the  popu- 
lar response  to  this  campaign.  It  was  a  personal  victory  for 
the  "  grand  old  man  ",  because  he  was  not  afraid  to  appeal  to 
the  people.  The  army  increment  scheme,  which  had  been 
the  principal  issue  in  bringing  about  the  dissolution,  was 
scarcely  mentioned  in  the  campaign.  Even  the  important 
negotiations  with  China  cut  little  figure;  although  they  prob- 
ably had  more  weight  than  the  two-division  increase.  The 
result  of  the  election  was  not  so  much  pro-Doshikai  as  anti- 
Seiyukai.  It  was  not  that  the  electorate  loved  the  Doshikai 
more  but  the  Seiyukai  less.  It  was  a  question  chiefly  of 
Okuma  or  Hara  (present  leader  of  the  Seiyukai).  It  was 
because  the  people  trusted  Okuma.  And  when  Okuma's  great 
victory  was  announced  to  him,  he  remarked :  "  Now  we  can 
witness  the  dawn  of  real  constitutionalism  in  Japan  ". 

Dr.  Ukita,  editor-in-chief  of  the  great  monthly  magazine, 
Taiyo  (Sun),  has  discussed,  in  quite  an  interesting  manner, 
the  change  of  methods  in  national  elections.  According  to 
a  summary  of  his  article,  he  expressed  these  sentiments: 

He  divides  the  history  of  parliamentary  campaigns  into  three 
periods, — namely,  the  robbery,  the  jobbery,  and  the  begging  periods. 
These  vicissitudes  in  the  history  of  elections  in  Japan  may,  he  re- 
marks, be  considered  either  progress  or  degeneration  according  to 
the  point  of  view.  In  the  first  period  the  voters  were  forced  to 
elect  men  whether  they  liked  them  or  not  by  a  display  of  force, 

(369) 


50  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

giving  much  occupation  to  the  sashi  [ruffians],  who  freely  made  use 
of  swords  and  revolvers  for  the  purpose  of  intimidation.  As  time 
passed,  and  men  grew  wiser  by  experience,  they  began  to  realize  that 
it  was  more  effective  and  profitable  to  collect  votes  by  the  dis- 
pensation of  money  than  by  threats  of  violence.  More  lately  begging 
has  come  to  be  a  popular  and  effective  method  of  collecting  votes, 
and  is  tried  by  many  candidates  side  by  side  with  the  buying-up 
process.  Some  may  argue  that  the  change  from  robber  to  beggar 
implies  degeneration,  while  others  may  consider  the  change  to  imply 
progress  as  discarding  barbarous  in  favor  of  more  "  civilized  "  meth- 
ods. Now  that  robbery,  jobbery,  and  begging  have  been  tried  in 
turn  in  the  electioneering  campaigns,  Dr.  Ukita  thinks  that  perhaps 
future  candidates  for  parliamentary  honors  will  find  it  necessary  to 
make  an  appeal  to  the  reason  and  sense  of  justice  of  the  voters. 
If  this  should  be  so,  candidates  in  future  must  pay  more  attention 
to  the  exposition  of  their  political  views  on  the  platform,  and  oratory 
may  be  found  to  supersede  less  honorable  methods  of  enlisting  the 
support  of  voters.1 

If  we  turn  to  consider  the  work  of  the  Diet,  we  find  one 
phase  quite  in  line  with  what  is  going  on  in  the  national  as- 
semblies of  other  countries.  The  real  business  of  each  House 
Iis  being  done  in  the  committee  rooms  rather  than  on  the  floor 
of  the  House.  Uyehara  remarks  on  this  point:  The  Govern- 
ment has  invented  a  doctrine  called  "  the  principle  of  fugen- 
jikko,  or  practice  without  discussion  ".2  But  the  discussions  in 
each  House  are  not  necessarily  checked;  the  oratorical  dis- 
plays are  not  shut  off;  but  the  decision  is  often  left  to  the 
calmer  consideration  of  a  committee  instead  of  the  excitement 
of  a  debate. 

The  House  of  Peers  is  a  troublesome  element  in  the  political 
!  world  of  Japan.  Uyehara  claims  that  it  is  "  a  great  obstacle 
to  the  proper  development  of  constitutional  government ". 
But  he  rightly  acknowledges  that  "  the  real  usefulness  of  the 
House  of  Peers  "  will  be  more  evident,  if  "  Ministers  become 
responsible  to  the  House  of  Representatives  ".3 

1  Japan  Chroniele,  Kobe,  April  29,  191 5. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  269. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  214. 

(370) 


No.  3]  CONCLUSION  t\ 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  mob  violence  is  too  frequent,  there  - 
has  been  a  great  growth  of  the  power  of  public  opinion.  There 
is  even  a  trend  toward  democracy,  not  so  much  in  form  as 
in  spirit.  Some  writers  go  so  far  as  to  assert  that  there  is  no 
public  opinion  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  that  there  is  only 
mob  opinion.  But  others  believe  that  they  see  in  mob  violence 
only  an  unfortunate  mode  of  expression  of  real  public  opinion; 
and  they  think  that,  with  less  official  repression,  there  will 
be  less  public  violent  expression.  They  write  about  "  the 
awakening  of  the  people  " ;  of  the  "  tendency  toward  popular 
government "  as  "  steadily  growing  strong  " ;  and  they  claim 
that  "on  the  whole,  it  must  be  admitted  that  constitutionalism 
has  made  marked  headway  ".  They  assert  that  the  time  has 
passed  when  the  Japanese  nation  would  follow  the  lead  of  one 
man  "as  sheep  follow  the  shepherd".  The  development  of] 
such  public  spirit  is  no  small  result  of  the  past  twenty-five  years.  | 

In  conclusion,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  how  the  Japanese 
seem  to  have  united  and  harmonized  various  forms  of  govern- 
ment. They  have  not  adopted  but  rather  adapted  what  they 
found  useful  in  other  political  systems,  and  have  harmonized 
all  with  Imperialism.  The  Emperor  is  still  nominally  and 
theoretically  the  head  of  the  Empire,  the  sole  Sovereign;  but 
he  has  voluntarily  given  away  some  of  the  administrative  func- 
tions to  an  Imperial  Diet,  partly  representative  in  its  nature; 
and  he  has  permitted  a  large  measure  of  local  self-government. 
In  other  words,  the  Japanese  have  evolved  a  form  of  constitu- 
tional government  which  theoretically  recognizes  the  "  divine 
right  "  of  the  Emperor  to  be  absolute  in  his  realm,  but  in  prac-  j 
tise  gives  to  the  people  an  increasing  measure  of  administra- 
tion with  such  representative  institutions  as  an  Imperial  Diet 
and  local  assemblies.     McLaren  says: 

A  Constitution  which  is  obviously  a  compromise  measure,  or  a 
system  of  government,  which  combines  the  three  hostile  elements  of 
an  absolute  monarch,  a  bureaucratic  oligarchy  and  a  representative 
legislature,  is  not  likely  to  be  permanently  satisfactory  to  a  nation.1 

1  Japanese  Documents,  p.  lxxxv. 

(371) 


52  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [-Vol.  VI 

The  Tokyo  Nichi-nichi  Shimbun  says : 

Our  political  system  is  neither  monarchical  nor  democratic,  neither 
bureaucratic  nor  parliamentary,  neither  militaristic  nor  anti-militaris- 
tic. These  six  elements  are  put  together  in  an  unharmonious  con- 
glomeration. 

Dr.  N.  Hozumi,  emeritus  professor  of  the  Imperial  Uni- 
versity, Tokyo,  has  expressed  his  conception  in  these  words : 

The  foregoing  statements  lead  us  to  a  very  peculiar  conclusion 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  government,  which  may  at  first  sight  seem 
paradoxical,  and  yet  is  true.  The  Emperor  holds  the  supreme  power, 
not  as  his  own  inherent  right,  but  as  an  inheritance  from  his  Divine 
Ancestor.  The  government  is,  therefore,  theocratical.  The  Em- 
peror rules  over  the  country  as  the  supreme  head  of  the  vast  family 
of  the  Japanese  nation.1  The  government  is,  therefore,  patriarchal. 
The  Emperor  exercises  the  sovereign  power  according  to  the  Con- 
stitution, which  is  based  on  the  most  advanced  principles  of  modern 
constitutionalism.  The  government  is,  therefore,  constitutional.  In 
other  words,  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  Japanese  government 
is  theocratico-patriarchal  constitutionalism?' 

In  another  place  Dr.  Hozumi  says : 

I  can  speak  from  personal  knowledge,  that  the  principal  care  of 
Prince  Ito,  in  preparing  the  draft  of  the  Constitution,  by  the  com- 
mand of  his  Sovereign,  was  to  reconcile  and  bring  into  harmony  the 
traditional  character  of  the  government,  based  on  the  cult  of  the 
Imperial  Ancestor,  with  the  most  advanced  principles  of  modern 
constitutionalism. s 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  as  if  the  Government  of  Japan  is 
not  unlike  what  Rev.  R.  A.  Hume,  in  writing  about  church 
government  in  his  "  Missions  from  the  Modern  View  ",  called 
"  Episco-presby-gational  ".     The  Emperor  is  the  "  bishop  ", 

1  Percival  Lowell  has  well  said  in  The  Soul  of  the  Far  East  (p.  30),  con- 
cerning Japan :  "  The  Empire  is  one  great  family ;  the  family  is  a  little 
empire  ". 

2  Ancestor- Worship  and  Japanese  Law,  pp.  87,  88. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  93. 

(372) 


No.  3]  CONCLUSION  53 

the  summits  episcopus ;  the  Imperial  Diet  is  the  synod  or  "pres- 
bytery " ;  and  local  governments  are  "  congregations  ".     Thus 
the  Japanese,  past  masters  in  the  art  of  compromise,   have  \j 
established  an  "  Episco-presbytery-gational  "  form  of  govern-  i 
ment. 

This  is  the  record  of  twenty-five  years  of  "  Constitutional  \ 
Imperialism  in  Japan  ".  It  is  "  Imperialism  "  in  origin,  in 
essence,  and  in  substance,  in  theory  and  in  fact;  but  it  has  been, 
is  being,  and  will  be,  greatly  modified  by  "  Constitutional  "  ele- 
ments. It  may  never  be  reversed  to  "  Imperial  Constitutional- 
ism " :  but  it  is  quite  likely  that  the  "  Imperial  M  features  will 
grow  smaller  and  weaker,  while  the  "  Constitutional  "  elements 
will  grow  larger  and  stronger.  This  will  come  not  by  revolu- 
tion but  by  evolution. 

(373) 


APPENDIX 

I.  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  JAPAN  1 
Imperial  Oath  at  the  Sanctuary  of  the  Imperial  Palace 

We,  the  Successor  to  the  prosperous  Throne  of  Our  Predecessors, 
do  humbly  and  solemnly  swear  to  the  Imperial  Founder  of  Our  House 
and  to  Our  other  Imperial  Ancestors  that,  in  pursuance  of  a  great 
policy  co-extensive  with  the  Heavens  and  with  the  Earth,  We  shall 
maintain  and  secure  from  decline  the  ancient  form  of  government. 

In  consideration  of  the  progressive  tendency  of  the  course  of  human 
affairs  and  in  parallel  with  the  advance  of  civilization,  We  deem  it 
expedient,  in  order  to  give  clearness  and  distinctness  to  the  instructions 
bequeathed  by  the  Imperial  Founder  of  Our  House  and  by  Our  other 
Imperial  Ancestors,  to  establish  fundamental  laws  formulated  into 
express  provisions  of  law,  so  that,  on  the  one  hand,  Our  Imperial 
posterity  may  possess  an  express  guide  for  the  course  they  are  to  fol- 
low, and  that,  on  the  other,  Our  subjects  shall  thereby  be  enabled 
to  enjoy  a  wider  range  of  action  in  giving  Us  their  support,  and  that 
the  observance  of  Our  laws  shall  continue  to  the  remotest  ages  of 
time.  We  will  thereby  to  give  greater  firmness  to  the  stability  of 
Our  country  and  to  promote  the  welfare  of  all  the  people  within  the 
boundaries  of  Our  dominions;  and  We  now  establish  the  Imperial 
House  Law  and  the  Constitution.  These  Laws  come  to  only  an  ex- 
position of  grand  precepts  for  the  conduct  of  the  government  be- 
queathed by  the  Imperial  Founder  of  Our  House  and  by  Our  other 
Imperial  Ancestors.  That  We  have  been  so  fortunate  in  Our  reign, 
in  keeping  with  the  tendency  of  the  times,  as  to  accomplish  this  work, 
We  owe  to  the  glorious  Spirits  of  the  Imperial  Founder  of  Our  House 
and  of  Our  other  Imperial  Ancestors. 

We  now  reverently  make  Our  prayer  to  Them  and  to  Our  Illus- 
trious Father,  and  implore  the  help  of  Their  Sacred  Spirits,  and  make 
to  Them  solemn  oath  never  at  this  time  nor  in  the  future  to  fail  to  be 
an  example  to  Our  subjects  in  the  observance  of  the  Laws  hereby 
established. 

May  the  Heavenly  Spirits  witness  this  Our  solemn  Oath. 

1  Official  Translations  from  the  Japan  Weekly  Mail,  Feb.  15,  1889. 

(374) 


APPENDIX  55 

Imperial  Speech  on  the  Promulgation  of  the  Constitution 

Whereas,  We  make  it  the  joy  and  glory  of  Our  heart  to  behold  the 
prosperity  of  Our  country,  and  the  welfare  of  Our  subjects,  We  do 
hereby,  in  virtue  of  the  supreme  power  We  inherit  from  Our  Imperial 
Ancestors,  promulgate  the  present  immutable  fundamental  law,  for 
the  sake  of  Our  present  subjects  and  their  descendants. 

The  Imperial  Founder  of  Our  House  and  Our  other  Imperial 
Ancestors,  by  the  help  and  support  of  the  forefathers  of  Our  subjects, 
laid  the  foundation  of  Our  Empire  upon  a  basis  which  is  to  last 
forever.  That  this  brilliant  achievement  embellishes  the  annals  of 
Our  country,  is  due  to  the  glorious  virtues  of  Our  Sacred  Imperial 
Ancestors,  and  to  the  loyalty  and  bravery  of  Our  subjects,  their  love 
of  their  country,  and  their  public  spirit.  Considering  that  Our 
subjects  are  the  descendants  of  the  loyal  and  good  subjects  of  Our 
Imperial  Ancestors,  We  doubt  not  but  that  Our  subjects  will  be  guided 
by  Our  views,  and  will  sympathize  with  all  Our  endeavours,  and  that, 
harmoniously  co-operating  together,  they  will  share  with  Us  Our 
hope  of  making  manifest  the  glory  of  Our  country,  both  at  home  and 
abroad,  and  of  securing  forever  the  stability  of  the  work  bequeathed 
to  Us  by  Our  Imperial  Ancestors. 

The  Constitution  of  the  Empire  of  Japan 
preamble 

Having,  by  virtue  of  the  glories  of  Our  Ancestors,  ascended  the 
throne  of  a  lineal  succession  unbroken  for  ages  eternal  J  desiring  to 
promote  the  welfare  of,  and  to  give  development  to,  the  moral  and 
intellectual  faculties  of  Our  beloved  subjects,  the  very  same  that 
have  been  favoured  with  the  benevolent  care  and  affectionate  vigil- 
ance of  Our  Ancestors;  and  hoping  to  maintain  the  prosperity  of 
the  State,  in  concert  with  Our  people  and  with  their  support,  We 
hereby  promulgate,  in  pursuance  of  Our  Imperial  Rescript  of  the 
14th  day  of  the  10th  month  of  the  14th  year  of  Meiji  [October  12, 
1881],  a  fundamental  law  of  State,  to  exhibit  the  principles  by  which 
We  are  to  be  guided  in  Our  conduct,  and  to  point  out  to  what  Our 
descendants  and  Our  subjects  and  their  descendants  are  forever  to 
conform. 

The  rights  of  sovereignty  of  the  State,  We  have  inherited  from 
Our  Ancestors,  and  We  shall  bequeath  them  to  Our  descendants. 
Neither  We  nor  they  shall  in  future  fail  to  wield  them,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  hereby  granted. 

(375) 


56  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

We  now  declare  to  respect  and  protect  the  security  of  the  rights 
and  of  the  property  of  Our  people,  and  to  secure  to  them  the  com- 
plete enjoyment  of  the  same,  within  the  extent  of  the  provisions  of 
the  present  Constitution  and  of  the  law. 

The  Imperial  Diet  shall  first  be  convoked  for  the  23rd  year  of 
Meiji  [1890],  and  the  time  of  its  opening  shall  be  the  date  when 
the  present  Constitution  comes  into  force. 

When  in  the  future  it  may  become  necessary  to  amend  any  of  the 
provisions  of  the  present  Constitution,  We  or  Our  successors  shall 
assume  the  initiative  right,  and  submit  a  project  for  the  same  to  the 
Imperial  Diet.  The  Imperial  Diet  shall  pass  its  vote  upon  it,  ac- 
cording to  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  present  Constitution,  and 
in  no  otherwise  shall  Our  descendants  or  Our  subjects  be  permitted 
to  attempt  any  alteration  thereof. 

Our  Ministers  of  State,  on  Our  behalf,  shall  be  held  responsible 
for  the  carrying  out  of  the  present  Constitution,  and  Our  present 
and  future  subjects  shall  foreover  assume  the  duty  of  allegiance  to 
the  present  Constitution. 

[His  Imperial  Majesty's  Sign-Manual] 
[Privy  Seal.] 
The  11th  day  of  the  2nd  month  of  the  22nd  year  of  Meiji  [Febru- 
ary 11,  1889]. 

[Countersigned  by  the  Ministers.] 

CHAPTER  I. THE  EMPEROR 

Article  I. — The  Empire  of  Japan  shall  be  reigned  over  and  gov- 
erned by  a  line  of  Emperors  unbroken  for  ages  eternal. 

Article  II. — The  Imperial  Throne  shall  be  succeeded  to  by  Im- 
perial male  descendants,  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  Imperial 
House  Law. 

Article  III. — The  Emperor  is  sacred  and  inviolable. 

Article  IV. — The  Emperor  is  the  head  of  the  Empire,  combining 
in  Himself  the  rights  of  sovereignty,  and  exercises  them  according  to 
the  provisions  of  the  present  Constitution. 

Article  V. — The  Emperor  exercises  the  legislative  power  with  the 
consent  of  the  Imperial  Diet. 

Article  VI. — The  Emperor  gives  sanction  to  laws,  and  orders 
them  to  be  promulgated  and  executed. 

(376) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  57 

Article  VII. — The  Emperor  convokes  the  Imperial  Diet,  opens, 
closes,  and  prorogues  it,  and  dissolves  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Article  VIII. — The  Emperor,  in  consequence  of  an  urgent  neces- 
sity to  maintain  public  safety  or  to  avert  public  calamities,  issues, 
when  the  Imperial  Diet  is  not  sitting,  Imperial  Ordinances  in  the 
place  of  law. 

Such  Imperial  Ordinances  are  to  be  laid  before  the  Imperial  Diet 
at  its  next  session,  and  when  the  Diet  does  not  approve  the  said 
Ordinances,  the  Government  shall  declare  them  to  be  invalid  for 
the  future.    . 

Article  IX. — The  Emperor  issues  or  causes  to  be  issued,  the  Or- 
dinances necessary  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  laws,  or  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  public  peace  and  order,  and  for  the  promotion  of  the 
welfare  of  the  subjects.  But  no  Ordinance  shall  in  any  way  alter 
any  of  the  existing  laws. 

Article  X. — The  Emperor  determines  the  organization  of  the 
different  branches  of  the  administration,  and  the  salaries  of  all  civil 
and  military  officers,  and  appoints  and  dismisses  the  same.  Excep- 
tions especially  provided  for  in  the  present  Constitution  or  in  other 
laws,  shall  be  in  accordance  with  the  respective  provisions  (bearing 
thereon). 

Article  XI. — The  Emperor  has  the  supreme  command  of  the 
Army  and  Navy. 

Article  XII. — The  Emperor  determines  the  organization  and 
peace  standing  of  the  Army  and  Navy. 

Article  XIII. — The  Emperor  declares  war,  makes  peace,  and 
concludes  treaties. 

Article  XIV. — The  Emperor  proclaims  the  law  of  siege. 

The  conditions  and  effects  of  the  law  of  siege  shall  be  determined 
by  law. 

Article  XV. — The  Emperor  confers  titles  of  nobility,  rank,  or- 
ders and  other  marks  of  honour. 

Article  XVI. — The  Emperor  orders  amnesty,  pardon,  commuta- 
tion of  punishments,  and  rehabilitation. 

Article  XVII. — A  Regency  shall  be  instituted  in  conformity 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Imperial  House  Law. 

The  Regent  shall  exercise  the  powers  appertaining  to  the  Emperor 
in  His  name. 

(377) 


58               CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 
CHAPTER  II. RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  SUBJECTS 

Article  XVIII. — The  conditions  necessary  for  being  a  Japanese 
subject  shall  be  determined  by  law. 

Article  XIX. — Japanese  subjects  may,  according  to  qualifications 
determined  in  laws  or  ordinances,  be  appointed  to  civil  or  military 
offices  equally,  and  may  fill  any  other  public  offices. 

Article  XX. — Japanese  subjects  are  amenable  to  service  in  the 
Army  or  Navy,  according  to  the  provisions  of  law. 

Article  XXI. — Japanese  subjects  are  amenable  to  the  duty  of 
paying  taxes,  according  to  the  provisions  of  law. 

Article  XXII. — Japanese  subjects  shall  have  the  liberty  of  abode 
and  of  changing  the  same  within  the  limits  of  law. 

Article  XXIII. — No  Japanese  subject  shall  be  arrested,  detained, 
tried,  or  punished,  unless  according  to  law. 

Article  XXIV. — No  Japanese  subject  shall  be  deprived  of  his 
right  of  being  tried  by  the  judges  determined  by  law. 

Article  XXV. — Except  in  the  cases  provided  for  in  the  law,  the 
house  of  no  Japanese  subject  shall  be  entered  or  searched  without 
his  consent. 

Article  XXVI. — Except  in  the  cases  mentioned  in  the  law,  the 
secrecy  of  the  letters  of  every  Japanese  subject  shall  remain  inviolate. 

Article  XXVII. — The  right  of  property  of  every  Japanese  sub- 
ject shall  remain  inviolate. 

Measures  necessary  to  be  taken  for  the  public  benefit  shall  be 
provided  for  by  law. 

Article  XXVIII. — Japanese  subjects  shall,  within  limits  not  pre- 
judicial to  peace  and  order,  and  not  antagonistic  to  their  duties  as 
subjects,  enjoy  freedom  of  religious  belief. 

Article  XXIX. — Japanese  subjects  shall  within  the  limits  of  law, 
enjoy  the  liberty  of  speech,  writing,  publication,  public  meeting,  and 
association. 

Article  XXX. — Japanese  subjects  may  present  petitions,  by  ob- 
serving the  proper  forms  of  respect,  and  by  complying  with  the 
rules  specially  provided  for  the  same. 

Article  XXXI. — The  provisions  contained  in  the  present  Chapter 
shall  not  affect  the  exercise  of  the  powers  appertaining  to  the  Em- 
peror, in  times  of  war  or  in  cases  of  a  national  emergency. 

(378) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX 


59 


Article  XXXII. — Each  and  every  one  of  the  provisions  contained 
in  the  preceding  Articles  of  the  present  chapter,  that  are  not  in  con- 
flict with  the  laws  or  the  rules  and  discipline  of  the  Army  and  Navy, 
shall  apply  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Army  and  of  the  Navy. 

CHAPTER  III. THE  IMPERIAL  DIET 

Article  XXXIII. — The  Imperial  Diet  shall  consist  of  two  Houses, 
a  House  of  Peers  and  a  House  of  Representatives. 

Article  XXXIV. — The  House  of  Peers  shall,  in  accordance  with 
the  Ordinance  concerning  he  House  of  Peers,  be  composed  of  the 
members  of  the  Imperial  Family,  of  the  orders  of  nobility,  and  of 
those  persons  who  have  been  nominated  thereto  by  the  Emperor. 

Article  XXXV. — The  House  of  Representatives  shall  be  com- 
posed of  Members  elected  by  the  people,  according  to  the  provisions 
of  the  Law  of  Election. 

Article  XXXVI. — No  one  can  at  one  and  the  same  time  be  a 
Member  of  both  Houses. 

Article  XXXVII. — Every  law  requires  the  consent  of  the  Im- 
perial Diet. 

Article  XXXVIII. — Both  Houses  shall  vote  upon  projects  of  law 
Submitted  to  them  by  the  Government,  and  may  respectively  initiate 
projects  of  law. 

Article  XXXIX. — A  Bill,  which  has  been  rejected  by  either  the 
one  or  the  other  of  the  two  Houses,  shall  not  be  again  brought  in 
during  the  same  session. 

Article  XL. — Both  Houses  can  make  representations  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, as  to  laws  or  upon  any  other  subject.  When,  however, 
such  representations  are  not  accepted,  they  cannot  be  made  a  second 
time  during  the  same  session. 

Article  XLI. — The  Imperial  Diet  shall  be  convoked  every  year. 

Article  XLI  I. — A  session  of  the  Imperial  Diet  shall  last  during 
three  months.  In  case  of  necessity,  the  duration  of  a  session  may  be 
prolonged  by  Imperial  Order. 

yrhe  duration  of  an  extraordinary  session  shall  be  determined  by 
Imperial  Order. 

Article  XLIV. — The  opening,  closing,  prolongation  of  session 
and  prorogation  of  the  Imperial  Diet,  shall  be  effected  simultaneously 
for  both  Houses. 

(379)  i 


6o  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

In  case  the  House  of  Representatives  has  been  ordered  to  dissolve, 
the  House  of  Peers  shall  at  the  same  time  be  prorogued. 

Article  XLV. — When  the  House  of  Representatives  has  been 
ordered  to  dissolve,  Members  shall  be  caused  by  Imperial  Order  to 
be  newly  elected,  and  the  new  House  shall  be  convoked  within  five 
months  from  the  day  of  dissolution. 

Article  XLVI. — No  debate  can  be  opened  and  no  vote  can  be 
taken  in  either  House  of  the  Imperial  Diet,  unless  not  less  than  one- 
third  of  the  whole  number  of  the  Members  thereof  is  present. 

Article  XLVII. — Votes  shall  be  taken  in  both  Houses  by  absolute 
majority.  In  the  case  of  a  tie  vote,  the  President  shall  have  the 
casting  vote. 

Article  XLVIII. — The  deliberations  of  both  Houses  shall  be  held 
in  public.  The  deliberations  may,  however,  upon  demand  of  the 
Government  or  by  resolution  of  the  House,  be  held  in  secret  sitting. 

Article  XLIX. — Both  Houses  of  the  Imperial  Diet  may  respec- 
tively present  addresses  to  the  Emperor. 

Article  L. — Both  Houses  may  receive  petitions  presented  by  sub- 
jects. 

Article  LI. — Both  Houses  may  enact,  besides  what  is  provided 
for  in  the  present  Constitution  and  in  the  Law  of  the  House,  rules 
necessary  for  the  management  of  their  internal  affairs. 

Article  LI  I. — No  member  of  either  House  shall  be  held  respon- 
sible outside  the  respective  Houses,  for  any  opinion  uttered  or  for 
any  vote  given  in  the  House.  When,  however,  a  Member  himself 
has  given  publicity  to  his  opinions  by  public  speech,  by  documents 
in  print  or  in  writing,  or  by  any  other  similar  means,  he  shall,  in  the 
matter,  be  amenable  to  the  general  law. 

Article  LIII. — The  Members  of  both  Houses  shall,  during  the 
session,  be  free  from  arrest,  unless  with  the  consent  of  the  House, 
except  in  cases  of  flagrant  delicts,  or  of  offences  connected  with  a 
state  of  internal  commotion  or  with  a  foreign  trouble. 

Article  LIV. — The  Ministers  of  State  and  the  Delegates  of  the 
Government  may,  at  any  time,  take  seats  and  speak  in  either  House. 

CHAPTER  IV. THE  MINISTERS  OF  STATE  AND  THE  PRIVY  COUNCIL 

Article  LV. — The  respective  Ministers  of  State  shall  give  their 
advice  to  the  Emperor,  and  be  responsible  for  it. 

All  Laws,  Imperial  Ordinances,  and  Imperial  Rescripts  of  what- 

(380) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  6X 

ever  kind,  that  relate  to  the  affairs  of  the  State,  require  the  counter- 
signature of  a  Minister  of  State. 

Article  LVI. — The  Privy  Council  shall,  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  for  the  organization  of  the  Privy  Council,  deliberate  upon 
important  matters  of  State,  when  they  have  been  consulted  by  the 
Emperor. 

CHAPTER  V. THE   JUDICATURE 

Article  LVII. — The  Judicature  shall  be  exercised  by  the  Courts 
of  Law  according  to  law,  in  the  name  of  the  Emperor. 

The  organization  of  the  Courts  of  Law  shall  be  determined  by  law. 

Article  LVIII. — The  judges  shall  be  appointed  from  among  those 
who  possess  proper  qualifications  according  to  law. 

No  judge  shall  be  deprived  of  his  position,  unless  by  way  of 
criminal  sentence  or  disciplinary  punishment. 

Article  LIX. — Trials  and  judgments  of  a  Court  shall  be  con- 
ducted publicly.  When,  however,  there  exists  any  fear  that  such 
publicity  may  be  prejudicial  to  peace  and  order,  or  to  the  mainten- 
ance of  public  morality,  the  public  trial  may  be  suspended  by  pro- 
vision of  law  or  by  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Law. 

Article  LX. — All  matters  that  fall  within  the  competency  of  a 
special  Court  shall  be  specially  provided  for  by  law. 

Article  LXI. — No  suit  at  law,  which  relates  to  rights  alleged  to 
have  been  infringed  by  the  illegal  measures  of  the  executive  authori- 
ties, and  which  shall  come  within  the  competency  of  the  Court  of 
Administrative  Litigation  specially  established  by  law,  shall  be  taken 
cognizance  of  by  a  Court  of  Law. 

CHAPTER  VI. FINANCE 

Article  LXI  I. — The  imposition  of  a  new  tax  or  the  modification 
of  the  rates  (of  an  existing  one)  shall  be  determined  by  law. 

However,  all  such  administrative  fees  or  other  revenue  having  the 
nature  of  compensation  shall  not  fall  within  the  category  of  the 
above  clause. 

The  raising  of  national  loans  and  the  contracting  of  other  liabili- 
ties to  the  charge  of  the  National  Treasury,  except  those  that  are 
provided  in  the  Budget,  shall  require  the  consent  of  the  Imperial  Diet. 

Article  LXI II. — The  taxes  levied  at  present  shall,  in  so  far  as 
are  not  remodelled  by  new  law,  be  collected  according  to  the  old 
system. 

(381) 


62  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

Article  LXIV. — The  expenditure  and  revenue  of. the  State  require 
the  consent  of  the  Imperial  Diet  by  means  of  an  annual  Budget. 

Any  and  all  expenditures  overpassing  the  appropriations  set  forth 
in  the  Titles  and  Paragraphs  of  the  Budget,  or  that  are  not  provided 
for  in  the  Budget,  shall  subsequently  require  the  approbation  of  the 
Imperial  Diet. 

Article  LXV. — The  Budget  shall  be  first  laid  before  the  House 
of  Representatives. 

Article  LXVL — The  expenditures  of  the  Imperial  House  shall 
be  defrayed  every  year  out  of  the  National  Treasury,  according  to 
the  present  fixed  amount  for  the  same,  and  shall  not  require  the  con- 
sent thereto  of  the  Imperial  Diet,  except  in  case  an  increase  thereof 
is  found  necessary. 

Article  LXVII. — Those  already  fixed  expenditures  based  by  the 
Constitution  upon  the  powers  appertaining  to  the  Emperor,  and  such 
expenditures  as  may  have  arisen  by  the  effect  of  law,  or  that  appertain 
to  the  legal  obligations  of  the  Government,  shall  be  neither  rejected 
nor  reduced  by  the  Imperial  Diet,  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
Government. 

Article  LXVII  I. — In  order  to  meet  special  requirements,  the 
Government  may  ask  the  consent  of  the  Imperial  Diet  to  a  certain 
amount  as  a  Continuing  Expenditure  Fund,  for  a  previously  fixed 
number  of  years. 

Article  LXIX. — In  order  to  supply  deficiencies,  which  are  un- 
avoidable, in  the  Budget,  and  to  meet  requirements  unprovided  for 
in  the  same,  a  Reserve  Fund  shall  be  provided  in  the  Budget. 

Article  LXX. — When  the  Imperial  Diet  cannot  be  convoked, 
owing  to  the  external  or  internal  condition  of  the  country,  in  case 
of  urgent  need  for  the  maintenance  of  public  safety,  the  Government 
may  take  all  necessary  financial  measures,  by  means  of  an  Imperial 
Ordinance. 

In  the  case  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause,  the  matter  shall  be 
submitted  to  the  Imperial  Diet  at  its  next  session,  and  its  appro- 
bation shall  be  obtained  thereto. 

Article  LXXI. — When  the  Imperial  Diet  has  not  voted  on  the 
Budget,  or  when  the  Budget  has  not  been  brought  into  actual  exist- 
ence, the  Government  shall  carry  out  the  Budget  of  the  preceding 
year. 

Article   LXXI  I. — The  final   account   of   the   expenditures   and 

(382) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  63 

revenue  of  the  State  shall  be  verified  and  confirmed  by  the  Board 
of  Audk,  and  it  shall  be  submitted  by  the  Government  to  the  Im- 
perial Diet,  together  with  the  report  of  verification  of  the  said  Board. 
The  organization  and  competency  of  the  Board  of  Audit  shall  be 
determined  by  laws  separately. 

CHAPTER  VII. SUPPLEMENTARY  RULES 

Article  LXXIII. — When  it  has  become  necessary  in  future  to 
amend  the  provisions  of  the  present  Constitution,  a  project  to  that 
effect  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Imperial  Diet  by  Imperial  Order. 

In  the  above  case,  neither  House  can  open  the  debate,  unless  at 
least  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  of  Members  are  present,  and  no 
amendment  can  be  passed,  unless  a  majority  of  at  least  two- thirds  of 
the  Members  present  is  obtained. 

Article  LXXIV. — No  modification  of  the  Imperial  House  Law 
shall  be  required  to  be  submitted  to  the  deliberation  of  the  Imperial 
Diet. 

No  provision  of  the  present  Constitution  can  be  modified  by  the 
Imperial  House  Law. 

Article  LXXV. — No  modification  can  be  introduced  into  the  Con- 
stitution, or  into  the  Imperial  House  Law,  during  the  time  of  a 
Regency. 

Article  LXXVI. — Existing  legal  enactments,  such  as  laws,  regu- 
lations, Ordinances,  or  by  whatever  names  they  may  be  called,  shall, 
so  far  as  they  do  not  conflict  with  the  present  Constitution,  continue 
in  force. 

All  existing  contracts  or  orders,  that  entail  obligations  upon  the 
Government,  and  that  are  connected  with  expenditure,  shall  come 
within  the  scope  of  Art.  LXVII. 

II.  IMPERIAL  ORDINANCE  CONCERNING  THE  HOUSE 

OF  PEERS 

We,  in  accordance  with  the  express  provision  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  Empire  of  Japan,  hereby  promulgate,  with  the  advice  of  Our 
Privy  Council,  the  present  Ordinance  concerning  the  House  of  Peers; 
as  to  the  date  of  its  being  carried  out,  We  shall  issue  a  special  order. 

[His  Imperial  Majesty's  Sign-Manual] 
[Privy  Seal.] 
The  11th  day  of  the  2nd  month  of  the  22nd  year  of  Meiji  [Febru- 
ary 11,  1889]. 

(383) 


64  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

[Countersigned  by  the  Ministers.] 

Article  I. — The  House  of  Peers  shall  be  composed  of  the  follow- 
ing Members. 

1.  The  members  of  the  Imperial  Family. 

2.  Princes  and  Marquises. 

3.  Counts,  Viscounts,  and  Barons  who  have  been  elected  thereto 
by  the  members  of  their  respective  orders. 

4.  Persons  who  have  been  elected,  one  Member  for  each  Fu 
(City)  and  Ken  (Prefecture),  by  and  from  among  the  tax- 
payers of  the  highest  amount  of  direct  national  taxes  on  land, 
industry  or  trade  therein,  and  who  have  afterwards  been 
nominated  thereto  by  the  Emperor. 

Article  II. — -The  male  members  of  the  Imperial  Family  shall 
take  seats  in  the  House  on  reaching  their  majority. 

Article  III. — The  members  of  the  orders  of  Princes  and  Mar- 
quises shall  become  Members  on  reaching  the  age  of  full  twenty-five 
years. 

Article  IV. — The  members  of  the  orders  of  Counts,  Viscounts 
and  Barons,  that  after  reaching  the  age  of  full  twenty-five  years 
have  been  elected  by  the  members  of  their  respective  orders,  shall 
become  Members  for  a  term  of  seven  years.  Rules  for  their  election 
shall  be  specially  determined  by  Imperial  Ordinance. 

The  number  of  Members  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause  shall 
not  exceed  one-fifth  of  the  entire  number  of  the  respective  orders  of 
Counts,  Viscounts  and  Barons. 

Article  V. — Any  man  of  above  the  age  of  full  thirty  years,  who 
has  been  nominated  Member  by  the  Emperor  for  meritorious  services 
to  the  State  or  for  erudition,  shall  be  a  life  Member. 

Article  VI. — One  Member  shall  be  elected  in  each  Fu  and  Ken 
from  among  and  by  the  fifteen  male  inhabitants  thereof  of  above  the 
age  of  full  thirty  years,  paying  therein  the  highest  amount  of  direct 
national  taxes  on  land,  industry,  or  trade.  When  the  person  thus 
elected  receives  his  nomination  from  the  Emperor,  he  shall  become 
Member  for  a  term  of  seven  years.  Rules  for  such  election  shall  be 
specially  determined  by  Imperial  Ordinance. 

Article  VII. — The  number  of  Members  that  have  been  nominated 
by  the  Emperor,  for  meritorious  services  to  the  State,  or  for  erudition, 
or  from  among  men  paying  the  highest  amount  of  direct  national 
taxes  on  land,  industry,  or  trade  in  each  Fu  or  Ken,  shall  not  exceed 
the  number  of  the  Members  having  the  title  of  nobility. 

(384) 


Vo.  3]  APPENDIX  g5 

Article  VIII. — The  House  of  Peers  shall,  when  consulted  by  the 
Emperor,  pass  vote  upon  rules  concerning  the  privileges  of  the 
nobility. 

Article  IX. — The  House  of  Peers  decides  upon  the  qualification 
of  its  Members  and  upon  disputes  concerning  elections  thereto.  The 
rules  for  these  decisions  shall  be  resolved  upon  by  the  House  of  Peers 
and  submitted  to  the  Emperor  for  His  Sanction. 

Article  X. — When  a  Member  has  been  sentenced  to  confinement, 
or  to  any  severer  punishment,  or  has  been  declared  bankrupt,  he  shall 
be  expelled  by  Imperial  Order. 

With  respect  to  the  expulsion  of  a  Member,  as  a  disciplinary  pun- 
ishment in  the  House  of  Peers,  the  President  shall  report  the  facts  to 
the  Emperor  for  His  decision. 

Any  Member  that  has  been  expelled  shall  be  incapable  of  again  be- 
coming a  Member,  unless  permission  so  to  do  has  been  granted  by  the 
Emperor. 

Article  XL— The  President  and  Vice-President  shall  be  nomin- 
ated by  the  Emperor,  from  among  the  Members,  for  a  term  of  seven 
years. 

If  an  elected  Member  is  nominated  President  or  Vice-President, 
he  shall  serve  in  that  capacity  for  the  term  of  his  membership. 

Article  XII. — Every  matter,  other  than  what  provision  has  been 
made  for  in  the  present  Imperial  Ordinance,  shall  be  dealt  with  ac- 
cording to  the  provisions  of  the  Law  of  the  Houses. 

Article  XIII. — When  in  the  future  any  amendment  or  addition 
is  to  be  made  in  the  provisions  of  the  present  Imperial  Ordinance,  the 
matter  shall  be  submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  House  of  Peers. 

III.  LAW  OF  THE  HOUSES 

We,  with  the  advice  of  Our  Privy  Council,  hereby  give  Our  Sanc- 
tion to  the  present  Law  of  the  Houses  and  order  it  to  be  promulgated, 
and  at  the  same  time  direct  that,  from  the  day  of  the  institution  of 
the  House  of  Peers  and  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  all  affairs 
connected  with  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  them,  be  conducted  in 
accordance  with  the  present  Law. 

[His  Imperial  Majesty's  Sign-Manual] 
[Privy  Seal.] 

The  11th  day  of  the  2nd  month  of  the  22nd  year  of  Meiji  [Febru- 
ary 11,  1889]. 

(3«5) 


66  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

[Countersigned  by  the  Ministers.] 

CHAPTER    I. CONVOCATION,    ORGANIZATION,    AND    OPENING    OF    THE 

IMPERIAL  DIET 

Article  I. — An  Imperial  Proclamation  for  the  convocation  of  the 
Imperial  Diet,  fixing  the  date  of  its  assembling,  shall  be  issued  at  least 
forty  days  beforehand. 

Article  II. — The  Members  shall  assemble  in  the  Hall  of  their 
respective  Houses,  upon  the  day  specified  in  the  Imperial  Proclama- 
tion of  convocation. 

Article  III. — The  President  and  Vice-President  of  the 'House  of 
Representatives  shall  both  of  them  be  nominated  by  the  Emperor, 
from  among  three  candidates  respectively  elected  by  the  House  for 
each  of  those  offices. 

Until  the  nomination  of  the  President  and  Vice-President,  the 
functions  of  President  shall  be  discharged  by  the  Chief  Secretary. 

Article  IV. — Each  House  shall  divide  the  whole  number  of  its 
Members  into  several  Sections  by  lot,  and  in  each  Section  a  Chief 
shall  be  elected  by  and  from  among  the  Members  belonging  thereto. 

Article  V. — Upon  the  organization  of  both  Houses,  the  day  for 
the  opening  of  the  Imperial  Diet  shall  be  fixed  by  Imperial  Order, 
and  the  ceremony  of  opening  shall  be  celebrated  by  the  assembling 
of  the  Members  of  both  Houses  in  the  House  of  Peers. 

Article  VI. — On  the  occasion  referred  to  in  the  preceding  Article, 
the  functions  of  President  shall  be  exercised  by  the  President  of  the 
House  of  Peers. 

CHAPTER    H. PRESIDENT,    SECRETARIES,    AND    EXPENSES 

Article  VII. — There  shall  be  in  each  House  a  President  and  a 
Vice-President. 

Article  VIII. — The  term  of  office  of  the  President  and  of  the 
Vice-President  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  shall  be  the  same 
as  that  of  the  membership  thereof. 

Article  IX. — When  the  office  of  President  or  of  Vice-President 
of  the  House  of  Representatives,  has  become  vacant  by  the  resigna- 
tion of  the  occupant  thereof  or  for  any  other  reason,  the  term  of  office 
of  the  successor  shall  be  in  correspondence  with  that  of  his  predecessor. 

Article  X. — The  President  of  each  House  shall  maintain  order 
therein,  regulate  the  debates,  and  represent  the  House  outside  thereof. 

(386) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  fa 

Article  XI. — The  President  of  each  House  shall  continue  to  as- 
sume the  direction  of  the  business  of  the  House,  during  the  interval 
that  the  Diet  is  not  in  session. 

Article  XII. — The  President  shall  be  entitled  to  attend  and  take 
part  in  the  debates  of  both  the  Standing  and  of  the  Special  Com- 
mittees, but  he  shall  have  no  vote  therein. 

Article  XIII. — In  each  House,  in  the  event  of  the  disability  of 
the  President,  he  shall  be  represented  in  his  functions  by  the  Vice- 
President. 

Article  XIV. — In  each  House,  in  the  event  of  the  disability  of 
both  the  President  and  of  the  Vice-President  at  the  same  time,  a 
temporary  President  shall  be  elected  to  exercise  the  functions  of 
President. 

Article  XV. — The  President  and  the  Vice-President  of  each 
House,  shall,  upon  the  expiration  of  their  term  of  office,  continue  to 
exercise  their  functions,  until  their  successors  have  been  nominated 
by  the  Emperor. 

Article  XVI. — In  each  House  there  shall  be  appointed  a  Chief 
Secretary  and  several  Secretaries. 

The  Chief  Secretary  shall  be  of  the  Chokunin  rank,  and  the  Secre- 
taries of  the  Sonin  rank. 

Article  XVII. — The  Chief  Secretary  shall,  under  the  direction 
of  the  President,  supervise  the  business  of  the  Secretaries  and  append 
his  signature  to  official  documents. 

The  Secretaries  shall  compile  the  records  of  debates,  make  drafts 
of  other  documents  and  manage  business  generally. 

Required  functionaries  other  than  Secretaries  shall  be  appointed 
by  the  Chief- Secretary. 

Article  XVIII. — The  expenses  of  both  Houses  shall  be  defrayed 
out  of  the  National  Treasury. 

chapter  hi. — the  annual  allowances  to  the  president,  vice- 
president  AND  MEMBERS 

Article  XIX. — The  Presidents  of  the  respective  Houses  shall  re- 
ceive each  an  annual  allowance  of  four  thousand  yen  and  the  Vice- 
Presidents,  that  of  two  thousand  yen  each;  while  such  Members  of 
the  House  of  Peers  as  have  been  elected  thereto,  and  such  as  have 
been  nominated  thereto  by  the  Emperor,  and  the  Members  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  shall  each  receive  an  annual  allowance  of 

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68  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

eight  hundred  yen.1  They  shall  also  receive  travelling  expenses  in 
accordance  with  regulations  to  be  specially  provided.  Members,  how- 
ever, who  do  not  comply  with  the  summons  of  convocation,  shall 
receive  no  annual  allowance. 

The  Presidents,  Vice-Presidents,  and  Members  shall  [not]  r  be 
allowed  to  decline  their  respective  annual  allowances. 

Members,  who  are  in  the  service  of  the  Government,  shall  receive 
no  such  annual  allowances. 

In  the  case  mentioned  in  Article  XXV,  the  Members  concerned 
shall  receive,  in  addition  to  the  annual  allowance  mentioned  in  the 
first  clause  of  the  present  Article,  an  allowance  of  not  more  than  five 
yen  per  diem,  in  accordance  with  the  schedule  determined  by  the  re- 
spective Houses. 

CHAPTER  IV. COMMITTEES 

Article  XX. — Committees  shall  be  of  three  kinds,  a  Committee 
of  the  Whole  House,  and  Standing  and  Special  Committees. 

The  Committee  of  the  Whole  House  is  composed  of  the  whole 
number  of  the  Members  of  the  House. 

The  Standing  Committee  shall  be  divided  into  several  branches 
according  to  the  requirements  of  business ;  and  in  order  to  engage  in 
the  examination  of  matters  falling  within  its  province,  the  several 
Sections  shall,  from  among  the  Members  of  the  House,  respectively 
elect  an  equal  number  of  members  to  the  Standing  Committeeship. 
The  term  of  the  Standing  Committeeship  shall  last  during  a  single 
session  only. 

The  Special  Committees  shall  be  chosen  by  the  House  and  specially 
entrusted  with  the  examination  of  a  certain  particular  matter. 

Article  XXI. — The  Chairman  of  the  Committee  of  the  Whole 
House  shall  be  elected  for  each  session  at  the  beginning  of  the  same. 

The  Chairman  of  both  the  Standing  and  Special  Committees  shall 
be  respectively  elected  at  the  meetings  of  the  Committees,  by  and  from 
among  the  members  thereof. 

Article  XXII. — No  debate  can  be  opened  nor  can  any  resolution 
be  passed  by  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  House,  unless  more  than 
one  third  of  the  entire  number  of  the  Members  of  the  House  is  present, 

1  Raised  im  1899  to  fire  thousand  yen,  three  thousand  yen,  and  two  thousand 
yen,  respecrirely. 
8  Deleted  in  1899. 

(3») 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  fig 

or  by  either  the  Standing  or  by  the  Special  Committees  unless  more 
than  one  half  of  the  members  of  the  same  is  present. 

Article  XXIII. — No  stranger,  other  than  Members  of  the  House, 
shall  be  admitted  to  the  meetings  of  either  the  Standing  or  of  the 
Special  Committees.  Members  may  also  be  excluded  from  such 
meetings  by  resolution  of  the  respective  Committees. 

Article  XXIV. — The  Chairman  of  each  Committee  shall  report 
to  the  House  concerning  the  proceedings  and  results  of  the  meetings 
of  the  Committee  over  which  he  presides. 

Article  XXV. — Each  House  may,  at  the  request  or  with  the  con- 
currence of  the  Government,  cause  a  Committee  to  continue  the  ex- 
amination of  Bills  during  the  interval  when  the  Diet  is  not  sitting. 

chapter  v. — sittings 

Article  XXVI. — The  President  of  each  House  shall  determine 
the  orders  of  the  day  and  report  the  same  to  the  House  over  which 
he  presides. 

In  the  orders  of  the  day,  the  Bills  brought  in  by  the  Government 
shall  have  precedence,  except  when  the  concurrence  of  the  Govern- 
ment has  been  obtained  to  the  contrary,  in  case  of  urgent  necessity 
for  debates. 

Article  XXVII. — A  project  of  law  shall  be  voted  upon,  after 
it  has  passed  through  three  readings.  But  the  process  of  three  read- 
ings may  be  omitted,  when  such  a  course  is  demanded  by  the  Gov- 
ernment, or  by  not  less  than  ten  Members,  and  agreed  to  by  a  ma- 
jority of  not  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  Members  present  in  the  House. 

Article  XXVIII. — Bills  brought  in  by  the  Government  shall 
never  be  voted  upon,  without  having  been  first  submitted  to  the 
examination  of  a  Committee.  But  it  may  happen  otherwise,  when 
it  is  so  demanded  by  the  Government  in  case  of  urgent  necessity. 

Article  XXIX. — When  a  Member  moves  to  introduce  a  Bill  or 
to  make  an  amendment  of  a  Bill,  such  motion  shall  not  be  made 
the  subject  of  debate,  unless  it  is  supported  by  not  less  than  twenty 
Members. 

Article  XXX. — The  Government  shall  be  at  liberty  at  any 
time  to  either  amend  or  withdraw  any  Bill  which  it  has  already 
brought  in. 

Article  XXXI. — All  Bills  shall,  through  the  medium  of  a  Min- 
ister of  State,  be  presented  to  the  Emperor  by  the  President  of  that 
House  in  which  the  Bill  has  been  last  voted  upon. 

(3*9) 


j0  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

When,  however,  a  Bill  originating  in  either  one  of  the  Houses  has 
been  rejected  in  the  other,  the  rule  set  forth  in  the  second  clause  of 
Article  LIV.  shall  be  followed. 

Article  XXXII. — Bills  which,  after  having  been  passed  by  both 
Houses  of  the  Diet  and  presented  to  the  Emperor,  may  receive  His 
Sanction,  shall  be  promulgated  before  the  next  session  of  the  Diet. 

CHAPTER  VI . — PROROGATION  AND  CLOSING 

Article  XXXIII. — The  Government  may  at  any  time  order  the 
prorogation  of  either  House  for  a  period  of  not  more  than  fifteen  days. 

When  either  House  again  meets  after  the  termination  of  the  proro- 
gation, the  debates  of  the  last  meeting  shall  be  continued. 

Article  XXXIV. — In  case  the  House  of  Peers  is  ordered  to  pro- 
rogue on  account  of  the  dissolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
the  rule  set  forth  in  the  second  clause  of  the  preceding  Article  shall 
not  apply. 

Article  XXXV. — Bills,  representations,  and  petitions,  that  have 
not  been  voted  upon  up  to  the  time  of  the  closing  of  the  Imperial 
Diet,  shall  not  be  continued  at  the  next  session.  It  is,  however,  other- 
wise in  the  case  mentioned  in  Article  XXV. 

Article  XXXVI. — The  closing  of  the  Diet  shall  be  effected  in  a 
joint  meeting  of  both  Houses,  in  accordance  with  the  Imperial  Order. 

CHAPTER  VII. SECRET  SITTINGS 

Article  XXXVII. — In  the  following  cases,  the  sittings  of  either 
House  may  be  held  with  closed  doors : — 

1.  Upon  motion  either  of  the  President  or  of  not  less  than  ten 
Members  and  agreed  to  by  the  House. 

2.  Upon  the  demand  of  the  Government. 

Article  XXXVIII. — When  a  motion  to  go  into  secret  sitting  is 
made  either  by  the  President  or  by  not  less  than  ten  Members,  the 
President  shall  cause  the  strangers  to  withdraw  from  the  House,  and 
shall  then  proceed,  without  debate,  to  take  votes  upon  the  motion. 

Article  XXXIX. — The  proceedings  of  a  secret  sitting  shall  not 
be  made  public. 

CHAPTER  VIII. THE  PASSING  GF  THE  BUDGET 

Article  XL. — When  the  Budget  is  brought  into  the  House  of 
Representatives  by  the  Government,  the  Committee  on  the  Budget 
shall  finish  the  examination  of  the  same,  within  fifteen  days  from 
the  day  on  which  it  received  it,  and  report  thereon  to  the  House. 

(390) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  7I 

Article  XLI. — No  motion  for  an  amendment  to  the  Budget  can 
be  made  the  subject  of  debate  at  a  sitting  of  the  House,  unless  it  is 
supported  by  not  less  than  thirty  Members. 

CHAPTER  IX. — THE  MINISTERS  OF  STATE  AND  THE  DELEGATES  OF  THE 

GOVERNMENT 

Article  XLIL— The  Ministers  of  State  and  the  Delegates  of  the 
Government  shall  be  allowed  at  any  time  to  speak.  But  the  speech 
of  no  Member  shall  be  interrupted  that  they  may  do  so. 

Article  XLIII.— When  a  Bill  has  been  referred  in  either  House 
to  a  Committee,  the  Ministers  of  State  and  the  Delegates  of  the  Gov- 
ernment may  attend  the  meetings  of  the  Committee  and  there  ex- 
piess  their  opinions. 

Article  XLIV. — A  Committee  in  meeting  may,  through  the  Presi- 
dent, demand  explanations  from  the  Delegates  of  the  Government. 

Article  XLV. — The  Ministers  of  State  and  the  Delegates  of 
the  Government,  except  such  of  them  as  are  Members  of  the  House, 
shall  have  no  vote  in  the  House. 

Article  XLVI. — When  a  meeting  of  either  a  Standing  or  of  a 
Special  Committee  is  to  be  held,  the  Chairman  thereof  shall  every  time 
report  the  fact  to  the  Ministers  of  State  and  to  the  Delegates  of  the 
Government  concerned  in  the  matter  to  be  considered. 

Article  XLVII. — The  orders  of  the  day  and  the  notice  relating 
to  debates  shall,  simultaneously  with  the  distribution  thereof  among 
the  Members,  be  transmitted  to  the  Ministers  of  State  and  to  the 
Delegates  of  the  Government. 

CHAPTER  X. QUESTIONS 

Article  XLVIII. — When  a  Member  in  either  House  desires  to 
put  a  question  to  the  Government,  he  shall  be  required  to  obtain  the 
support  of  not  less  than  thirty  Members. 

In  putting  such  question,  the  Member  proposing  it  shall  draw  up 
a  concise  memorandum  and  present  it  to  the  President,  after  he 
shall  have  signed  it  conjointly  with  the  supporters. 

Article  XLIX. — The  President  shall  transmit  the  memorandum 
on  questions  to  the  Government.  A  Minister  of  State  shall  then 
either  immediately  answer  the  questions,  or  fix  the  date  for  making 
such  answer,  and  when  he  does  not  do  so,  he  shall  explicitly  state 
his  reasons  therefor. 

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72  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

Article  L. — When  an  answer  has  been  or  has  not  been  obtained 
from  a  Minister  of  State,  any  Member  may  move  a  representation 
concerning  the  affairs  of  the  questions. 

CHAPTER  XI. ADDRESSES   AND  REPRESENTATIONS 

Article  LI. — When  either  House  desires  to  present  an  address 
to  the  Emperor,  it  shall  be  presented  by  it  in  writing ;  or  the  President 
may  be  directed,  as  the  representative  of  the  House,  to  ask  an  audi- 
ence of  the  Emperor,  and  present  the  same  to  Him. 

The  representations  of  either  House  to  the  Government  shall  be 
presented  in  writing. 

Article  LI  I. — No  motion  for  such  address  and  representation 
shall  in  either  House  be  made  the  subject  of  debate,  unless  at  least 
thirty  Members  support  it. 

CHAPTER  XII. — THE  RELATIONS  OF  THE  TWO  HOUSES  OF  THE  DIET  TO 

EACH  OTHER 

Article  LIII. — With  the  exception  of  the  Budget,  the  Bills  of 
the  Government  may  be  brought  in  either  one  of  the  Houses  first, 
according  to  the  convenience  of  the  case. 

Article  LIV. — When  a  Government  Bill  has  been  passed  in  either 
House  with  or  without  amendment,  it  shall  then  be  carried  into  the 
other  House.  When  the  second  House  either  concurs  in  or  dissents 
from  the  vote  of  the  first  House,  it  shall,  simultaneously  with  ad- 
dressing the  Emperor,  report  to  the  first  House. 

In  case  a  Bill  introduced  by  either  House  is  rejected  by  the  other 
House,  the  second  House  shall  report  the  fact  to  the  first  House. 

Article  LV. — When  either  House  makes  amendments  to  a  Bill 
carried  into  it  from  the  other  House,  the  Bill  as  amended  shall  be 
returned  to  the  first  House.  When  the  first  House  agrees  to  the 
amendments,  it  shall,  simultaneously  with  addressing  the  Emperor, 
report  to  the  second  House.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  the  first  House 
does  not  agree  to  such  amendments,  it  may  demand  a  conference  of 
the  two  Houses. 

When  either  House  demands  a  conference,  the  other  House  can- 
not refuse  it. 

Article  LVI. — Both  Houses  shall  elect  an  equal  number,  not  more 
than  ten,  of  Managers  to  meet  in  conference.  When  the  Bill  in 
question  has  been  adjusted  in  the  conference,  the  adjusted  Bill  shall 
be  discussed  first  in  that  House  which  had  either  received  it  from 

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No.  3]  APPENDIX  73 

the  Government  or  had  initiated  it,  and  the  Bill  is  then  carried  to 
the  other  House, 

No  motion  for  amendments  can  be  made  to  a  Bill  that  has  been 
adjusted  in  a  conference. 

Article  LVII. — The  Ministers  of  State,  the  Delegates  of  the 
Government  and  the  Presidents  of  both  Houses,  are  at  liberty  to  at- 
tend a  conference  of  the  two  Houses  and  to  express  their  opinions 
thereat. 

Article  LVIII. — No  strangers  are  allowed  to  be  present  at  a  con- 
ference of  the  two  Houses. 

Article  LIX. — At  a  conference  of  the  two  Houses,  vote  shall  be 
taken  by  secret  ballot.  In  the  event  of  a  tie  vote,  the  Chairman  shall 
have  the  casting  vote. 

Article  LX. — The  Managers  from  the  two  Houses  shall  separ- 
ately elect  one  of  themselves  Chairman  of  the  conference.  The 
Chairmen  thus  elected  shall  occupy  the  chair  at  alternate  meetings 
of  the  conference.  The  Chairmanship  of  the  first  meeting  shall  be 
settled  by  the  drawing  of  lots. 

Article  LXI. — All  other  regulations  besides  what  is  provided  for 
in  the  present  Chapter,  as  to  any  business  in  which  both  Houses  are 
concerned,  shall  be  determined  by  a  conference  of  the  two  Houses. 

chapter  xiii. — petitions 

Article  LXI  I. — All  petitions  addressed  to  either  House  by  people 
shall  be  received  through  the  medium  of  a  Member. 

Article  LXI  1 1. — Petitions  shall  be  submitted,  in  either  House,  to 
the  examination  of  the  Committee  on  Petitions. 

When  the  Committee  on  Petitions  considers  that  a  petition  is  not 
in  conformity  with  the  established  rules,  the  President  shall  return  it 
through  the  Member,  through  whose  medium  it  was  originally  pre- 
sented. 

Article  LXIV. — The  Committee  on  Petitions  shall  compile  a  list, 
in  which  shall  be  noted  the  essential  points  of  each  petition,  and  shall 
report  once  a  week  to  the  House. 

When  it  is  asked  for  by  a  special  report  of  the  Committee  on  Peti- 
tions or  by  not  less  than  thirty  Members  of  the  House,  either  House 
may  proceed  to  debate  on  the  matter  of  the  petition  in  question. 

Article  LXV. — When  either  House  passes  a  vote  to  entertain  a 
petition,  the  petition  shall  then  be  sent  to  the  Government,  together 

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74  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

with  a  memorial  of  the  House  thereon,  and  the  House  may  according 
to  circumstances,  demand  a  report  thereon  of  the  Government. 

Article  LXVI. — Neither  House  can  receive  a  petition  presented 
by  a  proxy,  excepting  when  such  proxy  is  a  party  recognized  by  law 
as  an  artificial  person. 

Article  LXVII. — Neither  House  can  receive  petitions  for  amend- 
ing the  Constitution. 

Article  LXVIII. — Petitions  shall  be  in  the  form  and  style  of 
a  prayer.  No  petition,  that  is  not  entitled  such,  or  that  does  not 
conform  with  the  proper  form  and  style,  shall  be  received  by  either 
House. 

Article  LXIX. — Neither  House  can  receive  a  petition  that  con- 
tains words  of  disrespect  towards  the  Imperial  Family  or  those  of 
insult  to  the  Government  or  the  House. 

Article  LXX. — Neither  House  can  receive  petitions  interfering 
with  the  administration  of  justice  or  with  administrative  litigation. 

Article  LXXI. — Both  Houses  shall  separately  receive  petitions 
and  shall  not  interfere  each  with  the  other  in  such  matters. 

CHAPTER  XIV. THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  HOUSES  AND  THE 

PEOPLE,  THE  GOVERNMENT  OFFICES  AND  LOCAL  ASSEMBLIES 

Article  LXXII. — Neither  House  is  allowed  to  issue  notifications 
to  the  people. 

Article  LXXIII. — Neither  House  is  allowed,  for  the  prosecution 
of  examinations,  to  summon  persons  or  to  direct  a  member  to  repair 
outside  the  precincts  of  the  House. 

Article  LXXIV. — When  either  House,  for  the  purposes  of  ex- 
aminations, asks  the  Government  for  necessary  reports  or  documents, 
the  Government  shall  comply,  provided  such  reports  or  documents  do 
not  relate  to  any  secret  matter. 

Article  LXXV. — Other  than  with  the  Ministers  of  State  and  the 
Delegates  of  the  Government,  neither  House  can  hold  any  corres- 
pondence with  any  Government  Office  or  with  any  Local  Assembly. 

CHAPTER  XV. RETIREMENT  AND  OBJECTIONS  TO  THE  QUALIFICATION 

OF   MEMBERS 

Article  LXX VI. — When  a  Member  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives has  been  appointed  a  Member  of  the  House  of  Peers,  or  has 
received  an  official  appointment,  which  by  law  disables  him  from 
being  a  member,  he  shall  be  considered  as  retired. 

(394) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  j  5 

Article  LXXVII. — When  a  Member  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives has  lost  any  of  the  qualifications  of  eligibility  mentioned  in  the 
Law  of  Election,  he  shall  be  considered  as  retired. 

Article  LXXVII  I. — When  an  objection  is  raised  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  as  to  the  qualifications  of  any  of  its  Members,  a 
Special  Committee  shall  be  appointed  to  examine  into  the  matter, 
upon  a  specified  day,  and  the  resolution  of  the  House  shall  be  taken 
upon  the  receipt  of  the  report  of  the  said  Committee. 

Article  LXXIX. — Whenever,  in  a  Court  of  Law,  legal  pro- 
ceedings pertinent  to  an  election  suit  have  been  commenced,  the  House 
of  Representatives  cannot  institute  enquiries  on  the  same  matter. 

Article  LXXX. — Until  the  disqualification  of  a  Member  has  been 
proved,  he  shall  not  lose  either  his  seat  or  his  vote  in  the  House. 
In  debates  relating  to  enquiries  into  his  own  qualifications,  a  Member, 
though  at  liberty  to  offer  explanations,  cannot  take  part  in  voting 
thereon. 

CHAPTER  XVI. LEAVE   OF   ABSENCE,    RESIGNATION,    AND   SUBSTITU- 
TIONAL ELECTIONS 

Article  LXXXI. — The  President  of  either  House  shall  have  the 
power  to  grant  to  Members  a  leave  of  absence  for  a  period  not  ex- 
ceeding a  week.  As  to  a  leave  of  absence  for  a  period  of  more  than 
a  week,  permission  may  be  given  by  the  House.  No  permission  shall 
be  given  for  a  leave  of  absence  for  an  unlimited  period  of  time. 

Article  LXXXII. — No  Member  of  either  House  can  absent  him- 
self from  the  meetings  of  the  House  or  of  a  Committee,  without  for- 
warding to  the  President  a  notice  setting  forth  proper  reasons  therefor. 

Article  LXXXIII. — The  House  of  Representatives  shall  have 
power  to  accept  the  resignation  of  a  Member. 

Article  LXXXIV. — When,  from  any  cause  whatever,  a  vacancy 
occurs  among  the  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  the 
President  shall  report  the  fact  to  the  Minister  of  State  for  Home 
Affairs,  demanding  a  substitutional  election. 

CHAPTER  XVII. DISCIPLINE  AND  POLICE 

Article  LXXXV. — For  the  maintenance  of  discipline  in  either 
House  during  its  session,  the  power  of  internal  police  shall  be  exer- 
cised by  the  President,  in  accordance  with  the  present  Law  and  such 
regulations  as  may  be  determined  in  the  respective  Houses. 

(395) 


76  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

Article  LXXXVI. — Police  officials  required  by  either  House,  shall 
be  provided  by  the  Government  and  put  under  the  direction  of  the 
President. 

Article  LXXXVII. — When,  during  a  meeting  of  the  House,  any 
Member  infringes  the  present  Law  or  the  rules  of  debate,  or  in  any 
way  disturbs  the  order  of  the  House,  the  President  shall  either  warn 
him,  stop  him,  or  order  him  to  retract  his  remarks.  When  he  fails 
to  obey  the  order  of  the  President,  the  latter  shall  have  the  power 
either  to  prohibit  him  from  speaking  during  the  remainder  of  the 
meeting,  or  to  order  him  to  leave  the  Hall. 

Article  LXXXVII  I. — When  the  House  is  in  a  state  of  excite- 
ment and  it  is  found  difficult  to  maintain  order,  the  President  shall 
have  power  either  to  suspend  the  meeting  or  close  it  for  the  day. 

Article  LXXXIX. — When  any  stranger  disturbs  the  debate,  the 
President  may  order  him  to  leave  the  House,  and  in  case  of  neces- 
sity, may  cause  him  to  be  handed  over  to  a  police  officer. 

When  the  strangers'  gallery  is  in  a  state  of  commotion,  the  Presi- 
dent may  order  all  strangers  to  leave  the  House. 

Article  XC. — When  any  person  disturbs  the  order  of  the  House, 
the  Ministers  of  State,  the  Delegates  of  the  Government,  and  the 
Members,  may  call  the  attention  of  the  President  thereto. 

Article  XCI. — In  neither  House  shall  the  utterance  of  expres- 
sions or  the  making  of  speeches,  implying  disrespect  to  the  Imperial 
House,  be  allowed. 

Article  XCII. — In  neither  House  shall  the  use  of  coarse  lan- 
guage or  personalities  be  allowed. 

Article  XCI  1 1. — When  any  member  has  been  vilified  or  insulted, 
either  in  the  House  or  at  a  meeting  of  a  Committee,  he  shall  appeal 
to  the  House  and  demand  that  proper  measures  be  taken.  There 
shall  be  no  retaliation  among  Members. 

CHAPTER   XVIII. DISCIPLINARY    PUNISHMENTS 

Article  XCIV. — Both  Houses  shall  have  the  power  to  mete  out 
disciplinary  punishment  to  the  respective  Members. 

Article  XCV. — In  each  House  there  shall  be  instituted  a  Com- 
mittee on  Disciplinary  Punishment  for  making  enquiries  into  cases 
of  disciplinary  punishment. 

When  a  case  for  disciplinary  punishment  occurs,  the  President 
shall,  in  the  first  place,  instruct  the  Committee  to  enquire  into  the 

(396) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  j  j 

matter,  and  shall  deliver  sentence  after  having  submitted  the  case 
to  the  consideration  of  the  House. 

When  a  case  for  disciplinary  punishment  occurs  at  a  meeting  of  a 
Committee  or  in  a  Section,  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  or  the 
Chief  of  the  Section  shall  report  the  matter  to  the  President  and  re- 
quire measures  to  be  taken  thereon. 

Article  XCVI. — Disciplinary  punishments  shall  be  as  follows^: — 

1.  Reprimands  at  an  open  meeting  of  the  House. 

2.  Expression  by  the  offender  of  a  proper  apology  at  an  open 
meeting  of  the  House. 

3.  Suspension  of  the  offender  from  presence  in  the  House  for  a 
certain  length  of  time. 

4.  Expulsion. 

In  the  House  of  Representatives,  expulsion  shall  be  decided  upon 
by  a  majority  vote  of  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  Members  present. 

Article  XCVI  I. — The  House  of  Representatives  shall  have  no 
power  to  deny  a  seat  to  a  Member  that  has  been  expelled,  when  he 
shall  have  been  re-elected. 

Article  XCVI  1 1. — Any  Member  shall,  with  the  support  of  not 
less  than  twenty  Members,  have  the  right  to  make  a  motion  for  the 
infliction  of  a  disciplinary  punishment. 

A  motion  for  a  disciplinary  punishment  shall  be  made  within  three 
days  from  the  commission  of  the  offence. 

Article  XCIX. — When,  for  non-compliance,  without  substantial 
reasons,  with  the  Imperial  Proclamation  of  convocation  within  one 
week  from  the  date  specified  therein,  or  for  absence,  without  good 
reasons,  from  the  meetings  of  the  House  or  of  a  Committee,  or  for 
having  exceeded  the  period  of  his  leave  of  absence,  a  Member  has 
received  a  summons  from  the  President  and  still  persists  in  delaying 
his  appearance  without  good  grounds  for  so  doing,  for  one  week 
after  the  receipt  of  the  said  summons,  he  shall,  in  the  House  of 
Peers,  be  suspended  from  taking  his  seat,  and  the  matter  shall  be 
submitted  to  the  Emperor  for  His  decision. 

In  the  House  of  Representatives,  such  a  Member  shall  be  expelled 
therefrom. 

(397) 


yS  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

IV.  THE  LAW  OF  FINANCE 

We,  with  the  advice  of  Our  Privy  Council,  hereby  give  Our  Sanc- 
tion to  the  present  Law  of  Finance  and  order  it  to  be  promulgated. 

[His  Imperial  Majesty's  Sign- Manual] 
[Privy  Seal.] 
The  11th  day  of  the  2nd  month  of  the  22nd  year  of  Meiji  [Febru- 
ary 11,  18&9]. 

[Countersigned  by  the  Ministers.] 

CHAPTER  I. GENERAL   RULES 

Article  I. — The  financial  year  of  the  Government  shall  com- 
mence on  the  1st  day  of  the  4th  month  in  each  year,  and  end  on  the 
31st  day  of  the  3rd  month  of  the  following  year. 

All  transactions  of  matters  relating  to  receipt  and  disbursement  of 
the  revenues  and  expenditures  of  each  financial  year,  shall  be  com- 
pleted on  the  31st  day  of  the  11th  month  of  the  following  financial 
year. 

Article  II. — All  receipts  from  taxes  and  all  other  resources  shall 
be  treated  as  revenues,  and  all  expenses,  as  expenditures.  Revenues 
and  expenditures  shall  be  embodied  in  the  general  budget. 

Article  III. — Sums  appropriated  for  each  financial  year  shall 
not  be  applied  to  the  payment  of  expenses  belonging  to  another 
financial  year. 

Article  IV. — No  Government  Office  is  allowed  to  keep  special 
funds  other  than  those  provided  for  by  law  or  ordinance. 

CHAPTER  II. — BUDGET 

Article  V. — The  general  budget  of  annual  revenues  and  expendi- 
tures shall  be  laid  before  the  Imperial  Diet  of  the  previous  year,  at 
the  beginning  of  its  session. 

Article  VI. — The  general  budget  of  annual  revenues  and  ex- 
penditures shall  be  divided  into  two  parts,  the  ordinary  and  extra- 
ordinary; and  each  part  shall  be  subdivided  into  Titles  and  Para- 
graphs. 

The  following  documents  shall  accompany  the  budget  for  the  in- 
formation of  the  Imperial  Diet: — 

1.  Paper  stating  the  amount  of  the  estimated  expenses  demanded 
by  the  respective  Departments  of  State.     In  this  paper  every 
item  in  each  Paragraph  shall  be  explicitly  stated. 
(39«) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  yg 

2.  Paper  stating  the  actual  accounts  of  the  revenue  and  expen- 
diture of  the  financial  year,  ended  on  the  31st  day  of  the  3rd 
month  of  the  current  year. 
Article  VII. — The  reserves  to  be  provided  in  the  budget  shall  be 
divided  into  the  following  two  classes: — 1st  reserve;  2nd  reserve. 

The  first  reserve  shall  be  used  to  supply  deficiencies,  which  are 
unavoidable  in  the  budget.  The  second  reserve  shall  be  used  to 
meet  necessary  expenses  unprovided  for  in  the  same. 

Article  VIII. — The  account  of  sums  defrayed  out  of  the  reserve 
shall,  after  the  lapse  of  the  financial  year,  be  laid  before  the  Im- 
perial Diet,  and  its  approbation  shall  be  sought. 

Article  IX. — The  maximum  amount  of  the  Treasury  Bills  to  be 
issued  during  each  financial  year,  shall  be  determined  with  the 
consent  of  the  Imperial  Diet. 

CHAPTER   III. RECEIPTS 

Article  X. — Taxes  and  other  revenues  shall  be  raised  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  laws  and  ordinances. 

Taxes  and  other  revenues  shall  not  be  levied  except  by  officials 
qualified  therefor  by  law  or  ordinance. 

CHAPTER  IV. — EXPENDITURES 

Article  XI. — The  amount  appropriated  for  the  expenses  of  the 
Government  for  each  financial  year,  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  the 
revenues  of  the  same  financial  year. 

Article  XII. — The  Ministers  of  State  shall  not  apply  the  ap- 
propriations for  any  object  other  than  that  prescribed  in  the  budget; 
nor  are  they  permitted  to  interchange  the  amounts  of  appropriation 
in  each  Paragraph  one  for  the  other. 

The  Ministers  of  State  shall  hand  over  to  the  Treasury  all  re- 
ceipts under  their  control,  and  shall  not  make  use  of  them  directly. 

Article  XIII. — The  Ministers  of  State  shall  draw  order  of  pay- 
ment upon  the  Treasury,  in  order  to  defray  the  expenses  appertain- 
ing to  their  respective  administrations. 

The  power  to  issue  order  of  payment,  however,  may  be  delegated 
to  other  functionaries  in  accordance  with  rules  specially  provided  for. 

Article  XIV. — The  Treasury  shall  not  make  payment  on  such 
orders  as  are  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  laws  and  ordinances. 

Article  XV. — The  Ministers  of  State  shall  not  issue  order  of 

(399) 


80  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

payment,  except  in  favor  of  a  legitimate  creditor  of  the  Government 
or  his  agent. 

For  the  expenses  enumerated  here  below,  the  Ministers  of  State 
may,  however,  issue  order  of  advance  payment  to  competent  officials 
or  to  banks  specially  assigned  by  the  Government. 

1.  Payment  on  the  principal  and  interest  of  national  debts. 

2.  Expenses  of  troops  and  fleets,  and  Government  vessels. 

3.  Expenses  of  Government  Offices  abroad. 

4.  All  expenses  to  be  paid  in  foreign  countries,  besides  those 
mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause. 

5.  Expenses  to  be  paid  in  those  districts  in  the  interior,  where 
the  means  of  transportation  and  communication  are  incom- 
plete. 

6.  Those  miscellaneous  ordinary  expenses  in  the  different  Gov- 
ernment Offices,  of  which  the  whole  annual  amount  is  below 
five  hundred  yen. 

7.  Expenses  of  Offices,  the  situation  of  which  cannot  be  settled 
in  one  place. 

8.  Expenses  of  works  carried  out  under  direct  supervision  of  the 
different  Government  Offices,  provided  such  expenses  do  not 
exceed  three  thousand  yen  for  each  superintending  official. 

CHAPTER   V. FINAL    ACCOUNTS 

Article  XVI. — General  final  accounts  to  be  laid  by  the  Govern- 
ment before  the  Imperial  Diet,  after  it  has  received  the  verification 
of  the  Board  of  Audit,  shall  be  drawn  up  in  the  same  form  as  the 
general  budget,  and  shall  contain  explicit  statements  as  to  the  fol- 
lowing particulars: — 

REVENUES 

Estimated  amount  of  revenues. 
Ascertained  amount  of  revenues. 
Amount  of  revenues  received. 
Amount  of  revenues  not  yet  received. 

EXPENDITURES 

Estimated  amount  of  expenditures. 

Amount  of  expenditures  increased  after  the  determination  of  the 
budget. 

Amount  of  expenditures  for  which  order  of  payment  had  been 
issued. 

Amount  to  be  carried  over  to  the  next  financial  year. 

(400) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  gx 

Article  XVII. — The  following  documents  shall  accompany  the 
general  final  accounts  mentioned  in  the  preceding  Article,  together 
with  the  report  of  verification  of  the  Board  of  Audit : — 

1.  Reports  of  final  accounts  submitted  of  the  respective  Depart- 
ments of  State. 

2.  Accounts  of  the  national  debts. 

3.  Accounts  of  cases  in  which  special  modes  of  treatment  are 
allowed. 

CHAPTER  VI. TERMS   OF    PRESCRIPTION 

Article  XVIII. — As  to  those  liabilities  of  the  Government,  of 
which  the  creditor  has  not  made  the  demand  of  disbursement  or  of 
payment  within  five  years,  after  the  end  of  the  financial  year  in 
which  the  payment  should  have  been  made,  they  shall  be  considered 
to  have  passed  the  term  of  prescription,  and  the  Government  shall 
be  free  from  the  liability.  But  in  case  the  term  of  prescription  is 
fixed  by  a  special  law,  the  provision  of  such  law  shall  be  followed. 

Article  XIX. — When,  concerning  any  amount  of  money  due  to 
the  Government,  a  person  has  not  received  notice  for  payment  within 
five  years,  after  the  end  of  the  financial  year  in  which  such  payment 
should  have  been  made,  he  shall  be  freed  from  their  liability.  But 
in  case  the  term  of  prescription  is  fixed  by  a  special  law,  the  pro- 
vision of  such  law  shall  be  followed. 

CHAPTER  VII. — SURPLUS   TRANSFER  OF   APPROPRIATIONS   TO  ANOTHER 

FINANCIAL  YEAR.       RECEIPTS  NOT  PROVIDED  IN  THE  BUDGET. 

REFUNDING   OF    APPROPRIATIONS 

Article  XX. — When  there  occurs  a  surplus  in  the  annual  ac- 
counts of  a  financial  year,  it  shall  be  carried  over  to  the  revenues 
of  the  next  financial  year. 

Article  XXL — In  case  any  express  permission  is  specially  pro- 
vided in  the  budget,  or  in  case  expenses  have  not  been  wholly  paid 
out  during  a  financial  year,  on  account  of  delays  caused  by  un- 
avoidable circumstances  in  the  progress  of  any  work  of  manufacture 
which  had  to  be  completed  within  the  said  financial  year,  appro- 
priations may  be  carried  over  to,  and  disbursed  in,  the  succeeding 
year. 

Article  XXII. — In  case  the  total  amount  of  a  continuing  expen- 
diture fund  is  determined  for  any  work,  manufacture,  or  any  other 
undertakings,  which  require  a  number  of  years  for  completion,  the 

(401) 


82  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

surplus  of  each  financial  year  may  be  successively  carried  over  and 
disbursed  until  the  end  of  the  year,  in  which  the  said  work,  manu- 
facture, or  other  undertakings  shall  be  finished. 

Article  XXIII. — Money  paid  back  for  refunding  sums  which 
had  been  out  in  mistake  or  had  been  overpaid,  receipts  belonging 
to  a  financial  year  of  which  the  accounts  of  receipts  and  payment 
have  been  finished,  and  all  other  receipts  not  provided  in  the  budget, 
shall  be  taken  into  the  revenue  of  the  current  financial  year.  How- 
ever, in  the  case  of  an  advance  payment,  of  a  disbursement  in  ap- 
proximate amounts,  or  of  a  disbursement  by  a  temporary  interchange 
of  items,  which  has  been  made  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
law  or  Imperial  Ordinance,  the  sums  of  money  paid  back  may  be 
applied  for  refunding  the  respective  appropriations,  out  of  which 
they  had  been  originally  paid. 

CHAPTER    VIII. WORKS    UNDER    THE    GOVERNMENT.       THE    SALE    AND 

PURCHASE,  AND  LENDING  AND  BORROWING  OF  OBJECTS 

Article  XXIV. — Excepting  the  cases  otherwise  prescribed  by 
law  or  Imperial  Ordinance,  works  under  the  Government,  and  the 
sale  and  purchase  and  lending  and  borrowing  of  articles,  shall  be 
put  to  competition,  by  giving  public  notice.  In  the  following  cases, 
however,  contracts  may  be  entered  into  at  discretion,  without  resorting 
to  the  competitive  means: — 

1.  In  the  case  of  the  purchase  or  borrowing  of  articles  in  the 
exclusive  possession  of  a  single  person  or  company. 

2.  In  the  case  of  works  to  be  carried  out,  or  of  articles  to  be 
purchased  or  sold,  or  to  be  lent  or  borrowed,  under  circum- 
stances requiring  the  actions  of  the  Government  to  be  kept 
secret. 

3.  In  the  case  of  extraordinary  urgency,  when  there  is  no  time  to 
put  to  competition  the  undertaking  of  a  work,  or  the  purchase 
or  sale,  or  borrowing  or  lending  of  articles. 

4.  In  the  case  of  articles  which,  on  account  of  their  peculiar 
nature,  or  on  account  of  the  special  object  for  which  they 
are  to  be  used,  require  to  be  purchased  directly  in  the  place  of 
production  or  manufacture,  or  from  the  producers  or  manu- 
facturers. 

5.  In  the  case  of  the  purchase  of  manufactures  or  instruments, 
which  cannot  be  manufactured  except  by  special  artists. 

6.  In  the  case  of  the  purchase  or  lease  of  lands  and  buildings, 
requiring  particular  situation  or  construction. 

(402) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  33 

7.  In  the  case  of  contracts  relating  to  works,  and  of  the  pur- 
chase or  borrowing  of  articles,  of  which  the  cost  or  value 
does  not  exceed  five  hundred  yen. 

8.  In  the  case  of  the  sale  of  movable  properties,  the  estimated 
value  of  which  does  not  exceed  two  hundred  yen. 

9.  In  the  case  of  the  purchase  of  men-of-war. 

10.  In  the  case  of  the  purchase  of  horses  in  the  Army. 

11.  In  case  a  work  or  manufacture  is  caused  to  be  undertaken, 
or  some  articles  are  purchased,  for  experimental  purposes. 

12.  In  the  case  of  the  employment  of  the  poor  belonging  to  a 
charity  establishment,  or  in  the  case  of  the  direct  purchase 
of  things  produced  or  manufactured  therein. 

13.  In  the  case  of  the  employment  of  convict  labour,  or  of  the 
direct  purchase  of  things  manufactured  by  the  same,  or  in  the 
case  of  the  direct  purchase  of  articles  produced  or  manu- 
factured at  an  agricultural  or  industrial  establishment  under 
the  control  of  the  Government. 

14.  In  the  case  of  the  sale  of  articles  produced  or  manufactured 
at  an  agricultural  or  industrial  establishment  under  the  Gov- 
ernment, or  an  establishment  for  charity,  education,  or  by 
convict  labour. 

Article  XXV. — No  payment  shall  be  made  in  advance  for  works 
or  manufacture,  or  for  the  purchase  of  articles,  excepting  in  cases 
of  men-of-war,  arms,  and  ammunition. 

CHAPTER   IX. ACCOUNTING  OFFICIALS 

Article  XXVI. — Officials,  who  are  charged  with  the  receipt  and 
disbursement  of  cash  and  with  serving  articles  in  and  out  that  belong 
to  the  Government,  shall  be  responsible  in  every  case  for  the  money 
and  articles  under  their  management,  and  receive  the  verification 
and  decision  of  the  Board  of  Audit. 

Article  XXVII. — In  cases  where  the  officials  mentioned  in  the 
preceding  Article  lose  or  injure  the  cash  or  articles,  by  fire  or  flood, 
or  by  being  robbed  of  them,  or  by  any  other  causes,  they  shall  not 
be  relieved  from  their  responsibility,  unless,  by  proving  to  the  Board 
of  Audit  that  the  loss  or  injury  has  been  unavoidable  in  connection 
with  the  custody,  they  shall  have  received  decision  of  the  said  Board, 
discharging  them  from  the  responsibility  for  the  same. 

Article  XXVIII. — The  officials  who  may  be  required  to  deposit 
security  for  being  charged  with  the  receipt  or  disbursement  of  cash 

(403) 


84  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vou  VI 

and  with  serving  articles  in  and  out,  shall  be  determined  by  Imperial 
Ordinance. 

Article  XXIX. — The  capacity  to  order  payment  and  that  of 
dealing  with  the  receipt  and  disbursement  of  money,  shall  not  be 
combined  in  one  person  at  the  same  time. 

CHAPTER  X. — MISCELLANEOUS  RULES 

Article  XXX. — In  case  when  it  is  difficult  to  follow  the  pro- 
visions of  the  present  Law  on  account  of  special  requirements,  a 
special  mode  of  treatment  may  be  allowed. 

The  establishment  of  a  special  mode  of  treatment  shall  be  effected 
by  law. 

Article  XXXI. — The  Government  may  entrust  the  Nippon 
Ginko  [Bank  of  Japan]  with  the  management  of  the  Treasury  funds. 

CHAPTER    XI. SUPPLEMENTARY    RULES 

Article  XXXII. — The  provisions  of  the  present  Law  not  relat- 
ing to  the  Imperial  Diet  shall  come  in  force  from  the  1st  day  of 
the  4th  month  of  the  23rd  year  of  Meiji  [April  1,  1890]  j  and  those 
relating  to  the  Imperial  Diet  shall  come  in  force  from  the  time  of 
its  opening. 

The  provisions  of  the  present  Law  relating  to  the  final  accounts 
shall  have  application  from  the  accounts  of  the  financial  year  for 
which  the  vote  of  the  Imperial  Diet  shall  have  been  obtained. 

Article  XXXIII. — Laws  and  ordinances  which  are  incompatible 
with  any  provision  of  the  present  Law,  shall  be  repealed  from  the 
day  of  the  coming  in  force  of  such  provision. 

V.  THE  NEW  LAW  OF  ELECTION  1 

CHAPTER  I. THE  ELECTION  DISTRICTS 

Article  I. — The  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  shall 
be  elected  in  each  of  the  Election  Districts.  The  Election  Districts, 
and  the  number  of  Members  to  be  elected  in  each  district,  are  set 
forth  in  the  Appendix  of  the  present  Law. 

Article  II.— The  Voting  Districts  shall  be  determined  accord- 
ing to  the  limits  of  Shi  (Cities),  Cho  (Towns),  and  San  (Villages). 
In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Imperial  Ordinance,  a  city, 
town  or  village  possessing  peculiar  circumstances  may  establish  not 

1  From  the  Japan  Weekly  Times  of  Aug.   16  and  23,  1902,  with  corrections. 

(404) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  g5 

less  than  two  voting  districts,  or  may  establish  one  voting  district 
for  several  towns  or  villages.  When  the  provisions  of  the  present 
Law  are  not  applicable  to  the  voting  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
clause,  special  provisions  may  be  enacted  by  Imperial  Ordinance. 

Article  III. — A  Union  of  several  Towns  or  several  Villages,  or 
of  Towns  and  Villages  administering  in  common  the  affairs  of  such 
Towns  and  Villages,  shall  be  regarded  as  one  Town  or  Village,  and 
the  administrators  of  the  Union  shall  be  regarded  as  the  Heads  of 
the  Town  or  Village. 

Article  IV. — The  Mayor  of  a  City  or  the  Head  of  a  Town  or 
Village  shall  take  charge  of  the  voting  in  the  capacity  of  Voting 
Overseer. 

Article  V. — The  Counting  Districts  shall  be  in  conformity  with 
the  limits  of  a  Gun  (Rural  District)  or  City.  The  Head  of  the  Gun 
or  the  Mayor  shall  take  charge  of  counting  affairs  in  the  capacity  of 
Counting  Overseer. 

Article  VI. — The  Governor  of  a  Local  Administration  Office 
shall  supervise  the  election  affairs  in  the  capacity  of  Chairman  of 
Election. 

Article  VII. — Even  when  an  alteration  takes  place  in  an  election 
district  in  consequence  of  one  in  the  administration  arrangement,  the 
member  or  members  actually  sitting  for  such  district  shall  retain 
their  seats. 

CHAPTER  II. RIGHTS  OF  ELECTORS  AND  OF  ELIGIBLE  PERSONS 

Article  VIII. — Any  person  possessing  the  following  qualifica- 
tions shall  enjoy  the  franchise. 

1.  He  must  be  a  male  Japanese  subject  and  be  not  less  than 
full  twenty-five  years  of  age. 

2.  He  must  have  had  his  permanent  residence  in  the  election 
district  for  not  less  than  one  year  previous  to  the  date  of  the 
drawing-up  of  the  electoral  list. 

3.  He  must  have  been  paying  in  the  electoral  district,  land  tax 
to  the  amount  of  not  less  than  ten  yen  for  not  less  than  one 
year,  and  previous  to  the  date  of  the  making  out  of  the 
electoral  list,  or  other  direct  national  taxes  exclusive  of  land 
tax  of  not  less  than  ten  yen  in  the  aggregate,  or  land  tax 
and  other  direct  national  taxes  combined  of  not  less  than 
ten  yen,  for  not  less  than  two  years ;  and  must  be  still  paying 
the  same. 

(405) 


86  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

In  the  case  of  a  person  that  has  acquired  property  by  succeeding 
to  an  estate,  the  amount  of  taxes  paid  on  the  estate  by  his  prede- 
cessor shall  be  regarded  as  taxes  paid  by  him. 

Article  IX. — In  the  qualifications  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
article,  those  that  depend  on  time  shall  not  be  affected  by  any 
alteration  of  the  administrative  jurisdiction  of  the  places  of  abode 
of  the  persons  concerned. 

Article  X. — A  male  Japanese  subject  who  is  not  less  than  full 
thirty  years  of  age  shall  be  eligible  for  election. 

Article  XI.— The  following  persons  shall  not  enjoy  the  fran- 
chise or  be  eligible  for  election: — 

1.  Those  who  have  been  declared  incompetent  or  quasi-in- 
competent. 

2.  Those  who  have  been  declared  bankrupt  and  have  not  yet 
fulfilled  their  obligations,  or  those  who  have  been  declared 
to  be  in  process  of  liquidation  or  to  be  insolvent  and  who 
have  not  yet  been  definitely  rehabilitated. 

3.  Those  who  have  been  deprived  of  civic  rights  or  whose  civic 
rights  are  suspended. 

[4.  Those  who  have  been  sentenced  to  simple  confinement  or 
to  a  graver  punishment  and  whose  cases  are  sub  judice.]  l 

Article  XII.— The  pater-familias  of  noble  families  shall  not  pos- 
sess the  franchise  or  be  eligible  for  election.  The  same  rule  applies 
to  men  in  the  Army  or  in  the  Navy  who  are  on  active  service  or  who 
have  been  summoned  in  time  of  war  or  of  emergency ;  also  to  students 
of  Government,  communal  and  private  educational  institutions. 

Article  XIII. — Shinto  priests  and  ministers,  priests  and  teach- 
ers of  religion  of  all  kinds,  teachers  of  elementary  schools  shall  be 
ineligible.  This  rule  applies  to  those  who  have  not  yet  passed  three 
months  after  they  have  resigned  their  respective  offices. 

Those  who  undertake  Government  work  under  contract  or  those 
who  are  officers  of  juridical  persons  undertaking  Government  work 
under  contract  shall  be  ineligible.* 

Article  XIV. — The  officers  and  officials  engaged  in  the  manage- 
ment of  an  election  shall  not  be  eligible  within  the  limits  of  the 

IThis  clause  was  deleted  in  1910. 

8  In  1908,  this  paragraph  was  amended  by  inserting  the  word  "  principally  " ; 
so  that  the  latter  part  would  read:  "those  who  are  officers  of  juridical  persons 
undertaking  principally  Government  work  under  contract  shall  be  ineligible.** 

(406) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  87 

jurisdiction  of  their  respective  offices.  This  rule  applies  to  those 
who  have  not  yet  passed  three  months  after  they  have  resigned  their 
respective  offices. 

Article  XV. — Officials  in  the  Imperial  Household  Department, 
Officials  of  Justice,  Chiefs  and  Judges  of  the  Administrative  Litiga- 
tion Court,  Auditors,  Revenue  Officials  and  Police  Officials  shall  not 
be  eligible. 

Article  XVI. — Officials  other  than  those  enumerated  in  the  pre- 
ceding article  may,  so  long  as  their  official  functions  are  not  there- 
by interfered  with,  serve  as  members,  retaining  their  official  position. 

Article  XVII. — A  member  of  a  Fu  or  Ken  Assembly  may  not 
combine  his  office  with  membership  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 

CHAPTER    III. ELECTORAL    LIST 

Article  XVIII. — The  Chocho  (Head  of  Town)  and  the  Soncho 
(Head  of  Village)  shall  make  every  year  according  to  the  existing 
state  of  things  on  the  1st  of  October  a  list  of  all  the  qualified  persons 
residing  in  the  Cho  and  the  Son,  and  shall  make  out  two  copies  of 
the  electoral  list  and  forward  them  to  the  Guncho  (Head  of  Rural 
District)  before  the  15th  of  the  month. 

The  Guncho  shall  inspect  the  lists  forwarded  to  him  by  the  Chocho 
and  Soncho  and  shall  return  the  duplicates  to  the  respective  Chocho 
and  Soncho  before  the  31st  of  October,  after  making  any  correction 
that  it  is  judged  necessary. 

The  Shicho  (Mayor)  shall  make  every  year,  according  to  the 
existing  state  of  things  on  the  1st  of  October,  a  list  of  all  the  quali- 
fied persons  residing  in  the  city  and  shall  make  out  an  electoral  list 
before  the  31st  of  the  same  month. 

In  the  electoral  list  shall  be  entered  the  name,  official  rank,  pro- 
fession, class,  residence,  date  of  birth  of  each  voter,  and  the  total 
amount  of  taxes  paid  by  him  and  the  place  in  which  such  taxes  are 
paid. 

Article  XIX. — When  an  elector  is  paying  direct  national  taxes 
without  the  limits  of  the  Shi,  Cho  or  Son  in  which  he  is  residing, 
he  shall  obtain  in  accordance  with  the  prescribed  process  a  certi- 
ficate to  that  effect,  and  shall  forward  it  before  the  5th  of  October 
to  the  Shicho,  Chocho,  or  Soncho  of  the  place  where  he  is  residing. 
In  case  the  said  certificate  is  not  forwarded  by  the  prescribed  time, 
the  said  taxes  shall  not  be  counted  in  the  electoral  list. 

Article  XX. — The  Guncho,  Shicho,  Chocho,  or  Soncho  shall,  at 

(407) 


8$  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

their  respective  offices  or  at  places  approved  by  their  respective  local 
Governors,  exhibit  for  public  inspection  the  electoral  list,  during 
fifteen  days  commencing  from  the  5th  of  November. 

Article  XXL — When  an  elector  discovers  an  omission  or  the 
wrong  registration  of  a  name  in  the  list,  he  may  claim  that  a  cor- 
rection be  made  by  giving  to  the  Guncho  or  the  Shicho  written 
notice  and  his  reasons  therefor,  together  with  corroborative  evidence. 

Article  XXII. — When  for  a  justifiable  reason  an  elector  cannot 
follow  the  process  mentioned  in  Article  XIX  and  his  name  has  not 
been  registered  in  the  list,  the  provisions  in  the  preceding  Article 
shall  apply. 

Article  XXIII. — After  the  expiration  of  the  period  for  public 
inspection,  a  claim  set  forth  in  the  preceding  two  articles  may  not 
be  made. 

Article  XXIV. — Upon  the  receipt  of  a  notice  set  forth  in  Article 
XXI  and  Article  XXII,  the  Guncho  or  Shicho  shall  examine  the 
reasons  alleged  and  the  evidence  adduced,  and  shall  give  his  decision 
within  twenty  days  from  the  receipt  of  such  notice.  When  he  de- 
cides that  the  notice  is  relevant,  he  shall  immediately  register  the 
name  omitted  and  communicate  to  that  effect  with  the  person  who 
has  given  the  notice  and  to  the  other  persons  concerned,  at  the  same 
time  publishing  the  main  points  of  the  case  in  the  election  districts. 
When  the  notice  is  decided  to  be  irrelevant,  a  communication  to  that 
effect  shall  be  made  to  the  person  who  has  given  the  notice. 

When  the  registration  has  been  corrected,  the  Guncho  shall  com- 
municate the  circumstances  to  the  Chocho  or  Soncho  of  the  place  in 
which  the  person  in  question  is  residing. 

Article  XXV. — When  either  the  person  who  has  given  the  notice 
or  other  persons  concerned  are  not  satisfied  with  the  decision  of  the 
Guncho  or  Shicho  made  in  conformity  with  the  foregoing  article, 
they  may,  within  seven  days  from  the  day  on  which  the  said  decision 
was  given,  institute  against  the  Guncho  or  Shicho  a  suit  in  a  Local 
Court. 

No  appeal  is  allowed  to  Appellate  Courts  against  the  judgment  of 
the  Local  Court  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause,  but  it  is  per- 
missible to  bring  an  appeal  to  the  Court  of  Cassation  for  revision. 

Article  XXVI. — The  Chocho  or  the  Soncho  shall  forward  to  the 
Guncho  between  the  20th  of  November  and  the  10th  of  December 
the  electoral  list  placed  under  his  management. 

(408) 


Mo.  33  APPENDIX  %g 

The  Guncho  shall  examine  the  list  forwarded  to  him  in  conform- 
ity with  the  preceding  clause  and  shall  send  it  back  by  the  20th  of 
December  to  the  Chocho  or  the  Soncho  after  making  the  necessary 
correction  whenever  there  is  any  part  to  be  corrected  in  the  list. 

Article  XXVII. — The  electoral  list  shall  be  settled  on  the  20th 
of  December,  and  the  list  shall  be  kept  till  the  day  on  which  the 
electoral  list  for  the  next  year  is  settled.  When,  however,  any  cor- 
rection is  to  be  made  in  the  list  in  pursuance  of  the  judgment  of  a 
Court  of  Law,  the  Guncho  or  the  Shicho  shall  at  once  make  the  said 
correction  and  shall  publish  the  fact. 

When  the  list  has  been  corrected  in  conformity  with  the  preceding 
clause,  the  Guncho  shall  communicate  the  circumstances  to  the 
Chocho  or  Soncho  of  the  place  where  the  person  concerned  is  residing, 
and  shall  cause  the  duplicate  copy  to  be  corrected  accordingly. 

A  new  electoral  list  shall  be  compiled  whenever  a  natural  calamity 
or  any  other  unavoidable  circumstance  may  require  it. 

The  compilation  of  the  electoral  list  according  to  the  foregoing 
clause  and  the  date  and  also  the  date  and  duration  for  placing  the 
list  for  public  inspection  and  for  settling  it  shall  be  determined  by 
order. 

CHAPTER  IV. VOTING  AND  VOTING  PLACE 

Article  XXVIII. — The  date  of  a  general  election  shall  be  deter- 
mined by  Imperial  Ordinance  and  shall  be  proclaimed  at  least  thirty 
days  beforehand. 

Article  XXIX. — Election  shall  be  done  by  voting. 

In  voting  one  elector  shall  vote  for  one  person  only. 

Article  XXX. — The  voting  place  shall  be  opened  in  a  City  or  a 
Town  or  a  Village  Office  or  in  some  other  place  appointed  by  the 
voting  overseer  with  the  approval  of  the  local  Governor. 

Article  XXXI. — A  voting  overseer  shall  proclaim  to  the  voting 
district  at  least  five  days  previous  to  the  date  of  election  the  locality 
of  the  voting  place  placed  under  his  management. 

Article  XXXII. — The  Guncho  or  the  Shicho  shall  nominate 
not  less  than  three  and  not  more  than  five  voting  witnesses  from 
among  the  electors  of  the  voting  district  under  his  management,  and 
the  notice  of  the  nomination  shall  be  sent  to  the  persons  nominated 
at  least  three  days  previous  to  the  day  of  election,  requesting  them 
to  attend  the  voting  place  on  that  day. 

(4<>9) 


go  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

The  witnesses  can  not  decline  their  nomination  without  proper 
reasons. 

Article  XXXIII. — The  voting  place  shall  be  opened  at  7  o'clock 
a.  m.  and  be  closed  at  6  o'clock  p.  m. 

Article  XXXIV. — On  the  day  of  election,  electors  shall  come 
in  person  to  the  voting  place  and  vote,  after  identifying  themselves 
as  the  persons  whose  names  are  in  the  electoral  list  and  after  affixing 
their  seals  to  it. 

In  case  a  voting  overseer  cannot  identify  a  person  who  is  about 
to  vote,  he  shall  require  him  to  declare  on  oath  his  proper  identity. 
When  this  declaration  is  not  made,  such  person  shall  not  be  allowed 
to  vote. 

Article  XXXV. — The  ballots  shall  be  given  to  each  elector  at 
the  voting  place  on  the  day  of  voting. 

Article  XXXVI. — Every  elector  shall,  at  the  voting  place,  him- 
self inscribe  upon  the  ballot  the  name  of  the  person  he  wishes  to 
vote  for,  and  shall  put  the  paper  into  the  ballot-box. 

An  elector  must  not  write  his  name  on  the  ballot. 

Article  XXXVII. — No  person,  other  than  those  entered  in  the 
electoral  list,  shall  be  capable  of  voting.  Should,  however,  any  one 
come  to  the  voting  place  on  the  day  of  election,  bringing  with  him 
a  writ  of  decision  entitling  him  to  have  his  name  entered  on  the 
electoral  list,  the  voting  overseer  shall  allow  him  to  vote. 

Article  XXXVIII. — Whenever  a  person  entered  in  the  electoral 
list  does  not  possess  the  right  of  election,  such  person  cannot  vote. 

The  foregoing  clause  applies  to  those  persons  who  cannot  them- 
selves write  the  names  of  the  persons  they  wish  to  vote  for. 

Article  XXXIX. — The  voting  overseer  shall,  on  consulting  the 
voting  witnesses,  decide  whether  or  not  to  allow  the  voting. 

In  case  an  elector  of  a  Cho  or  Son  on  whom  the  decision  mentioned 
in  the  foregoing  clause  has  been  made  is  dissatisfied  with  it,  the  voting 
overseer  shall  provisionally  allow  him  to  vote. 

For  a  vote  mentioned  in  the  foregoing  clause  the  elector  shall  be 
made  to  put  it  in  an  envelope  and  to  seal  it  and  to  place  it  in  the 
ballot-box  after  superscribing  his  own  name  on  the  envelope. 

For  an  elector  of  a  Cho  or  Son  objected  to  by  any  of  the  persons 
mentioned  in  clause  1  of  this  article,  the  provisions  of  clause  2  of 
this  article  shall  apply. 

Article  XL. — When  the  time  for  closing  the  polls  arrives,  the 

(410) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  gi 

voting  overseer  shall  declare  the  fact  and  close  the  entrance  of  the 
voting  place;  and  shall  close  the  ballot-box  as  soon  as  the  electors 
present  in  the  voting  place  have  finished  voting.  After  the  shutting 
of  the  ballot-box,  no  voting  shall  be  allowed. 

Article  XL  I. — The  voting  overseer  shall  keep  minutes  of  the 
voting,  in  which  are  to  be  entered  all  matters  relating  to  the  voting 
and  to  which  he  shall  put  his  signature  as  shall  also  the  witnesses. 

Article  XLII. — In  the  case  of  a  Cho  or  Son  the  voting  overseer 
shall,  in  company  with  one  or  more  witnesses,  send,  not  later  than 
the  day  following  that  of  election,  the  ballot-box,  the  minutes 
of  the  voting  and  the  electoral  list  to  the  counting  overseer. 

Article  XLII  I. — In  the  case  of  an  island  or  other  place  whence 
it  is  impossible,  owing  to  imperfect  means  of  communication,  to  send 
the  ballot  box  within  the  time  mentioned  in  the  preceding  article, 
the  local  Governor  may  fix  a  convenient  date  for  voting  and  cause 
the  ballot-box,  minutes  of  the  voting,  and  the  electoral  list  to  be 
sent  by  the  time  of  counting  the  votes. 

Article  XLIV. — When  owing  to  natural  calamity  or  other  un- 
avoidable circumstances  it  is  found  to  be  impossible  to  carry  out  the 
voting  or  it  is  necessary  to  take  a  new  vote,  the  voting  overseer  shall 
give  notice  to  that  effect  to  the  Chairman  of  Election.  In  such  case 
the  Chairman  of  Election  shall  cause  the  voting  to  be  carried  out  by 
fixing  a  new  date.  The  date,  however,  shall  be  proclaimed  in  the 
voting  district  at  least  five  days  beforehand. 

Article  XLV. — In  the  case  where  two  or  more  members  are 
to  be  elected  simultaneously  in  one  and  the  same  electoral  district, 
the  provisions  of  Article  XXIX  and  XXXVI  shall  be  applied  irre- 
spective of  the  nature  of  the  election. 

Article  XL VI. — No  person  is  under  obligation  to  state  the  name 
of  a  person  voted  for  to  any  person. 

CHAPTER   V. CONTROL    OF    VOTING    PLACES 

Article  XLVII. — The  voting  overseer  shall  maintain  order  at 
the  voting  place  and  may,  in  case  of  necessity,  ask  the  interference 
of  police  officials. 

Article  XLVII  I. — With  the  exception  of  the  electors,  persona 
attending  to  the  business  of  the  voting  place,  officials  who  are  au- 
thorized to  oversee  the  voting  place  and  police  officials,  no  person  is 
allowed  to  enter  the  voting  place. 

(4») 


92 


CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 


Article  XLIX. — When  at  the  voting  place  any  person  makes 
speeches,  engages  in  discussion  or  causes  an  uproar,  or  holds  a  con- 
ference or  uses  persuasion  as  to  voting,  or  otherwise  disturbs  the 
order  of  the  voting  place,  the  voting  overseer  shall  caution  him,  and, 
if  the  caution  is  disregarded,  shall  cause  him  to  leave  the  voting  place. 

Article  L. — A  person  who  has  been  compelled  to  leave  a  voting 
place  in  accordance  with  the  foregoing  article,  may  be  allowed  to 
vote  at  the  end  of  the  voting;  but  this  rule  may  not  be  adhered  to 
when  the  voting  place  has  been  closed. 

CHAPTER  VI. COUNTING  OF   BALLOTS   AND   COUNTING-OFFICE 

Article  LI. — Subject  to  the  approval  of  a  Gun  or  Shi  Office 
or  of  the  local  Governor,  a  counting  office  shall  be  established  at  a 
place  appointed  by  the  counting  overseer. 

Article  LI  I. — The  counting-overseer  shall  proclaim  the  counting- 
office  beforehand. 

Article  LIII. — The  local  Governor  shall  nominate  in  each  count- 
ing district  not  less  than  three  and  not  more  than  seven  counting 
witnesses  from  among  the  electors  in  the  district,  and  shall  cause 
them  to  attend  the  counting.  However  the  voting  witnesses  may  act 
as  counting  witnesses  in  a  Shi. 

A  counting  witness  may  not  resign  his  nomination  without  proper 
causes. 

Article  LIV. — The  counting-overseer  shall  open  in  the  presence 
of  the  witnesses  the  ballot-box  on  the  day  following  that  of  its 
arrival  in  the  case  of  a  Gun,  and  on  the  day  following  that  of  election 
in  the  case  of  a  Shi,  and  shall  count  the  total  number  of  ballots 
and  that  of  voters. 

Article  LV. — When  the  counting  mentioned  m  the  preceding 
article  has  been  finished,  the  counting-overseer  shall  next  examine 
the  votes  coming  under  clause  2  and  clause  4  of  Article  XXXIX  and 
shall  decide  as  to  their  acceptability  on  consulting  the  opinion  of 
the  counting  witnesses. 

The  counting-overseer  shall  mix  the  ballots  of  the  various  vot- 
ing places  and  shall  sort  the  ballots. 

Article  LVI. — The  electors  are  entitled  to  request  to  be  permitted 
to  inspect  the  counting  at  the  respective  offices. 

Article  LVII. — The  validity  of  ballots  shall  be  decided  by  the 
counting-overseer  on  consulting  the  opinion  of  the  counting  witnesses. 

(4") 


No.  3]  ,  APPENDIX  93 

Article  LVIII. — The  following  ballots  shall  be  void: — 

1.  Those  for  which  a  regular  ballot  has  not  been  used. 

2.  Those  on  which  the  names  of  two  or  more  persons  voted  for 
are  entered. 

3.  Those  on  which  the  names  of  a  person  voted  for  can  not 
be  deciphered. 

4.  Those  on  which  the  name  of  a  person  who  has  no  qualifica- 
tion for  election  is  inscribed. 

5.  Those  on  which  words  other  than  the  name  of  the  person 
voted  for  are  written.  This  rule  does  not  apply  to  those 
on  which  the  official  rank,  profession,  class,  residence  or 
honorincs  are  entered. 

Article  LIX. — Ballots  shall  be  sorted  into  those  that  are  valid  and 
those  that  are  void  and  shall  be  preserved  by  the  respective  count- 
ing-overseers during  the  tenure  of  office  of  the  members. 

Article  LX. — The  counting-overseer  shall  keep  minutes  of  count- 
ing, in  which  shall  be  recorded  all  matters  relating  to  the  counting, 
and  shall,  after  affixing  his  signature  and  those  of  the  counting  wit- 
nesses, preserve  them  together  with  the  voting  minutes  during  the 
tenure  of  office  of  the  members. 

Article  LXI. — When  the  examination  of  ballots  has  been  finished 
the  counting-overseer  shall  at  once  report  the  result  to  the  Chairman 
of  Election. 

Article  LXI  I. — The  provisions  of  Article  XLIV  shall,  with 
the  exception  of  the  proviso,  be  applied  correspondingly  to  counting. 

Article  LXI  1 1. — For  the  control  of  counting  offices  the  pro- 
visions of  Chapter  V  shall  be  applied  correspondingly. 

CHAPTER  VII. ELECTION    MEETING 

Article  LXIV. — The  election  meeting  shall  be  held  at  the  place 
and  on  the  date  appointed  by  the  Chairman  of  Election,  to  examine 
the  returns  mentioned  in  Article  LXI. 

When  the  counting  returns  mentioned  in  Article  LXI  have  been 
received  in  the  case  where  a  new  election  has  been  held  owing  to  the 
invalidation  of  a  portion  of  the  election,  the  Chairman  of  Election 
shall  summon  an  election  meeting  and  shall  examine  anew  the  said 
returns  together  with  those  forwarded  by  the  other  counting-overseers. 

Article  LXV. — The  Chairman  of  Election  shall  previously  pro- 
claim the  place  and  date  of  the  election  meeting. 

(413) 


94  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

Article  LXVI. — The  Chairman  of  Election  shall  nominate  from 
among  the  electors  of  the  different  election  districts  not  less  than 
three  and  not  more  than  seven  election  witnesses  and  shall  summon 
them  to  attend  the  election  meeting  on  the  day  when  it  is  held,  by 
giving  notice  of.  the  day  of  the  meeting  to  the  said  witnesses  at  least 
three  days  beforehand. 

An  election  witness  cannot  resign  the  nomination  without  proper 
reasons. 

Article  LXVI  I. — The  Chairman  of  Election  shall  keep  minutes 
of  the  election,  in  which  shall  be  recorded  all  matters  relating  to  the 
election  meeting,  and  shall  preserve  them  together  with  the  returns 
mentioned  in  Article  LXI,  during  the  tenure  of  office  of  the  members, 
after  affixing  his  signature  and  those  of  the  witnesses. 

Article  LXVIII. — The  electors  may  request  admission  to  the 
election  meeting  of  their  respective  election  districts. 

Article  LXIX. — For  the  control  of  the  place  of  the  election  meet- 
ing the  provisions  of  Chapter  V  shall  be  applied. 

CHAPTER  VIII. ELECTED  PERSONS 

Article  LXX. — The  individual  who  has  obtained  a  relative  ma- 
jority of  the  total  number  of  valid  ballots  shall  be  declared  the 
elected  person.  However  the  number  of  ballots  obtained  shall  not 
be  less  than  one-fifth  of  that  obtained  by  dividing  the  total  number 
of  the  electors  entered  in  the  electoral  list  by  the  fixed  number  of 
members  to  be  returned  from  the  district. 

When  an  elected  person  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause  either 
declines  the  election  or  dies  previous  to  the  issue  of  the  notice  of  elec- 
tion ;  or  when  his  election  has  been  invalidated  in  consequence  of  his 
having  been  punished  for  an  offence  committed  in  connection  with  the 
election  either  before  or  after  the  issue  of  the  notice  of  election;  or 
when  the  election  has  been  invalidated  by  his  having  been  disqualified 
for  election,  the  vacancy  shall  be  filled  from  among  those  who  ob- 
tained ballots  as  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause  but  who  were 
not  declared  elected,  the  selection  to  be  made  according  to  the 
relative  majority  of  ballots  obtained. 

Besides  the  cases  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause,  when  it  is 
found  necessary  according  to  the  issue  of  a  suit  either  about  election 
or  about  returns,  the  elected  person  shall  be  decided  anew  according 
to  the  precedents  mentioned  in  the  present  Article. 

The  provisions  of  Article  VII  shall  also  be  applied  to  cases  coming 
under  the  preceding  two  clauses. 

(4M) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  95 

In  deciding  an  elected  person  according  to  the  present  article,  when 
the  number  of  ballots  is  equal,  the  individual  who  is  the  senior  in 
point  of  birth  shall  be  elected,  and  when  they  are  both  of  the  same 
age,  it  shall  be  decided  by  drawing  lots. 

Article  LXXI. — When  the  elected  person  has  been  decided,  the 
Chairman  of  Election  shall  at  once  communicate  the  fact  to  the  per- 
son concerned. 

Article  LXXI  I. — Upon  the  receipt  of  notice  of  election,  men- 
tioned in  the  preceding  article,  every  elected  person  shall  communi- 
cate to  the  Chairman  of  Election  whether  he  accepts  or  not. 

One  and  the  same  person  cannot  accept  the  election  of  several 
different  election  districts. 

Article  LXXI  1 1. — Those  elected  persons  shall  be  considered  to 
have  declined  their  election  who  have  not  made  the  communication 
of  acceptance  within  twenty  days  from  the  day  on  which  they  re- 
ceived notice  of  election. 

Article  LXXIV. — In  case  there  is  no  elected  person,  the  local 
Governor  shall  fix  the  date  and  shall  carry  out  a  new  election,  pro- 
claiming previously  the  date  therefor. 

In  case  the  number  of  persons  elected  does  not  come  up  to  the  re- 
quired number,  the  local  Governor  shall,  in  conformity  with  the 
precedent  mentioned  in  the  preceding  article,  cause  an  election  to  be 
held  to  fill  up  the  deficiency  in  the  number. 

The  rules  of  the  preceding  two  clauses  shall  also  apply  when  an 
elected  person  is  lacking  for  a  cause  coming  under  clauses  2  and  3 
of  Article  LXX, 

An  election  mentioned  in  the  present  article  may  not  be  held 
during  the  period  allowed  for  filing  a  suit  mentioned  in  Articles 
LXXX  and  LXXXII,  or  till  the  settlement  of  judgment  in  a  case 
where  a  suit  has  been  filed. 

Article  LXXV. — When  an  elected  person  has  accepted  his  elec- 
tion, the  local  Governor  shall  at  once  give  him  a  certificate  of  election, 
and  publish  his  name  throughout  the  extent  of  his  jurisdiction,  at 
the  same  time  reporting  thereon  to  the  Minister  of  State  for  Home 
affairs. 

Article  LXXVI. — When  owing  to  a  suit  either  about  election 
or  about  returns,  either  the  one  or  the  other  has  been  invalidated; 
or  when  after  the  issue  of  a  certificate  of  election  the  election  has  been 
invalidated  as  a  result  of  punishment  for  an  offence  committed  rela- 

(4i5) 


g&  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Yol.  VI 

tive  to  election,  the  local  Governor  shall  cancel  the  certificate  of  elec- 
tion and  shall  publish  the  fact  throughout  the  extent  of  his  juris- 
diction. 

CHAPTER  IX. TERM  OF  MEMBERSHIP  AND  SUBSTITUTIONAL  ELECTIONS 

Article  LXXVII. — The  term  of  membership  shall  be  four  years 
from  the  date  of  a  general  election.  Even  when  the  term  expires 
during  a  sitting  of  the  Imperial  Diet,  the  members  shall  remain  on 
duty  till  the  close  of  the  session. 

Article  LXXVII  I. — When  a  vacancy  occurs  among  Members 
within  one  year  from  the  date  of  a  general  election,  such  case  shall 
be  dealt  with  in  conformity  with  the  precedents  mentioned  in  Article 
LXX. 

When  in  a  case  mentioned  in  the  preceding  article  there  is  no  elected 
person,  or  when  a  vacancy  occurs  among  Members  after  the  expira- 
tion of  one  year  from  the  date  of  a  general  election,  the  local  Gov- 
ernor shall,  in  accordance  with  the  order  of  the  Minister  of  State 
for  Home  Affairs,  carry  out  a  substitutional  election  within  twenty 
days  from  the  day  on  which  he  received  the  said  order. 

The  date  of  a  substitutional  election  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
clause  shall  be  notified  beforehand  by  the  local  Governor. 

Article  LXXIX. — A  member  elected  by  substitutional  election 
shall  remain  on  duty  during  the  remainder  of  the  term  of  his  pre- 
decessor. 

CHAPTER  X. LAW  SUITS  ABOUT  ELECTIONS  AND  ABOUT  RETURNS 

Article  LXXX. — An  elector  who  entertains  an  objection  to  the 
validity  of  the  election  may  institute  a  suit  against  the  Chairman  of 
Election  in  a  Court  of  Appeal  within  thirty  days  from  the  day  of 
the  election. 

Those  who  are  dissatisfied  with  the  judgment  of  the  said  Court 
may  make  an  appeal  to  the  Court  of  Cassation  for  revision. 

Article  LXXX  I. — When  the  provisions  for  election  are  violated, 
the  Court  of  Law  shall  declare  the  election  void  either  in  toto  or  in 
part,  only  in  case  such  violation  is  judged  liable  to  affect  the  issue 
of  returns. 

In  regard  to  a  law  suit  about  returns,  when  the  election  is  judged 
to  come  under  the  foregoing  clause,  the  Court  of  Law  shall  also 
declare  the  election  void  either  in  toto  or  in  part. 

Article   LXXXII. — When   a  person   who   has  lost   an  election 

(416) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  gj 

questions  the  validity  of  the  election  of  the  elected  person  in  the 
election  district,  he  may  institute  a  suit  in  a  Court  of  Appeal  against 
the  elected  person,  within  thirty  days  from  the  day  of  the  notifica- 
tion of  the  name  of  the  elected  person  as  mentioned  in  Article 
LXXV.  However,  when  a  law  suit  is  instituted  on  the  ground  that 
the  requirement  provided  in  the  proviso  of  clause  1,  Article  LXX  has 
been  acquired,  such  suit  shall  be  made  against  the  Chairman  of 
Election,  and  shall  be  instituted  within  thirty  days  from  the  day  of 
notification  mentioned  in  Article  LXX IV. 

Those  who  are  dissatisfied  with  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Appeal  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clause  may  bring  an  appeal  to  the 
Court  of  Cassation  for  revision. 

Article  LXXXIII. — In  trying  a  suit  about  election  or  about 
returns  a  Court  shall  require  the  Public  Procurator  to  attend  the 
proceedings. 

Article  LXXXIV. — When  a  suit  about  an  election  or  about 
returns  has  been  decided  in  a  Court,  a  copy  of  the  judgment  shall 
be  sent  to  the  Minister  of  State  for  Home  Affairs;  and  when  the 
Imperial  Diet  is  in  session,  another  copy  shall  be  sent  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Article  LXXXV. — The  plaintiff  shall,  simultaneously  with  the 
filing  of  his  petition,  deposit  as  security  in  the  Court  three  hundred 
yen  in  cash  or  Public  Bonds  of  equal  value. 

In  case  the  judgment  has  been  given  against  the  plaintiff,  should  he 
fail  to  pay  the  whole  amount  of  the  legal  costs  within  seven  days  from 
the  day  on  which  the  judgment  was  settled,  the  security  money  shall 
be  appropriated  for  the  purpose,  and  should  there  still  remain  any 
deficiency,  the  required  amount  shall  be  charged  to  the  plaintiff. 

CHAPTER  XI. PUNITIVE   RULES 

Article  LXXXVI. — Any  person,  who  has  effected  by  fraudulent 
process  the  insertion  of  his  name  in  the  electoral  list,  or  who  has 
made  a  false  declaration  in  the  case  of  clause  2,  Article  XXXIV, 
shall  be  liable  to  a  fine  of  not  less  than  ten  yen  and  of  not  more 
than  fifty  yen. 

Article  LXXXVII. — Any  person,  who  has  committed  whether 
prior  or  subsequent  to  the  election  an  act  coming  under  any  of  the 
following  items,  shall  be  sentenced  to  minor  confinement  without 
hard  labor  for  not  less  than  one  month  and  not  more  than  one  year, 
or  to  pay  a  fine  of  not  less  than  ten  yen  and  not  more  than  one 
hundred  yen : — 

(4i7) 


98  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN  [Vol.  VI 

1.  When  in  connection  with  an  election,  money,  goods,  notes 
or  other  presents,  or  public  or  private  employment  have  been 
given,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  an  elector  or  to  a  can- 
vasser, or  when  promised  to  be  given ;  or  when  persuasion  has 
been  used  either  to  accept  the  said  articles  or  benefit  or  to 
accept  the  promise  of  giving  them,  or  when  the  said  articles 
or  benefit  have  been  accepted  or  their  acceptance  has  been 
promised. 

2.  When  in  connection  with  an  election  persons  have  been  enter- 
tained with  liquors  or  food  or  with  amusements,  under  what- 
ever pretexts  or  in  whatever  forms,  or  when  such  entertain- 
ment has  been  enjoyed ;  or  when  ships,  vehicles,  or  horses 
have  been  furnished  for  conveying  persons  to  or  from  a  place 
of  election  meeting  or  place  for  counting  ballots  or  voting 
place,  or  when  such  facilities  of  conveyance  have  been  ac- 
cepted; or  when  traveling  expenses  or  expenses  incurred  in 
lodging  or  in  taking  rest  have  been  paid  for  other  persons 
or  when  persons  have  got  such  expenses  paid  for  them  by 
others;  or  when  promise  has  been  given  to  persons  to  make 
such  payment  for  them  or  when  such  promise  has  been  ac- 
cepted from  others. 

3.  When,  in  connection  with  an  election,  irrigation,  tenancy, 
credit,  contribution  and  other  matters  of  interest  relating  to 
an  elector  or  to  a  shrine,  temple,  school,  company,  guild  or  a 
civic  corporation  related  to  an  elector  have  been  taken  ad- 
vantage of  in  persuading  an  elector;  or  when  an  elector  has 
complied  with  persuasion  of  this  kind. 

In  any  case  mentioned  in  the  preceding  clauses,  the  articles  received 
shall  be  confiscated  and  those  already  spent  shall  have  their  value 
collected. 

Article  LXXXVIII. — Those  who  come  under  any  of  the  follow- 
ing items  shall  be  sentenced  to  minor  confinement  without  hard  labor 
for  not  less  than  two  months  and  not  more  than  two  years,  with  a 
fine  of  not  less  than  five  yen  and  not  more  than  one  hundred  yen. 

1.  When,  in  connection  with  an  election,  an  elector  is  subjected 
to  an  act  of  violence  or  to  intimidation,  or  when  he  is 
abducted. 

2.  When  the  convenience  of  passage  of  an  elector  is  obstructed, 
or  when,  by  fraudulent  means,  either  the  exercise  of  the  right 
of  election  is  interfered  with  or  an  elector  is  caused  to  vote. 

(418) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX  qq 

3.  When,  in  connection  with  an  election,  irrigation,  tenancy, 
credit  or  other  matters  of  interest  relating  to  an  elector  or  to 
a  shrine,  temple,  school,  company,  guild  or  a  civic  corpora- 
tion related  to  an  elector  have  been  taken  advantage  of  as 
means  of  persecuting  an  elector. 

Article  LXXXIX. — When  a  Government  official,  employee,  wit- 
ness or  overseer  connected  with  election  business  has  shown  to  per- 
sons the  names  of  persons  voted  for  by  electors,  he  shall  be  sentenced 
to  minor  confinement  without  hard  labor  for  not  less  than  two  months 
and  not  more  than  two  years,  with  a  fine  of  not  less  than  five  yen 
and  of  not  more  than  one  hundred  yen.  This  rule  applies  even 
when  the  facts  shown  are  incorrect. 

Article  XC. — When,  without  any  justifiable  cause,  any  person 
has  either  at  a  voting  place  or  a  counting  place,  interfered  with 
the  voting  of  an  elector  or  has  put  into  practice  any  device  calculated 
to  get  the  knowledge  of  the  name  of  a  person  voted  for,  he  shall  be 
sentenced  to  minor  confinement  without  hard  labor  for  not  less  than 
one  month  and  not  more  than  one  year,  or  to  pay  a  fine  of  not  less 
than  ten  yen  and  not  more  than  one  hundred  yen. 

The  foregoing  clause  shall  apply  to  a  person  who,  without  follow- 
ing the  provisions  of  the  laws  and  regulations,  has  opened  a  ballot- 
box  or  has  taken  out  ballots  from  a  ballot-box. 

Article  XCI. — Whoever  has  done  violence  to  a  voting  overseer, 
counting  overseer,  Chairman  of  Election,  witnesses,  or  election  over- 
seer, or  has  disturbed  a  place  of  election  meeting,  a  counting  place 
or  a  voting  place ;  or  detains,  damages,  or  plunders  ballots  or  ballot- 
boxes,  shall  be  sentenced  to  minor  confinement  without  hard  labor 
for  not  less  than  four  months  and  not  more  than  four  years. 

Whoever  has  committed  an  offence  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
clause  by  assembling  a  crowd  for  the  purpose,  shall  be  liable  to  be 
sentenced  to  imprisonment  with  hard  labor;  whoever  has  knowingly 
joined  such  a  crowd  to  add  to  its  influence,  shall  be  liable  to  minor 
confinement  without  hard  labor  for  not  less  than  one  month  and  not 
more  than  five  years. 

Article  XCI  I. — Whoever  has  assembled  a  crowd  for  the  purpose 
of  intimidating  an  elector,  a  person  who  has  offered  himself  for 
election,  or  his  canvasser;  or  of  disturbing  a  place  of  election  meet- 
ing, a  counting  place,  or  a  voting  place ;  or  of  detaining,  damaging, 
or  plundering  the  ballots,  ballot-boxes  or  other  documents  relating 
to  the  election,  shall  be  liable  to  be  sentenced  to  hard  confinement 

(419) 


IOO  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN         [Vol.  VI 

without  hard  labor  for  not  less  than  six  months  and  not  more  than 
three  years.  Whoever  has  knowingly  joined  such  a  crowd  to  add 
to  its  influence  shall  be  liable  to  minor  confinement  without  hard 
labor  for  not  less  than  fifteen  days  and  not  more  than  three  months. 

When  the  offender  has  carried  any  of  the  articles  mentioned  in 
Article  XCIII,  one  degree  shall  be  added  to  the  principal  punishment. 

Article  XCIII. — When  an  elector,  a  person  who  has  offered  him- 
self for  election,  or  a  canvasser  carries,  in  connection  with  election, 
fire-arms,  spear  or  halberd,  sword  or  dagger,  pointed  bamboo,  blud- 
geon, or  other  weapons  capable  of  killing  or  injuring  persons,  he  shall 
be  liable  to  minor  confinement  without  hard  labor  for  not  less  than 
two  years  or  to  a  fine  of  not  less  than  five  yen  and  of  not  more  than 
two  hundred  yen. 

A  police  official  or  gendarme  may,  whenever  it  is  judged  neces- 
sary, seize  any  of  the  articles  mentioned  in  the  foregoing  clause. 

Article  XCIV. — Whoever  enters  a  place  of  election  meeting, 
counting  place,  or  voting  place  carrying  any  of  the  articles  mentioned 
in  the  preceding  article  shall  be  liable  to  be  dealt  with  according 
to  the  provisions  of  the  foregoing  article,  with  one  degree  added  to 
the  punishment. 

Article  XCV. — Whoever,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  display 
in  connection  with  an  election,  assemblies  a  crowd,  causes  a  pro- 
cession to  parade,  or  makes  use  of  fire-works,  bonfires  or  torch- 
lights j  or  beats  a  bell  or  drum  or  sounds  a  conch  or  bugle ;  or  makes 
use  of  a  flag  or  a  similar  object  of  display ;  or  commits  similar  acts 
disregarding  the  warning  of  police  officials,  shall  be  liable  to  minor 
confinement  for  not  less  than  fifteen  days  and  not  more  than  six 
months,  or  to  a  fine  of  not  less  than  five  yen  and  not  more  than  one 
hundred  yen. 

Article  XCVI. — Whoever,  with  the  object  of  making  other  per- 
commit  any  of  the  acts  mentioned  in  Articles  LXXXIX  to  XCV, 
instigates  them  by  means  of  speeches,  newspapers,  magazines,  cir- 
culars, placards  or  in  any  other  form,  shall  be  liable  to  be  dealt  with 
according  to  the  provisions  of  the  respective  Articles.  In  the  case 
of  a  newspaper  or  a  magazine  the  person  registered  as  editor  shall 
be  dealt  with. 

Article  XCVI  I. — Whoever,  with  the  object  of  preventing  the 
election  of  another  person,  has  published  false  information  agai»st 
a  person  who  has  offered  himself  for  election,  by  means  of  speeches, 
newspapers,  magazines,  circulars,  placards  or  by  any  other  means 

(420) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX-  : 


IOI 


whatever,  shall  be  liable  to  minor  confinement  for  not  less  than 
six  months,  with  a  fine  of  not  less  than  fifty  yen.  The  proviso  of  the 
preceding  article  shall  apply  to  a  newspaper  or  a  magazine. 

Article  XCVIII. — Any  person  who  has  voted  without  being  an 
elector  himself,  or  who  has  voted  by  fraudulently  assuming  the  name 
of  another  person,  shall  be  liable  to  minor  confinement  without  hard 
labor  for  not  less  than  one  month  and  not  more  than  two  years,  with 
a  fine  not  less  than  ten  yen  and  not  more  than  one  hundred  yen. 

Article  XCIX. — Should  a  witness  fail  to  discharge  any  of  the 
duties  mentioned  in  the  present  Law  without  any  justifiable  reason, 
he  shall  be  punished  with  a  fine  of  not  less  than  five  yen  and  of  not 
more  than  fifty  yen. 

Article  C. — In  case  any  of  the  offences  mentioned  in  Clause  II, 
Article  XCII,  Articles  XCIII  and  XCIV  have  been  committed,  the 
article  found  on  the  person  of  an  offender  shall  be  confiscated. 

Article  CI. — Should  an  elected  person  have  been  punished  for 
committing  an  offence  in  connection  with  his  election,  his  election 
shall  be  void. 

Article  CI  I. — Any  person  who  has  been  punished  for  an  offence 
committed  in  connection  with  an  election,  shall  be  forbidden  to 
exercise  the  right  to  vote  and  to  be  elected  for  a  period  of  time  not 
less  than  two  years  and  not  more  than  eight  years  from  the  ex- 
piration of  the  term  of  the  punishment  as  determined  by  declaration 
of  the  Court  of  Law. 

Article  CI II. — For  an  offence  punishable  according  to  the  pres- 
ent Law  six  months  shall  be  considered  as  the  term  of  prescription. 

CHAPTER  XII. SUPPLEMENTARY  RULES 

Article  CIV. — Expenses  relating  to  an  election  shall  be  fixed  by 
Imperial  Ordinance. 

Article  CV. — With  regard  to  a  law  suit  connected  with  an 
election,  the  Court  of  Law  shall  at  once  give  trial  irrespective  of 
the  order  of  filing  of  other  suits. 

Article  CVI. — In  Towns  and  Villages  where  the  Law  for  the 
Organization  of  Towns  and  Villages  is  not  in  force,  the  functions 
of  the  Chocho  or  the  Soncho  mentioned  in  the  present  Law  shall  be 
taken  charge  of  by  the  Kocho  (Headman)  or  an  official  correspond- 
ing in  his  function  to  the  Kocho. 

In  localities  where  a  Toshi  (Governor  of  Island)  is  on  duty,  the 

(421) 


IQ2  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN       [Vol.  VI 

functions  of  the  Guncho  mentioned  in  the  present  Law  shall  be 
taken  charge  of  by  the  Toshi;  where  there  is  no  Toshi,  an  official 
corresponding  in  his  function  to  the  Toshi  shall  take  charge  of  the 
said  functions. 

For  the  municipalities  of  Tokyo,  Kyoto,  and  Osaka  the  Shi  men- 
tioned in  the  present  Law  shall  correspond  to  Ku,  the  Shicho  to 
Kucho,  and  the  Shiyakusho  to  Kuyakusho. 

Article  CVII. — When  the  witnesses  do  not  attend  the  appointed 
place  in  time,  or  when  the  required  quorum  is  lacking  in  the  course 
of  the  function,  a  voting  overseer,  counting  overseer,  or  Chairman 
of  Election  may  nominate  provisionally  the  required  number  of 
witnesses  from  among  the  electors. 

Article  CVII  I. — With  regard  to  law  suits  relating  to  an  elec- 
toral list  and  to  law  suits  about  elections  or  about  returns,  they  shall 
be  dealt  with  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Civil  Pro- 
cedure, with  the  exception  of  all  those  cases  specially  provided  in  the 
present  Law. 

Article  CIX. — The  kinds  of  the  direct  national  taxes  mentioned 
in  the  present  Law  shall  be  determined  by  Imperial  Ordinance. 

Article  CX. — Whenever  the  provisions  of  the  present  Law  are 
judged  inapplicable  to  a  case  occurring  in  Hokkaido  and  Okinawa, 
special  provisions  may  be  provided  by  Imperial  Ordinance. 

CHAPTER  XIII. APPENDED   RULES 

Article  CXI. — The  present.  Law  shall  be  put  in  force  from  the 
next  General  Election.  However  for  Hokkaido  (excepting  the 
urban  districts  of  Sapporo,  Hakodate,  and  Otaru)  and  Okinawa,  the 
date  of  enforcement  shall  be  specially  determined  by  Imperial 
Ordinance. 

Article  CXI  I. — Only  for  the  compilation  of  electoral  lists  neces- 
sary for  the  Election  of  Members  for  the  first  time  according  to  the 
present  Law,  the  dates  and  period  mentioned  in  Articles  XVIII 
to  XX,  Articles  XXIV,  XXVI,  and  XXVII,  may  be  specially  de- 
termined by  Imperial  Ordinance.  The  said  lists  shall  remain  valid 
till  the  day  on  which  the  electoral  lists  for  the  next  year  are  settled. 
[List  of  Electoral  Districts  omitted] . 

(422) 


No.  3]  APPENDIX 


103 


VI.  THE  IMPERIAL  HOUSE  LAW 


It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  reproduce  in  full  the  Imperial  House 
Law,  promulgated  at  the  same  time  as  the  Constitution;  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  pick  out  a  few  of  the  most  important  points.1 

A  large  number  of  the  articles  (in  all  LXII  in  number)  deal  with 
the  personal  affairs  and  relations  of  the  Imperial  Family.  It  is 
perfectly  natural  that,  according  to  Article  XXXV, 

The  members  of  the  Imperial  Family  shall  be  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  Emperor. 

Marriages  of  the  members  of  the  Imperial  Family  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  the  sanction  of  the  Emperor  (Article  XL). 
No  member  of  the  Imperial  Family  can  adopt  any  one  as  his 
son   (Article  XLII). 

When  a  member  of  the  Imperial  Family  wishes  to  travel  beyond 
the  boundaries  of  the  Empire,  he  shall  first  obtain  the  sanction 
of  the  Emperor  (Article  XLIII). 

A  female  member  of  the   Imperial   Family  who  has  married 
a  subject  shall  be  excluded  from  the  membership  of  the  Im- 
perial Family  (Article  XLIV). 
Article  I  says: 

The  Imperial  Throne  of  Japan  shall  be  succeeded  to  by  male 
descendants  in  the  male  line  of  Imperial  Ancestors. 
Article  II  specifies  that 

The  Imperial  Throne  shall  be  succeeded  to  by  the  Imperial 
eldest  son. 
Articles   III-IX  specify  very  particularly  the  line  of  succession 
in  case  there  is  no  Imperial  eldest  son,  or  grandson,  or  any  descend- 
ant, or  Imperial  brother  or  his  descendants,  or  Imperial  uncle  or  his 
descendants.     It  is  well  provided  that  there  shall  be  no  break  in 
the  line,  so  that,  as  is  stated  in  the  Preamble,  "  Our  House  shall  be 
founded  in  everlasting  strength  and  its  dignity  be  forever  maintained." 
Article  XI  directs  that 

The  ceremonies  of  coronation  shall  be  performed  and  a  Grand 
Coronation  Banquet  shall  be  held  at  Kyoto. 

In  accordance  with  that  article,  the  present  Emperor  was  officially 
crowned  in  Kyoto  in  November,  1915. 

1  Translation  by  Satoh. 

(423) 


104  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPERIALISM  IN  JAPAN      [Vol.  VI 

Article  XII  reads  as  follows: 

Upon  an  ascension  to  the  throne,  a  new  era  shall  be  inaugur- 
ated, and  the  name  of  it  shall  remain  unchanged  during  the 
whole  reign. 
Accordingly,  when  the  present  Emperor  ascended  the  throne  in 
1912,  the  Meiji  era  gave  way  to  the  Taisho  era,  or  Era  of  Great 
Righteousness. 

The  Emperor,  the  Imperial  eldest  son  (Crown  Prince)  and  the 
Imperial  grandson  attain  their  majority  at  the  age  of  eighteen;  but 
all  other  members  of  the  Imperial  Family  do  not  attain  their  ma- 
jority till  the  age  of  twenty. 

The  Emperor,  the  Grand  Empress-Dowager,  the  Empress- 
Dowager  and  the  Empress  are  to  be  addressed  as  "  Majesty"  (His, 
Her,  or  Your)  ;  while  all  other  members  of  the  Imperial  Family 
are  to  be  addressed  as  "Highness"   (His,  Her,  or  Your). 

(424) 


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